Disclosure of executive remuneration in large banks by Schott, Max
i 
 
Universität Hohenheim 
 
Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 
 
Institut für Betriebswirtschaftslehre 
 
Lehrstuhl für Bankwirtschaft und Finanzdienstleistungen 
 
Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of  
Executive Remuneration 
 in Large Banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
 
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften (Dr. oec.) 
 
an der Fakultät für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Max Schott 
 
aus Stuttgart 
 
 
 
 
2008 
i 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 15.12.2008  
 
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Jochen Streb 
 
Berichterstatter, 1. Prüfer:        Prof. Dr. Hans-Peter Burghof 
Mitberichterstatter, 2. Prüfer:   Prof. Dr. Dirk Hachmeister 
Mitberichterstatter, 3. Prüfer:   Prof. Dr. Christian Ernst 
 
 
i 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 1 
PART I   AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF DISCLOSURE RULES AND THEIR EXECUTION 7 
1 Introduction 8 
2 The case for disclosure of executive remuneration 9 
3 Examples: disclosure of the largest banks in six countries 13 
3.1 Japan, the Mizuho Financial Group: an unpaid lip service 13 
3.2 The US, Citigroup: the giant archetype 14 
3.3 Switzerland, UBS: the Swiss federal discreetness 15 
3.4 France, Credit Agricole S.A.: stuck in the middle 15 
3.5 United Kingdom, HSBC: the role model 16 
3.6 Germany, Deutsche Bank: tentative, yet a big step forward 16 
4 Hypotheses on relations of the disclosure of executive remuneration 17 
4.1 Legal systems and corporate governance 17 
4.2 Bank-centered versus market-centered systems 20 
4.3 The size and integration of capital markets 21 
5 Data and the construction of the transparency index 22 
6 Descriptive statistics 25 
6.1 Results of the estimation of the country and banks proxy of disclosure of executive 
remuneration 26 
6.2 Reconciliation: compliance with the legal framework 28 
6.3 Observations of disclosure habits and peer group behavior problems 30 
6.3.1 Introduction 30 
6.3.2 Inmate’s dilemma 31 
6.3.3 Fortress’ dilemma 34 
7 Testing the hypotheses: regression analysis 35 
8 Conclusion 40 
ii 
 
PART II  DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION BY THE 245 LARGEST LISTED BANKS 
OF THE WORLD AND THE IMPACT ON THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL AND/OR 
STOCK PERFORMANCE  
1 Introduction 44 
2 Information risk and the cost of equity capital 44 
3 Research design and methodological approach 50 
4 Data analysis: impact of transparency 52 
4.1 Transparency investment strategy: long/short spreads 52 
4.2 Stock performance: Sharpe ratio 54 
4.2.1 Definition and hypotheses 54 
4.2.2 One-factor regression analysis 57 
4.3 Cost of equity capital: P/E ratios 59 
4.3.1 Definitions and hypotheses 59 
4.3.2 Tackling two structural deficits of the P/E ratio 61 
4.3.3 Incorporating different earnings possibilities for each country 63 
4.3.4 One-factor regression analysis 65 
4.3.5 Multi-factor regression analysis 67 
4.3.6 Endogeneity concerns 70 
4.3.7 Criticism of the interpretation of adjusted data 71 
4.3.8 Alternative regressions with only deficiency-adjusted P/E 72 
4.3.9 Bank’s P/E positions in relation to the average country P/E and the bank proxy 73 
4.4 Investor’s confidence: Tobin’s q 76 
4.4.1 Definition and calculation of Tobin’s q 76 
4.4.2 One-factor regression analysis 81 
4.4.3 Multi-factor regression analysis 82 
4.4.4 Endogeneity concerns 84 
5 Conclusion 85 
iii 
 
PART III DISCLOSURE OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION BY THE LARGEST LISTED BANKS OF 
THE WORLD AND THE IMPACT ON ABNORMAL STOCK RETURNS   
1 Introduction 90 
2 Theory and hypotheses 90 
3 Research design and methodological approach 94 
3.1 Estimation of the abnormal stock return 94 
3.1.1 One-factor model: Sharpe’s CAPM 96 
3.1.2 Three-factor model: small-minus-big and high-minus-low 99 
3.1.3 Four-factor model: momentum 100 
3.2 Data and time-series considerations 103 
4 Data analysis: disclosure and abnormal returns 105 
4.1 Bank-by-bank time-series regressions 105 
4.2 Rolling bank-by-bank time-series regressions 110 
4.3 Portfolio regressions 115 
4.3.1 Portfolio regression with two extreme portfolios 115 
4.3.2 Portfolio regressions with nine systematic portfolio setups 117 
5 Conclusion 124 
CONCLUSIONS/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 127 
APPENDICES 129 
REFERENCES 141 
CURRICULUM VITAE 156 
iv 
 
v 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Part I 
Table I.1: Elements of disclosure and their weights in disclosure proxy ................................................ 23 
Table I.2: Four groups of country disclosure .............................................................................................. 26 
Table I.3: Actual bank’s disclosure proxy ..................................................................................................... 27 
Table I.4: Peer group dilemmas, database .................................................................................................... 33 
Table I.5: OLS estimates with country proxy as dependent variable (30 observations, without 
Singapore) .................................................................................................................................................. 37 
Table I.6:  Legal environment and market size effect factor loadings .................................................... 38 
Table I.7: OLS regression estimates with bank disclosure proxy as dependent variable  ................... 39 
Part II 
Table II.1: Long/short spread results for the five portfolios ................................................................... 53 
Table II.2: Regression results of SD of Sharpe ratios on number of banks per country  ................... 56 
Table II.3: Banks Sharpe ratios per country ................................................................................................. 57 
Table II.4: Sharpe ratio one-factor country regression. ............................................................................. 58 
Table II.5: Sharpe ratio one-factor bank regression ................................................................................... 59 
Table II.6: Market capitalization premium to the book capital - high outliers. ..................................... 62 
Table II.7: Market capitalization premium to the book capital - negative outliers. .............................. 62 
Table II.8: Deficiency-adjusted P/E one-factor regression results (country-level) .............................. 65 
Table II.9: Interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E one-factor regression results (country-level). ...... 66 
Table II.10: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on individual banks and country 
disclosure proxies ..................................................................................................................................... 67 
Table II.11: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on individual banks disclosure 
proxies and the control variables. ......................................................................................................... 69 
Table II.12: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on instrumented individual banks 
disclosure proxies and the control variables ....................................................................................... 71 
Table II.13: Regressions with the only deficiency-adjusted country P/E ratios of national stock 
indexes on country disclosure proxies and the two country control variables ............................ 73 
Table II.14: Regression of the difference between individual bank P/E ratios and country stock 
market index P/E ratios on individual bank proxy and control variables. ................................... 74 
Table II.15: Regression banks P/E on banks proxy with Japan dummy. .............................................. 76 
Table II.16: Regression result of bank Tobin’s qs on bank P/E ratios .................................................. 78 
vi 
 
Table II.17: Tobin’s qs of banks per country .............................................................................................. 80 
Table II.18: One-factor OLS regression results of Tobin’s qs on average bank and country proxy at 
country level .............................................................................................................................................. 81 
Table II.19: One-factor regression results of Tobin’s qs on bank and country proxy......................... 82 
Table II.20: Results of the GLS multi-factor regression of individual bank Tobin’s qs on individual 
bank proxy and control variables. ......................................................................................................... 83 
Table II.21: 2SLS regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable on instrumented individual 
bank disclosure proxies and the control variables. ............................................................................ 85 
Part III 
Table III.1: Summary statistics for alphas estimated as intercepts from bank-by-bank time-series 
regressions ............................................................................................................................................... 106 
Table III.2: Bivariate regressions of alphas calculated in the four multi-factor specifications on 
bank’s disclosure proxy at the bank-by-bank level. ......................................................................... 108 
Table III.3: Bivariate regressions of the arithmetic means of alphas per country calculated in the 
four multi-factor models on the country-level disclosure proxy .................................................. 109 
Table III.4: Multivariate regressions of alphas calculated in the four multi-factor model 
specifications on bank proxy, total assets, leverage, asset growth and capital market 
integration. .............................................................................................................................................. 110 
Table III.5: Summary statistics for rolling alphas estimated as intercepts from bank-by-bank time-
series regressions calculated in the four multi-factor model specifications ................................ 111 
Table III.6: Bivariate regressions of rolling alphas calculated in the four multi-factor model 
specifications on the bank’s disclosure proxy on the individual bank-by-bank level. .............. 112 
Table III.7: Bivariate regressions of the arithmetic means of rolling alphas per country calculated in 
the four multi-factor model specifications on the country-level disclosure proxy .................... 113 
Table III.8: Multivariate regressions of banks’ individual rolling alphas calculated in the four multi-
factor model specifications on bank proxy, total assets, leverage, asset growth and capital 
market integration .................................................................................................................................. 114 
Table III.9: Excess abnormal monthly stock returns (alpha high-low) of the two extreme portfolios 
of banks with highest and lowest disclosure..................................................................................... 116 
Table III.10: Alternative portfolio constructions ...................................................................................... 118 
Table III.11: Abnormal monthly stock returns (alpha) of an investment strategy that is long in 
stocks of banks with highest disclosure and short in stocks of banks with lowest disclosure 
with 9 different portfolio allocations. ................................................................................................ 119 
vii 
 
Table III.12: The 10 portfolios setup. Difference of the abnormal mean monthly stock returns 
(alpha high-low) of the High minus the Low portfolio .................................................................. 123 
viii 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF DIAGRAMS 
Part I 
Diagram I.1: Reconciliation of banks and country disclosure .................................................................. 28 
Diagram I.2: Relationship between banks’ average disclosure proxy and proxy’s standard deviation 
within countries ........................................................................................................................................ 34 
Part II 
Diagram II.1: Only deficiency-adjusted average country P/E to country proxy .................................. 72 
Diagram II.2: Bivariate scatterplot of individual bank’s disclosure proxy vs. difference between 
bank and country P/E ratios ................................................................................................................. 75 
Part III 
Diagram III.1: Difference of the monthly mean abnormal stock returns between HIGH- and LOW 
portfolios in relation to the number of portfolios ........................................................................... 120 
x 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF VARIABLES AND INDICES 
rightsdiranti --  Proxy variable reflecting the magnitude and quality of the overall 
corporate governance rules of a country 
)( gbdravg  The 10-year government bond return of all 29 countries (average 
weighted by the number of the banks per country) 
b , i  Indices representing a bank 
badjpe  The deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of a bank 
bpe  The P/E ratio of a bank. 
bproxy  The disclosure proxy of a bank 
cinadjpe  Variable equaling the difference between an individual bank’s P/E 
ratio and the P/E ratio of its home country’s national stock market 
index 
cpe  The P/E ratio of the stock market index of a country 
cproxy  The disclosure proxy of a country 
  Error term  
finsys  Financial system dummy variable, distinguishes between banks located 
in countries with a bank-based system and banks domiciled in 
countries with market systems 
grassets  Growth proxied by book value of total assets over the years 2003 and 
2004 
grprofit  Proxy variable for growth rate of profits, measured as the relative 
difference between a bank’s pretax profits from 2003 to 2004 
badjpeir -  The interest rate and deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of bank 
cadjpeir -  The interest-rate and deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of  a country  
j  Index representing a country 
leverage  The leverage of a bank per the end of the fiscal year 2004; it is proxied 
by the total debt to total assets 
lnassets  Total assets variable (in USD), reflecting the size of each bank as 
measured by the sum of the total assets of the balance sheet as of 2004 
(where available - otherwise as of 2003) 
mcapgnp  Variable estimating the magnitude of the capital market integration of a 
country; it is the share of a country’s stock market capitalization of the 
country’s GNP  
xii 
 
mcapusd  Variable representing the size of a bank; the size is assessed by the 
stock market capitalization of common equity as of the end of 2004 
Momentum  Estimates momentum effects 
gbdr  The 10-year government bond return (price and coupon) of the 
respective country of a bank 
rf  The return of a risk free asset; it is created as a world risk free rate by 
forming the arithmetic average of the monthly returns of all risk free 
assets in the respective 29 countries in which the 191 banks in the 
portfolio are located 
rmsci  The monthly return of the world stock market index MSCI 
rp  The return of the banks’ equally weighted stocks in the portfolio in the 
particular month, assessed by the percentage difference of the stock 
prices to the stock prices of the previous month 
R  Stock return 
fR  Risk-free return 
SD  Standard deviation 
Sh  The Sharpe ratio 
t  Index representing a month 
tobinq  The value of the Tobin’s q of a bank 
xiii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Abs. Sh. average Sharpe ratio of banks per country
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
APT arbitrage pricing theorem
BEA Bank of East Asia
CAPM capital asset pricing theorem
CEO chief executive officer
GLS generalized least squares
GNP gross national product
HSBC Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
ICGN International Corporate Governance Network
KOSPI Korea Composite Stock Price Index
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International
MTFG Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OLS ordinary least squares
P/E price-earnings
SD standard deviation
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SLS stage least squares
SMFG Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
UBS biggest Swiss bank; abbreviation originated from Union Bank of 
Switzerland, a predecessor firm of UBS 
UK United Kingdom
US(A) United States (of America)
USD US dollar 
z-val results of regressions with normalized variables (z-transformation)
 
xiv 
 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Among bankers, it is popular to say that at the end of each day, the most important asset leaves the 
firm and re-enters it the next morning. This idea mirrors the considerable importance of the 
executive officer in finance and banking, as opposed to non-banking businesses, where patents, 
production facilities and the like traditionally play a larger role. However, this pithy saying also 
mirrors the values that leading bankers worldwide receive as compensation. Whether the level in 
individual cases or at large is fair or not, there certainly is a good case for the disclosure of executive 
pay. 
Executive remuneration lies at the center of the principal-agent issue. As capital markets all over the 
world are evolving into highly integrated instruments of public wealth, business policies of 
individual companies should aim at sustaining and enlarging shareholder value. Managerial staff is 
trusted with far-reaching responsibilities to determine and execute those policies. Remuneration is 
perhaps the most effective means of aligning the actions of the executive officer with the interests 
of the shareholder, provided that the nexus of task, performance and pay is appropriately designed.  
However, performance-oriented executive remuneration suffers from inherent design defects, as 
Ferrarini and Moloney (2004) point out. Two major difficulties trouble the two common proxies 
for firm performance, i.e., share price and share options. Connecting pay and share price may 
increase the danger that management inflates earnings and manages disclosure so as to generate 
short-term share price increases. The use of stock options may pose four potentially damaging risks 
for deepening agency costs: dilution, repricing and the impact of options on dividend policy and 
the influence on the risk management.  
Seen from the shareholder’s perspective, performance-oriented executive pay raises additional 
questions. First, as for the design, remuneration schemes are not devised by outside owners but 
insiders, i.e., through a remuneration committee as a subcommittee of the board. Second, boards 
may become passive or captured by management and thus poorly incentivized to bargain for 
optimal incentive remuneration for a variety of reasons: board dynamics, which often result in 
deference and politeness towards the chief executive, social ties and conflicts of interests.  
Outside owners have but one powerful means of influencing boards as well as remuneration 
committees: their investment decisions. To use this instrument properly, they rely on information 
about the remuneration of executives. If information is provided in full detail, shareholders can 
assess whether the board is negotiating and monitoring effectively at arm’s length. Also, disclosure 
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requirements prompt the board to justify pay choices and the disclosure of the pay-setting process 
can also enhance the accountability of the remuneration committee.  
In the light of these considerations, it may come as a surprise that, on the global scale, there is no 
consensus on the disclosure issue whatsoever. Many important countries have not enacted any kind 
of disclosure regulation. Japan, home to the second largest capital market in the world, is a case in 
point. But even in countries where the disclosure of CEO remuneration is mandatory, pay is often 
camouflaged. What makes monitoring difficult is the complexity and opacity of pay packages. For 
instance, a comprehensive table of total compensation, including salary, bonus, equity grants, 
accumulated deferred compensation plans, pension plans, perks, tax benefits and the like, usually 
does not exist. This is especially true in countries where the disclosure issue is still evolving and 
emotional public debates tend to prevail while serious structural discussions are rare. 
In many cases, executives - and even shareholders - are not willing to disclose anything about 
remuneration beyond what they might be obliged to by law. Disclosure may contribute to an 
escalation of compensation precisely because it adds transparency to a domain figured by one-
upmanship, also called the ratcheting effect (Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Disclosure can heighten 
social resentments in ways that constrain optimal compensation arrangements (Romano 2001). 
From the perspective of the executive, disclosure also exposes deep cultural divides as to the 
primacy of personal privacy in pay. In conclusion, however, none of these three observations may, 
can nor should defer clear and comprehensive disclosure enactment. Disclosure brings another 
dimension to the process, raising the ideas of accountability, explanation, and justification to 
shareholders. The benefits of greater shareholder activism from disclosure must be weighed against 
populist and political reactions to high executive pay.  
In the first part of this thesis, the disclosure rules concerning executive remuneration and their 
respective execution on the individual firm’s level will be quantified, analyzed and compared on an 
international level. Two main issues will be addressed: First I will determine whether and how 
elements of the legal environment alongside the market size of the respective countries explain the 
extent of countries’ disclosure requirements. Second, I will look at how individual banks actually 
disclose against the background of those elements and rules. I will give an introductory overview of 
literature on executive compensation disclosure and cultural and regulatory issues involved. 
Hypotheses on the determinants of differences in disclosure standards are developed. I expect the 
magnitude of disclosure levels to depend on the type of legal tradition in a country (common versus 
civil law), its law origin (French, Scandinavian, German or English), the type of its financial system 
(market-based versus bank-based), the strength of shareholder rights the country’s legislation grants 
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as well as capital market size and the degree of capital market integration. After the construction of 
the disclosure proxy, the metric for the quality of executive pay disclosure, I measure disclosure 
both at countries’ level of disclosure rules and at individual banks’ magnitude of executive 
remuneration disclosure. The results of testing the hypotheses from descriptive statistics will be 
presented. Also, the reconciliation of the individual banks’ compliance with the legal framework 
will be analyzed. In addition, a regression analysis will be conducted. The regression models involve 
country-level variables, and explain both country-level disclosure standards anchored in national 
legislation and country averages of disclosure quality achieved by the banks in the sample.  
While supporters of executive information disclosure often argue the case from the perspective of 
the interested public, I think that there is an aspect to the subject that should be appealing to the 
shareholder and the executive officer alike. Good executive information disclosure creates a win-
win situation. For shareholders, the question of executive remuneration disclosure is part of the 
information risk associated with their investment in a company. Less knowledge means higher, 
better knowledge lower information risk. The former translates into higher, the latter into lower 
risk premiums demanded by investors. In this respect, the shareholder’s and the executive’s 
interests concur: While the investor is interested in a reduction of risk, managerial staff seeks to cut 
the cost of equity capital. In the literature, there is plenty of evidence that information disclosure 
lowers investment risks and hence reduces capital costs and/or improves stock performance. With 
this in mind it seems surprising that an analogous relationship between executive remuneration 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital has not been surveyed separately as of yet. The issue is if 
one could generate significant statistic evidence in support of the hypothesis that better executive 
remuneration disclosure leads to reduced cost of equity capital and/or a better stock performance. 
After providing an overview of the literature on the relationship between information disclosure 
activities as well as other elements of corporate governance and the cost of equity capital, the 
methodological approach is described and possible criticism is discussed. Thus, in part two, I 
employ practitioners’ methods to assess absolute values of cost of equity capital and risk premiums. 
Four common proxies for either stock performance, volatility and/or cost of equity capital will be 
analyzed: long/short spreads, Sharpe ratios, price-earnings ratios, and Tobin’s qs. 
In part three, the remaining question is addressed: Does better transparency of the complex 
executive remuneration contracts result in potential abnormal stock returns for the shareholders? 
Does better transparency of executive remuneration explain better relative stock performance, 
proxied by the abnormal stock returns, which will be controlled for stock volatility, size and book-
to-market ratio effects and potential short-term underreactions to information, i.e. the momentum 
effect. I assert that the better the executive remuneration disclosure is, the higher the abnormal 
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stock returns will be. Moreover, firms domiciled in countries that demand comprehensive and 
detailed disclosure by issuing and enforcing consequent disclosure enactment might display 
potentially positive abnormal stocks returns in contrast to firms located in countries with lax 
disclosure requirements. With regard to the estimation of possible abnormal stock returns, I refer 
to the four-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Cahart (1997). That is, the absolute 
stock returns will be controlled for the price of the four risk factors: volatility (Scharpe 1964), size 
and book-to-market ratio effects (Fama and French 1993) and potential short-term underreactions 
to information (i.e. the momentum effect; Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Investors do not like bridal 
veils, but want to know the exact nature of the nexus of individual performance, firm profitability 
and absolute pay level to which their funds are devoted. So the inherent reasons for possible and 
positive abnormal stock returns in case of good transparency might derive from higher absolute 
stock performance and/or lower stock price volatility with regard to the four risk factors. Thus, in 
part three, the relevant theory will be explicated and the hypotheses will be formulated. After 
outlining the research design and methodological approach, the method of the estimation of the 
abnormal stock return is explained and discussed. The data analysis that extensively tests the 
hypotheses is comprised. 
The overall conclusion at the end of this thesis summarizes the most important and significant 
findings. 
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Part I 
Disclosure of  
Executive Remuneration  
in Large Banks 
 
An international comparison of disclosure rules  
and their execution 
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1 Introduction 
This first part of my thesis contributes to the body of corporate governance studies by quantifying 
and analyzing (a) the magnitude of executive remuneration disclosure of the world’s 245 largest 
exchange-listed banks and (b) the disclosure rules and regulations in the 31 countries in which these 
banks are domiciled. Two main issues will be addressed: First I will determine whether and how 
elements of the legal environment alongside the market size of the respective countries explain the 
extent of countries’ disclosure requirements. Second, I will look at how individual banks actually 
disclose against the background of those elements and rules.   
Section 2 gives an introductory overview of the literature on executive compensation disclosure and 
cultural and regulatory issues involved. I note both the lack of international consensus on the 
necessity of disclosure regulation and ample leeway for executives in countries that did enact some 
kind of mandatory disclosure to camouflage parts of their pay in less transparent forms. Section 3 
contains brief examples of disclosure enactment of the six largest banks of the world. It will be 
interesting to see whether those banks exhibit a similarly high level of disclosure against the 
background of their commonly high importance for the global financial markets. 
In section 4, hypotheses on the determinants of differences in disclosure standards are developed. I 
expect the magnitude of disclosure levels to depend on the type of legal tradition in a country 
(common versus civil law), its law origin (French, Scandinavian, German or English), the type of its 
financial system (market-based versus bank-based), the strength of shareholder rights the country’s 
legislation grants as well as capital market size and the degree of capital market integration. In 
section 5, the construction of the disclosure proxy, my metric for the quality of executive pay 
disclosure, is discussed. I measure disclosure both at countries’ level of disclosure rules and at 
individual banks’ magnitude of executive remuneration disclosure.  
Section 6 presents the results of testing the hypotheses formulated in section 4 that I obtained from 
descriptive statistics. Also, the reconciliation of the individual banks’ compliance with the legal 
framework will be analyzed. In section 7 I conduct a regression analysis. The regression models 
involve country-level variables, and I attempt to explain both country-level disclosure standards 
anchored in national legislation and country averages of disclosure quality achieved by the banks in 
the sample. Section 8 concludes. 
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2 The case for disclosure of executive remuneration 
The need for good corporate governance arises from the fundamental problem of the separation of 
principals (the shareholders) and agents (the executives). Modern academic literature on corporate 
governance starts with the work of Berle and Means (1932). The contractual nature of the firm and 
the principal-agent problem, as Berle and Means describe it, leads to the development of the agency 
approach to corporate finance. They argue that, in practice, managers of a firm pursue their own 
interests rather than the interests of shareholders and that, due to information asymmetries, agents 
tend to expropriate principals. Controlling insiders not only have the ability, but also the incentive 
to expropriate outside investors (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Given that certain owners have better means of influencing the managers than others, La Porta et 
al. (2000, 4) define corporate governance as: “to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by any insiders”. If the firm is controlled 
by the management itself, corporate governance helps solve a principal agent conflict between the 
management and the shareholder. In case that the firm is controlled by majority shareholders, it 
deals with a two-stage principal agent conflict between management, controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders. 
Two types of mechanisms are supposed to resolve the resulting two sets of conflicts between 
owners and managers, and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The first 
type consists of internal mechanisms: ownership structure, transparency and control of executive 
compensations, input from boards of directors, and requirements for financial disclosure. The 
second consists of external mechanisms: the external takeover market, the legal infrastructure, and 
the protection of minority shareholders (Banks 2004). Thus, corporate governance consists of 
many different and heterogeneous elements, and an overall evaluation of its quality is not easy to 
achieve (Bai et al. 2003, Black 2001, Black et al. 2005, Beiner et al. 2004, Gompers et al. 2003, 
Klapper and Love 2004). 
Modern principal agent theory clusters around incentive schemes for agents that are optimal in the 
sense that they maximize the principals’ utility (Kutta and Radner 1994, Haubrich 1991, 
Mookherjee 1984, Conyon and Schwalbach 1999). With regard to executive remuneration, this 
approach has had a strong impact on business practice. Large components of the managers’ salary 
were made dependent on certain performance measures, and stock market firms construed stock 
option plans to better incentivize their top management (Abowd 1990, Jensen and Murphy 1998, 
Wallace 1997). On the empirical side, several studies deal with the pay for performance-sensitivity 
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to find out if managers did, on average, obtain the right incentives to maximize shareholder value 
(Zhou and Swan 2003), whereas theoretical papers are looking for the incentive-compatible 
compensation schemes, i.e., compensation schemes that lead to an optimal behavior of the 
managers with regard to the maximization of the firm value (Diamond and Verrecchia 1982, Zhou 
1999). 
However, remuneration schemes are not designed by outside owners but insiders, e.g., through a 
remuneration committee as a subcommittee of the board. Thus, the publishing of the chosen 
remuneration scheme is important. It contains a commitment of those insiders that they are going 
to follow the goals implied with this incentive scheme. Furthermore, outside owners have no 
means of exerting influence on the management or other insiders’ behavior directly. Their only 
alternative is to exit and abstain from financing the firm if they are not content with its 
management. To use this instrument properly, they rely on information, particularly about the 
remuneration of the executives, to know what the incentives had been in the past and what to 
expect in this respect for the future. 
Ferrarini and Moloney (2005) note that executive pay raises a number of problems with respect to 
design, governance and disclosure. Performance pay suffers from inherent design defects that 
damage the performance link. Two major design difficulties trouble the two common proxies for 
firm performance, i.e., share price and share options. Connecting pay and share price may increase 
the danger that management inflates earnings and manages disclosure so as to generate short-term 
share price increases. The use of stock options may pose four potentially damaging risks for 
deepening agency costs: dilution, repricing and the impact of options on dividend policy and risk 
management. Thus, shareholders require detailed information on remuneration packages, including 
the stock options programs. The latest mutation of managerial rent extraction is the payment of 
dividend on phantom shares (Bloomberg 2006), which occurred in the US.  
The effectiveness of the incentive contract therefore depends on adequate monitoring by 
independent directors and, ultimately, by shareholders. Directors or boards respectively may 
become passive or captured by management and thus poorly incentivized to bargain for optimal 
incentive remuneration for a variety of reasons: board dynamics, which often result in deference 
and politeness towards the chief executive, social ties and conflicts of interests. Effective 
governance therefore depends on effective disclosure. Disclosure requirements prompt the board 
to justify pay choices, and the disclosure of the pay-setting process can also enhance the 
accountability of the remuneration committee. If full information is provided about pay packages 
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and their relationship to performance, shareholders can assess whether the board is negotiating 
effectively at arm’s length and can initiate appropriate action (Ferrarini et al. 2004). 
Consequently, the OECD principles of corporate governance stress that “ … the corporate 
governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters,” and among these material matters “ … remuneration policy for members of the board 
and key executives and information about board members, including their qualifications, the 
selection process, other company directorships and whether they are regarded as independent by 
the board.“ (OECD 2004, chapter V). However, this principle does not specify what exactly the 
firms should or have to disclose to comply with it. 
Why would firm insiders want to disclose their remuneration to outside owners? The central 
argument is that it might reduce capital costs. Although the relationship between a company’s 
capital costs and the quality of its respective disclosure of executive remuneration has not yet been 
surveyed separately, there is plenty of evidence that good corporate governance reduces capital 
costs and/or improves stock performance (Drobetz et al. 2003, Black et al. 2005, Beiner et al. 2004, 
Gompers et al. 2003). The better the information is disclosed, the more the parameter uncertainty 
and estimation risk is reduced (Barry and Brown 1985). Disclosure reduces information 
asymmetries and hence lowers the risk premium of investors. Lombardo and Pagano (1999) argue 
that disclosure simply reduces out-of-pocket costs borne by investors for the procurement of 
information. 
McKinsey (2002) conducted an extensive survey among global institutional investors, finding that 
corporate governance remains of great concern to institutional investors, that, in fact, corporate 
governance is at the heart of investment decisions. Institutional investors state that they still put 
corporate governance on a par with financial indicators. An overwhelming majority of investors are 
prepared to pay a premium for companies exhibiting high governance standards. Premiums 
averaged 12-14% in North America and Western Europe; 20-25% in Asia and Latin America; and 
over 30% in Eastern Europe and Africa. Therefore, financial disclosure is a pivotal concern. 
Specific policy priorities include strengthening shareholder rights. Moreover, Gallagher et al. (2005) 
confirm that fund managers indeed monitor executive compensation. 
Many investors do think that spiraling CEO pay has become dangerously detached from 
performance (Eisinger 2005, Bebchuk and Fried 2004). Thus, the requirement that each 
shareholder individually assess the appropriateness of the nexus of performance and pay on a 
regular, institutionalized basis should be obvious and apparent. Furthermore, Selbach, chair of the 
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ICGN Executive Remuneration Committee in 2005, notes that “Executive remuneration practices 
are at the heart of good governance. I have observed that corporations that have developed 
transparent, well-defined processes for these decisions tend also to have strong governance 
structures overall. Conversely, poor remuneration practices are often symptomatic of less than 
optimal corporate governance“ (ICGN 2005). Thus, the degree of disclosure of remuneration is an 
important indicator for the general attitude of the management towards the interest of the outside 
owners.  
In contrast to these findings, in many cases, executives - and even shareholders - are not willing to 
disclose anything about the remuneration of the board beyond what they might be obliged to by 
law. I identify three major arguments that might justify this behavior: First, from the perspective of 
shareholders, disclosure of executive remuneration may contribute to an escalation of 
compensation precisely because it adds transparency to a domain figured by one-upmanship, also 
called the ratcheting effect. High levels of top executive compensation have triggered an intense 
debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressure for managerial 
services or from managerial overreaching. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that current 
remuneration levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking and not by arm’s-length 
bargaining designed to create an optimum pay and performance nexus.  
Second, disclosure can heighten social resentments in ways that constrain optimal compensation 
arrangements. Thus, remuneration committees may be vulnerable to public pressures and respond 
by adopting suboptimal compensation structures (Romano 2001). The differences in the 
magnitudes of the disclosure appear to be correlated with two variables: ownership concentration 
and the strength of social democracy, inversely related to each other. Where ownership 
concentration is high, individualized disclosure provides fewer benefits because large blockholders 
can control managerial rent extraction. Where social democracy is strong, more disclosure may 
increase resentment against high compensation packages and lead to suboptimal arrangements 
from the shareholder’s perspective. The examples of the UK with high disclosure and Germany 
with low disclosure are instructive (Ferrarini et al. 2004). 
Third, from the perspective of the executive, disclosure also exposes deep cultural divides as to the 
primacy of personal privacy in pay. The public, predominantly shareholders, is concerned about 
executive compensation, not only in terms of the presumed disconnect between pay and 
performance, but also on the absolute level, especially in relation to other social frames of value. 
The public’s reaction to high levels of compensation is not necessarily proportionate to the average 
shareholder’s concern. 
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In conclusion, however, none of these three observations may, can nor should defer clear and 
comprehensive disclosure enactment. By contrast, a culture that proves that superior performance 
is clearly disclosed and properly explained should not trigger resentment. Disclosure brings another 
dimension to the process, raising the ideas of accountability, explanation, and justification to 
shareholders. The benefits of greater shareholder activism from disclosure must be weighed against 
populist and political reactions to high executive pay.  
Internationally there is no consensus on whether the lack of a sufficient voluntary disclosure 
requires a regulatory intervention on the disclosure issue. Thus, many countries have not enacted 
comprehensive disclosure regulations. But even in countries where the disclosure of executive 
remuneration is mandatory, pay is often camouflaged. In fact, the complexity and opacity of pay 
packages make monitoring difficult. For instance, a comprehensive table of total compensation, 
including salary, bonus, equity grants, accumulated deferred compensation plans, pension plans, 
perks, tax benefits and the like usually does not exist.  
3 Examples: disclosure of the largest banks in six countries 
Before entering into a systematic analysis of both disclosure rules and practice with regard to 
executive remuneration, I provide a first impression of the high degree of diversity in this field 
through the description of the disclosure practice of the largest bank of Japan, the US, Switzerland, 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. The rank order results from the size of the 
total assets per the end of 2004 in USD. The fact that all these banks compete on the same 
international capital markets stresses the importance of the differences between the countries with 
regard to the regulatory, institutional and cultural setting.  
3.1 Japan, the Mizuho Financial Group: an unpaid lip service 
In 2004, Mizuho Financial Group was the world’s largest bank in terms of total assets. Hence, one 
tends to assume that in terms of its disclosure practices, the bank will aspire to world standards, and 
in fact, the annual report of 2004 (Mizuho 2004, 148) promises “voluntary, proactive disclosure“ 
for “customers, shareholders, and investors both in and outside Japan in a timely, fair and 
appropriate manner in order that they may form accurate judgments and appraisals of the group.” 
However, the voluminous annual report from 2004 contains no information about the directors’ 
remuneration at all. The same concentration on pure lip service holds for, e.g., the Mitsubishi 
Tokyo Financial Group (MTFG 2004) or the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG 2004). 
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Further enquiries met with the unofficial statement that there was no disclosure, and, considering 
how bad the performance of the publicly listed Japanese banks had been, that this was not such a 
bad decision either. 
3.2 The US, Citigroup: the giant archetype 
Citigroup, the second largest bank of the world in terms of total assets, however five times the 
market capitalization of the Mizuho Financial Group and number one in that category (The Banker 
2004), employs about 330,000 people in more than 100 countries and has performed tremendously 
successfully during the last years with regard to profit and growth. It dedicates almost half of its 117 
page core annual report 2004 to the issue of corporate governance (Citigroup 2004). On 17 pages, 
Citigroup clearly and extensively describes the directors’ remuneration. Shareholders and the public 
are informed about the stock ownership of board members, the base salary, discretionary incentive 
and retention awards, deferred compensation and retirement benefits, employment agreements and 
severance arrangements, change in control payments, the talent development and succession 
planning, the executive performance plan, retirement plans, debts to the firm, and any other 
perquisites and personal benefits to the executives or even their spouses. Finally, Citigroup 
enumerates the values of granted options by a “grant present day value“, using the binominal 
option pricing model. The underlying assumptions of the model are fully displayed. Most of the 
remuneration components mentioned above are presented in several compensation tables.  
Observers from other countries might be impressed not only by the minuteness of the report, but 
also by the sheer number and complexity of the different components of remuneration, and, of 
course, by the impressive magnitude of the compensation. Citibank declares that its compensation 
philosophy is to choose competitive compensation levels to attract and retain high performing 
executives, assuming implicitly that these could earn just as much in other banks. Furthermore, 
compensation is to a high degree performance oriented. However, Citibank states that 
“performance should be based on a broad mix of factors rather than focussing on a single metric 
so as to avoid encouraging focus on one performance measure at the expense of others,“ which, 
although sensible in itself, certainly does not subserve transparency. Finally, the report does not 
contain a synopsis combining all remuneration parts in one sheet, or a performance balance or 
objective achievement balance for each chief executive to make transparent why he did receive a 
certain remuneration package. Thus, outside owners receive plenty of information, but will have 
difficulties to draw their own substantiated conclusions from it.  
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3.3 Switzerland, UBS: the Swiss federal discreetness 
Within the 60 pages of the 2004 annual report of UBS (UBS 2004), corporate governance is 
addressed on only 4 pages. UBS records the compensation for senior executives as a total sum only, 
remaining unspecific to whether this comprises the “Group Executive Board“ or another circle of 
recipients. Assuming that the number mentioned refers to the group executive board, and further 
assuming that the pensions paid to former senior executives are not included and that the chief 
executive receives 1.5 times the remuneration of his board colleagues - a commonly used rule of 
thumb -, then the CEO should have been paid about 14 million USD, his colleagues around 9.5 
million USD. However, the balance of executive targets and achievement as well as any details 
about the remuneration packages remain missing. UBS assures the reader that “the approval of 
senior executive compensation and the design of senior executive compensation schemes are 
subject to a rigorous process“, and, moreover, that “no one has any approval authority for his or 
her own compensation“ (UBS 2004, 33). Thus, investors are asked to blindly trust the internal 
control mechanism.  
More information can be found in a separate compensation report published in the 2004/05 
handbook as a separate report. This contains a lot of general statements about, e.g., compensation 
frameworks, market pay practices, superior compensation for superior performance and the use of 
equity-based awards. However, solid data which actually interests shareholders, i.e., precise and 
specific facts and figures, cannot be detected. Some details about the relation of fixed to variable 
remuneration and about stock option awards are revealed. Compared to the corporate governance 
and disclosure practices of, e.g., Citigroup, the UBS disclosure significantly lacks transparency. 
3.4 France, Credit Agricole S.A.: stuck in the middle 
After its acquisition of Credit Lyonnais, Credit Agricole became the largest banking group in 
France, with 43 regional banks, all strongly anchored in their respective geographical area. Credit 
Agricole stresses the principle of decentralization, which might reduce the relative importance of 
the central management, and probably its ability to draw rents from the firm. 
Of the 208 pages of the annual report 2004 of Credit Agricole (Credit Agricole 2004), about 18 
pages are devoted to corporate governance, four of them are about officers’ compensation. The 
chairman points out that “the Financial Security Act requires all listed companies to provide a 
report on their corporate governance and internal control systems“ (88). Thus, Credit Agricole 
simply wants to comply with an obligation and does not aim at satisfying shareholders’ needs in the 
first place. 
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On page 98, Credit Agricole reports the fixed and performance-related compensation and the stock 
options of the chief and deputy executive. More details about the composition of those payments 
are not provided, and further information on any other remuneration components is missing. If the 
listed pay of the CEO were complete, its value would be just around one tenth of the 
compensation of the CEOs of UBS or Citigroup. 
3.5 United Kingdom, HSBC: the role model 
Headquartered in London, HSBC is one of the largest banking and financial services organizations 
in the world with activities in 77 different countries. It has a tremendous tradition as an 
internationally active bank with a strong focus on East Asia. Of HSBC’s annual report for 2004 
(HSBC 2004), 17 pages refer to the issue of directors’ remuneration. The magnitude and the quality 
of the information equal that of Citigroup. There are areas in which HSBC even exceeds 
Citigroup’s clarity.  
HSBC presents some details about the benchmark they use to identify good performance, which is 
based on the stock performance of other significant European banks and a sample of large UK-
based firms. Furthermore, the report is particularly accurate with regard to pensions, presenting the 
accrued annual pension at December 31, 2004, the increase in accrued annual pensions during 
2004, and the transfer value of accrued pensions per January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2004, 
respectively. 
As in the case of Citibank, the reader gets no concise overview of the different elements of 
remuneration per director in a single table.  
3.6 Germany, Deutsche Bank: tentative, yet a big step forward 
Of the 200 pages that make up the Deutsche Bank annual report for 2004 (Deutsche Bank 2004), 
17 are concerned with corporate governance. Three of these 17 pages refer to directors’ 
remuneration. Fixed compensation is reported clearly on a per director basis, as are mid-term 
incentives (the cash part) and the value of the stock-based remuneration, the latter calculated 
according to the last price of the share of the Deutsche Bank. Moreover, the number of shares, 
equity units and performance options per person are also reported. However, it is not possible to 
derive any detailed information about the value and other restrictions of these remuneration 
components from the information provided. Thus, the disclosure quality of Deutsche Bank 
exceeds by far that of Credit Agricole in France or UBS in Switzerland, not to mention the 
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Japanese Mizuho Financial Group. However, compared to Citigroup and HSBC, I still conceive 
large gaps in the reporting.   
In conclusion, the brief disclosure examples of the six largest banks of the world alone indicate that 
extensive differences in the magnitude of disclosure rules within the countries are to be expected 
and that even on the world-leading level, no common understanding exists with regard to what 
management should reveal to the respective shareholders. This is surprising and distressing at the 
same time, because these six banks all compete on the same world markets and their stability and 
reliability are significant for the global financial markets. 
4 Hypotheses on relations of the disclosure of executive remuneration 
In order to explain the magnitude of a country’s enactment of disclosure rules one might conceive 
of variables connected to the respective legal environment and/or the financial system. I will 
analyze the following three structural, exogenous country determinants and formulate six 
hypotheses: 
1. The legal system of a country 
2. Whether a country possesses a bank-centered or a market-centered system 
3. The size and integration of a country’s capital market 
Based on the principal-agent theorem, the legal system provides the answer to the question 
regarding the degree to which shareholders are endowed with rights to prevent insider 
expropriation. A bank-centered system, contrary to a market-centered system, emphasizes the 
power of creditors as opposed to that of shareholders. The size of the capital market of the 
respective country implies that the more players there are on the field, the clearer and more 
comprehensive the rules should be.  
4.1 Legal systems and corporate governance  
Four major legal systems prevail in the world today. The legal systems of the countries in the panel 
derive from these four legal families: the English common law, the French and the German civil 
law, which both derive from the Roman law, and the Scandinavian civil law. In the 19th century, 
these systems spread throughout the world through conquest, colonization and voluntary adoption 
(David and Brierly 1985). England transferred the common law to former colonies, including the 
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US, Canada, Australia and others. Due to French influence, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and 
many countries in Latin America adopted the French civil law tradition. Germanic countries and a 
number of countries in East Asia are part of the German civil law tradition. The Scandinavian 
countries form their own tradition. In our sample, Saudi Arabia is the only country of Islamic law 
origin in this sample and thus has a very different tradition with regard to financial markets. 
Historically, differences exist between the relative power of the central government and property 
owners across European states. In England, the power came under the scope of the parliament and 
thus the property owners who dominated it. Common law evolved to protect private property 
against the crown. Courts extended this protection to shareholders. By contrast, in France and 
Germany, parliamentary power was weaker. Commercial codes were adopted only in the nineteenth 
century by Napoleon and Bismarck to enable the state to better regulate economic activity. The 
state resisted the surrender of power to financiers. Accordingly, corporate governance in common 
law countries is more comprehensive than in civil law countries (Finer 1997). 
Building on the historical approach, scholars support the first hypothesis by relating the stronger 
corporate governance to the nature of the common law paradigm. Coffee (1999) notes that legal 
rules in the common law system are based on precedents. Hence judges are expected to rule on 
new situations by the general principle of the fiduciary duty of fairness even though specific modes 
of conduct have not yet incorporated into the statutes. By contrast, in civil law countries rules are 
made by legislatures, and judges are not entitled to interpret beyond the statutes. Thus the fiduciary 
duty principles of common law countries are more protective of shareholders than the bright line 
rules of the civil law. 
Empirical evidence is, among others, provided by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
who conducted extensive research on corporate governance with regard to investor protection. The 
results were published between 1997 and 2002.  In La Porta et al. (1999a), they argue that the legal 
approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance than the conventional 
distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems. In their view, countries 
with English law origin also seem to have more efficient courts and more informative accounting 
standards (La Porta et al. 1998), stronger shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 2000), less 
interventionist governments and better protection of private property (La Porta et al. 1999b) and 
that French civil law countries have the lowest quality of law enforcement (La Porta et al. 1997). An 
interesting study, both theoretically and empirically, on the enactment and the enforcement of 
security laws in 55 countries, has been conducted by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004), suggesting 
that sometimes no security law may be even better than a good security law that is not enforced. 
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Unfortunately, neither sufficient nor reliable data about the enforcement of disclosure are available.  
However, even the common law system is not beyond criticism, as Bhattacharya et al. (2006) 
indicate. Solidly analyzed, they conjecture that in the US, firms are less likely to lose corporate 
litigations than foreign firms - thus, the US firms have a home court advantage.  
These observations and explanations lead to the following conjectures: 
Hypothesis 1: Common law countries have tighter disclosure rules and regulations than civil 
law countries. 
Hypothesis 2: Countries with legal systems originating in the English law possess the 
highest quality disclosure enactments, followed by countries whose legal systems developed 
from German or Scandinavian law respectively. Countries whose legal systems derived 
from the French legal tradition have the worst disclosure enactments. 
Hypothesis 3: The better the antidirector rights of the shareholders are, the higher the 
disclosure quality of the respective country is. 
La Porta et al. (1998) developed and tested an index aggregating shareholders rights, which is used 
as a proxy for the quality of enactment of corporate governance. The countries in their panel are 
classified by legal origin. The proxy represents the extent of “antidirectors’ rights of shareholders”. 
On a scale from 0 to 5, the higher the factor is, the better the antidirector rights of shareholders are. 
China and Saudi Arabia have not been included in their study. Allen et al. (2004) demonstrate that 
China is a significant counterexample to La Porta et al. findings and theories on law, institutions, 
finance, and growth. Despite its poor legal and financial systems, China has one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world.
 
Using Purchasing Power Parity formulas, China already has the 
second largest economy, and it is supposed that it will overtake the US and become the largest 
economy in the world within ten years. They gauge the factor for antidirectors’ rights for China on 
the base of La Porta et al. (1998) with the astonishingly high result of 3. Thus, in terms of 
shareholder protection, China falls in between English-origin and French-origin countries. As will 
be shown later in the survey, in terms of disclosure enactment, China in no way deserves a quality 
rating close to, for example, Ireland or Malaysia. 
Saudi Arabia’s legal system is almost entirely based on Islamic law (Mahoney 2001). The Milken 
Institute (2003) has calculated a capital access index for 89 countries, using about 50 financial 
market-related variables. Saudi Arabia scored rank 80 of those 89. The closest countries from the 
panel are Brazil and Turkey, both on rank 71. Since Brazil scores 3 points and Turkey 2 points, I 
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estimate a 1 point rating for Saudi Arabia. Some more details about corporate governance and 
disclosure practices of Saudi Arabia can be found in appendix 7. The legal system origin and the 
antidirector rights of the countries are listed in appendix 1. 
4.2 Bank-centered versus market-centered systems 
Some corporate governance systems, notably those of the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries, are 
built on the foundation of a stock market-centered capital market. Other systems, like those of 
Germany and Japan, rest on a bank-centered capital market. In market-centered systems, one 
observes that owners typically exert formal, arm’s-length input into corporate governance through 
the board of directors, shareholder initiatives, and the like.  
Bank-centered systems are characterized by the central role played by banks and other financial 
institutions. Banks serve as stable shareholders with significant portions of equity. Stable banking 
relationships provide a significant portion of the firm’s debt resources. Decisional involvement by 
banks is considerable, with senior managers and equity interests sharing power with banks and 
other financial stakeholders. Thus, rather than the arm’s-length monitoring of market-based 
systems, bank-centered systems are built upon mutual monitoring (Dow and McGuire 2004). A 
further characteristic of many bank-centered systems is reciprocal shareholdings. It also endows 
banks with the opportunity to exercise voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights. Such 
pyramiding usually signals weak investor protection and thus creates a ripe environment in which 
principal-principal agency problems can flourish (La Porta et al. 2000). While these quasi-insider 
shareholders may have significant input into firm decision-making, they may also pursue private 
benefits to the detriment of other stakeholders. Less attention is paid to an additional systematic 
difference between bank- and stock market-centered capital markets: the existence of a much 
stronger venture capital industry in stock market-centered systems (Gilson 2000). 
There is no uniformly accepted empirical definition to definitively determine whether a given 
country’s financial system is market-based or bank-based. Previous studies use stylized facts based 
on a handful of countries, such as Germany and Japan as a representation of bank-based systems 
and the UK and the US as a prototype of market-based systems. According to Rajan and Zingales 
(2003), in the last 20 years the European financial system has become more market-based as a result 
of increasing international capital movements and the transition to a more unified European 
government. 
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Tadesse (2002) uses a variety of financial architecture indicators based on aggregate cross-country 
data recently compiled at the World Bank. The data set described contains measures of the relative 
size, activity, and efficiency of the banking sector as well as sub-sectors of the financial system over 
the period from 1980 to 1995. Tadesse constructs a comprehensive proxy relating the relative size 
of stock markets to that of banks in the financial system, the activity of stock markets relative to 
that of banks and the efficiency of a country’s stock markets vis-à-vis that of its banks. The result 
of the classification and more details are presented in appendix 2.  
Hypothesis 4: Market-centered systems provide more comprehensive disclosure rules for 
the shareholders than bank-centered systems. 
4.3 The size and integration of capital markets 
In both cases, the argument is intuitive. The more players on the field and the more important the 
capital markets are for the wealth of an economy, the better the rules for disclosure should be in a 
country. The US capital market is by far the biggest in the world, still twice as large as the following 
markets of Japan and the UK combined. The two smallest capital markets in the sample, with 
around 100 billion USD in 2004 only, are those of Israel and Turkey. By comparison, that is about 
one third of Citigroup’s market capitalization in the US only.  
The capital market integration is proxied by the market capitalization of the capital markets in 
relation to the gross national product (GNP). The highest capital market integration is exhibited by 
Switzerland with almost 230%, and Singapore with 190%, closely followed by the US. Austria and 
Italy - with only 22% and 42% respectively - show the lowest integration. The market capitalization 
of the major stock exchanges and the market capitalization per GNP per country are listed in 
appendix 2. 
Hypothesis 5: The larger capital markets provide more comprehensive disclosure rules to 
the shareholders than the smaller capital markets. 
Hypothesis 6: Measured by the relation of the size of the capital market to the total annual 
GNP of the respective country, the higher the integration of a capital market, the more 
comprehensive the disclosure enactment is.  
I did not find any literature that covers this question as the main focus. Moreover, with the capital 
market size, the probability of endogeneity in the sense of a reversed causality might be significant: 
Not large markets evoke good disclosure of executive remuneration, but excellent disclosure 
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regulations as a part of good corporate governance result in flourishing capital markets. Hence, I 
will confine myself to a brief rather than a more systematic and extensive analysis of this question 
5 Data and the construction of the transparency index 
The data set contains information about the 245 largest publicly listed banks of the world. The 
proxy for the size of a bank is the bank’s total assets in USD per December 31, 2004 according to 
the overview of the top 1000 world banks in The Banker (The Banker, 2004 and 2005). To gather 
the 245 largest listed banks, the 390 largest banks have been taken into account. Of these banks, 
138 are either state-owned or wholly privately owned and thus not publicly listed. The remaining 
banks represent total assets of 37.2 trillion USD and 1.61 trillion USD of book equity. A list of the 
banks in the panel can be found in appendix 3. Excluding the seven countries with only one 
publicly listed bank in the sample and, in addition, the countries with unlisted banks only among 
the 390 largest banks of the world, leaves out Bahrain, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, 
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Russia and Syria. 
The banks’ disclosure data for this study has been gathered primarily from the 245 individual   
annual reports from 2004 and/or 2003 respectively. For some of the US banks, the data source of 
executive compensation was obtained from company proxy statements filed with the SEC, 
condensed via the American AFL-CIO (2005). The countries’ respective disclosure laws and 
regulations have been investigated up to June 2005 with the help of Ernst&Young Law 
International, Ferrarini et al. (2003 and 2004) and the numerous listing rules of the respective stock 
exchanges. 
In the following, I construct a proxy for the degree of disclosure of executive remuneration. 
Developing the idea and technique of creating this proxy I draw on the work of Burghof and 
Hofmann (2004). Unfortunately, their approach is not applicable to the regulatory framework and 
would require more information about the individual bank. First, I apply this proxy on the country-
specific rules and regulations regarding the disclosure of executive remuneration. Obviously, this 
requires a certain degree of interpretation, as these rules are not always very precise. For example, 
Japanese regulation requires the elaboration on the remuneration policy - and, indeed, all Japanese 
banks duly and more or less briefly confirm the existence of such a policy. However, a well-
founded interpretation would at least presuppose that the extensive content and the controlling of 
such a policy be presented in an annual report. Hence, I always make a best guess in terms of 
interpreting on what is meant. Secondly, I use the proxy to evaluate the disclosure of executive 
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remuneration in each of the 245 banks of the sample. In some cases, the interpretation of the rules 
and regulations requires a higher degree of disclosure than what can be found in the reports of 
banks of the respective country. This discrepancy might be due to a misunderstanding of the rules 
and regulations on my side. However, it might also suggest a lack of enforcement. The differences 
between the legal framework proxies and the banks actual conduct proxy are discussed later. 
The disclosure proxy is constructed as a sum of scores assigned to various elements of 
remuneration disclosure. These elements and their scores are listed in table 1. Since availability of 
information on different disclosure points is not weighted equally, I will next elaborate on the 
choice and importance of these measures.   
  
Table I.1: Elements of disclosure and their weights in disclosure proxy 
ELEMENT OF 
DISCLOSURE 
VALUE 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 3 
 
Disclosure of individual 
remuneration 
 
no 
 
- 
 
aggregate only
 
- 
 
- 
 
yes 
 
Disclosure of 
remuneration policy 
 
no 
 
- 
 
- 
 
yes 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Form of  
Disclosure 
 
no 
disclosure 
 
- 
 
annual general 
meeting 
 
- 
 
annual  
report 
 
separate 
report 
 
Disclosure of cash 
compensation 
 
no 
 
- 
 
aggregate only
 
- 
 
yes, 
 individually 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of stock 
options/share programs
 
no 
 
 
- 
 
aggregate only
 
- 
 
yes, 
 individually 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of long-term 
incentive plans 
 
no 
 
aggregate 
only 
 
- 
 
yes,  
individually
 
- 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of pension 
plans 
 
no 
 
- 
 
aggregate only
 
- 
 
yes, 
 individually 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of granted 
loans 
 
no 
 
aggregate 
only 
 
- 
 
yes,  
individually
 
- 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of non-
monetary benefits 
 
no 
 
aggregate 
only 
 
- 
 
yes,  
individually
 
- 
 
- 
 
Disclosure of share 
transactions of chief 
executives and related 
persons (family and 
friends) 
 
no 
 
- 
 
yes,  
Transactions 
 of chief 
executives 
 
- 
 
yes, 
 transactions of 
chief executives 
and related 
persons 
 
- 
The disclosure of individual remuneration achieves the most points, because a shareholder can 
relate the individual position of the executive member to his pay for it. Aggregate disclosure still 
yields one point, because as a rule of thumb, one should be able to obtain an impression of the 
absolute executive’s pay.  
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The form of disclosure: The UK, Portugal and Canada require their banks to publish 
remuneration issues in a separate report, which is sent to the shareholders. This kind of visibility is 
better for the shareholder than just including it somewhere in the annual report. This justifies the 
three-point rating. Luxembourg requests the disclosure of remuneration not in the annual report, 
but just at the annual general meeting. The shareholder is not able to prepare for the discussion of 
remuneration-related issues, and thus there is only one point added to the disclosure proxy. 
Cash compensation comprises short-term payments, and fixed as well as performance-related 
bonuses. 
Stock options and share programs, traditionally, should ensure that the medium- and long-term 
aspirations of chief executives are aligned in accord with the interests of shareholders. Apparently, 
this part of remuneration often constitutes a very large chunk of an executive’s total remuneration. 
On the other hand, it is very difficult to calculate the actual value of a stock option or share 
program related to the year of allocation. There exist several methods for estimating the theoretical 
future value of stock options; however, none of them ensures accurate prediction of the future 
value of the stocks. One frequently used method is Black and Scholes (1973). Citigroup employs 
the binominal model, including seven assumptions about future developments, e.g., future interest 
rates, average holding period, future dividend policy, and so on.  
Long-term incentive plans are provided by many banks for their chief executives other than 
stock options or share programs. Pecuniarily however, these plans are not weighted as much as 
stock plans. Thus there is 0.5 fewer points added to the disclosure proxy. 
Pension plans: The endowment of chief executives with pension plans seems to be pretty 
standard. The most accurate method for allotting the relevant, yearly expense of the pension plan 
for the bank is the one used by HSBC, i.e., the increase in accrued annual pensions during 2004 
expressed as the difference of the transfer value of accrued pensions per January 1, 2004 and 
December 31, 2004 respectively. When one is trying to assess the overall value of a remuneration 
package, it is not very helpful to detect either no numbers at all, or, for example, the yearly pension 
in case of retirement. Nor is it very informative to just read some general remark, e.g., “it has been 
taken care of ...”, or to find out that only the accrued pension of all executives has been included. 
Disclosure of granted loans: Of the 245 banks in the panel, 58 disclosed having granted loans to 
their chief executives. While it is reasonable to assume that these loans have been issued at 
favorable rates, for the shareholder it might be more important to be informed about the volume of 
the loans granted. 
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Non-monetary benefits: Subsumed in this part are, for example, the company car plus chauffeur, 
health insurance, subsidized house purchase loans, the use of the company jet, etc.  
Disclosure of share transactions of chief executives and disclosure of share transactions of 
related persons (family and friends): If directors or their relatives either purchase or sell shares, 
this incidence has to be reported on an ad hoc basis to the stock exchange in those countries, 
where such reporting is required. To learn of such purchases or sales in an annual report many 
months later cannot be satisfying for the shareholders. On the other hand, the annual report 
receives a great deal of attention. Thus, in terms of comprehensive disclosure procedures, the 
directors’ dealings and those of family and friends will increase the disclosure proxy by one point 
each respectively. 
The highest achievable rating for comprehensive transparency of disclosure of chief executive 
remuneration is 20.0 points; the lowest is 0. How the 31 countries have issued the rules about the 
disclosure of executive remuneration and how the respective banks actually execute disclosure of 
executive remuneration according to the above outlined proxy will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Data for this study has been gathered primarily from annual reports from 2004 and 2003. Later 
reports might already show more developed behavior regarding the disclosure of executive 
remuneration. Information has been collected and disclosure laws and regulations have been 
investigated up to December 2004. Since then, corporate governance standards for various 
countries might have evolved. In terms of size, the annual reports for the 245 banks range from 50 
to 400 pages. This allowed for many variations in the dispersion of the elements of interest 
regarding the disclosure of executive remuneration packages. For the purposes of this study, most 
if not all of the annual reports have been screened twice and in some cases even three times, just to 
ensure that no element has been evaluated unfairly. Often, annual reports from two years were 
analyzed. In addition, the investor relations pages for the bank’s Web site were surveyed as well. In 
cases where the required information was found there, it was valued as if it had been found in the 
annual report. In cases where there was some uncertainty, I requested the respective investor 
relations departments to cross-check the findings. 
6 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, I first present the results of the estimation of the disclosure proxies of the countries’ 
enactment of regulations and of the banks’ actual degree of execution of the disclosure of executive 
remuneration. Second, I reconcile the respective country and banks disclosure proxy and elaborate 
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on the differences on a qualitative and quantitative level. The impact of the two existing law 
paradigms common versus civil law on both the countries’ enactment and the banks’ actual 
execution of disclosure will be discussed. The hypotheses are that common law countries will 
generally demonstrate tighter remuneration disclosure enactments and, moreover, that common 
law countries will enforce these rules and regulations more carefully. From this it is possible to 
conjecture that the quality of compliance with regulations and execution of disclosure by the 
market participants is higher.  
6.1 Results of the estimation of the country and banks proxy of disclosure of executive 
remuneration 
With regard to binding requirements for the disclosure of executive remuneration, I can separate 
the country sample into four groups as exhibited in table 2: 
Table I.2: Four groups of country disclosure 
Highest 
disclosure Points 
High 
disclosure 
 
Points
Low 
disclosure Points 
Lowest 
disclosure Points 
Canada 19.0 Malaysia 15.0 Spain 6.5 Greece 4.0
Ireland 19.0 South Africa 15.0 Brazil 6.5 Belgium 3.0
USA 19.0 India 14.0 Japan 6.5 Singapore 1.0
UK 17.0 Italy 13.0 Denmark 6.0 China 0.0
Sweden 16.5 Taiwan 12.0 Saudi Arabia 5.5 Indonesia 0.0
  Netherlands 11.5 Australia 5.0 Israel 0.0
  Switzerland 10.0 Austria 5.0 South Korea 0.0
  France 10.0 Germany 5.0 Thailand 0.0
   Portugal 5.0 Turkey 0.0
The comprehensive composition of the country disclosure proxy is provided in appendix 4.  Japan 
has the second-largest capital market on earth; yet, in terms of its disclosure of executive 
remuneration, it ranks in the lower half of the panel (more details in appendix 7).  
The arithmetic average of the disclosure proxy of the common law countries is 15.04, the same 
number for the civil law countries is 6.34. Henceforth and in terms of the disclosure proxy, 
common law countries enact remuneration disclosure rules about 2.5 times better. The result is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The averages are computed arithmetically, weighted by the 
number of banks per country. The data base for these calculations is provided in appendix 6.  
The results regarding the actual compliance and execution with disclosure regulations for the banks 
of each country are provided in table 3. Not surprisingly, the two countries with among the most 
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developed and largest capital markets of the world, the US and the UK, lead the ranks together 
with Ireland. Countries with large capital markets like France, Spain, Germany and Italy occupy the 
midfield, after countries with rather small markets like Thailand, Sweden and others. At the end of 
the panel are the two large industrialized countries South Korea and Japan.  
Table I.3: Actual bank’s disclosure proxy 
COUNTRY Number ofbanks 
Average banks’ 
disclosure proxy 
Law origin Law system 
USA 47 18.83 English common 
Canada 6 18.50 English common 
Ireland 5 17.80 English common 
Netherlands 3 17.33 French civil 
UK 11 16.86 English common 
Sweden 4 15.88 Scandinavian civil 
Thailand 3 13.83 English common 
Italy 12 13.33 French civil 
Australia 6 13.25 English common 
France 3 12.67 French civil 
South Africa 5 12.30 English common 
Singapore 3 11.67 English common 
Spain 5 11.20 French civil 
Austria 2 10.00 German civil 
Germany 8 9.63 German civil 
Belgium 3 9.50 French civil 
Portugal 3 8.67 French civil 
Israel 4 8.50 English common 
Denmark 2 8.50 Scandinavian civil 
Switzerland 5 8.30 German civil 
Malaysia 2 8.25 English common 
India 5 5.90 English common 
Saudi Arabia 3 4.17 Islamic civil 
Greece 5 3.30 French civil 
Taiwan 5 3.10 German civil 
China 8 2.19 German civil 
Japan 61 2.11 German civil 
Indonesia 2 1.50 French civil 
Turkey 4 0.38 French civil 
Brazil 4 0.25 French civil 
South Korea 6 0.00 German civil 
SUM 245    
In the 20 civil law countries, there are 148 publicly listed banks in the panel. These 148 banks 
achieve a weighted average of 5.06 points of the disclosure proxy. In the 11 common law countries, 
97 banks are included in this study. These 97 banks achieve a weighted average of 15.69 points of 
the disclosure proxy. As expected, the disclosure practices of banks in common law countries are 
more comprehensive than those of banks in civil law countries. The numbers, however, are quite 
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impressive:  in terms of the disclosure proxy the former’s disclosure measures are about three times 
more comprehensive than the latter’s activities (statistically significant at the 1% level). 
6.2 Reconciliation: compliance with the legal framework 
Appendix 5 exhibits the country with its disclosure proxy value compared to the average disclosure 
execution proxy of the banks in the respective country. Diagram 1 shows the nexus of country and 
banks proxies visually. Before interpreting the results, it is necessary to reflect on the nature of the 
differences.  
Diagram I.1: Reconciliation of banks and country disclosure 
A negative deviation of a bank proxy from the respective country proxy does not necessarily 
indicate that the bank has broken the law. First, the annual reports and the additional information 
on the Internet pages about investor relations were scanned thoroughly. Apparent deviations were 
double-checked. All reports were screened by the numerous keywords at least twice. However, 
since about 245 annual reports were analyzed with each report being up to 400 pages in length, it is 
still possible that some information was overlooked. To reduce this possible mistake, all investor 
relation departments of the respective banks were contacted about the available information. Their 
feedback, however, was rather disappointing. 
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Second, due to the complexity of the issue involved, there might exist different opinions regarding 
what informational elements are to be reported to whom. In terms of the number of deviations, the 
two proxy elements “disclosure of share transactions of executives” and “disclosure of share 
transactions of related persons” yielded the most differences. If those transactions take place, they 
either have to be reported to the local security exchange commission or another financial authority 
or they are not to be reported at all. In case the transactions have to be reported, there is no 
standardized understanding by the banks as to whether and how that information should also be 
published in the annual report. Because the inclusion of such yearly summaries of executives’ share 
transactions in the annual report appears to be a positive marker of good corporate governance, 
this element of the proxy has been added. 
Third, there is plenty of room for interpretation. In the case of Brazil, for example, the enactments 
demand the disclosure of the remuneration policy in the annual report. The annual reports of the 
four Brazilian banks merely mention the existence of the remuneration committee and the 
prevalence of some payment policy, but they do not contain any further information. It is the 
interpretation of this paper that this does not live up to good international corporate governance 
standards. The same policy is true for the Japanese banks. According to the enactment, Japanese 
banks are supposed to reveal their remuneration policies. In fact, the Japanese banks mention the 
existence of compensation committees in their respective annual reports. However, only stating 
that the committee is working on “issues related to remuneration, salaries, and incentive programs 
and other remuneration issues”, as presented in the Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group annual 
report (2004, 27), does not fulfill the purpose of the regulation. Thus there exists a negative 
deviation between enactment proxy and bank proxy, although in terms of Japanese regulations, the 
bank formally complies with the rule. 
Fourth, if information about an element of the proxy has not been found in either the annual 
report or on the investor relations page of the bank’s Web site, then no points were added to the 
bank proxy. If either of the sources stated that some remuneration part was not used or issued, 
then the points for the information availability were added. Thus, a case might exist in which a 
bank did not use some part of a remuneration package and has not stated this explicitly, and thus 
receives no points since it did not address the omission explicitly. The attempts to clarify this 
matter by contacting the respective investor relation departments of those banks found only weak 
feedback. Thus, one must expect that even an investor wanting to know about these aspects would 
not be informed either.  
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In terms of the disclosure proxy, the banks in common law countries surpass countries’ enactment 
by a factor of 4.32% (statistically significant at the 10% level), whereas the banks domiciled in civil 
law countries underperform by -20.20% (statistically significant at the 1% level). Furthermore, the 
former exceed the latter in terms of compliance with and execution of disclosure rules by a factor 
of 1.31, statistically significant at the 1% level. The statistic significance levels are tested by a one-
tailed T-Test.  
The data base for these calculations is provided in appendix 6 in a comparison of country versus 
banks proxy sorted by law system. The averages are computed arithmetically, weighted by the 
number of banks domiciled in the respective country. 
6.3 Observations of disclosure habits and peer group behavior problems 
6.3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will discuss disclosure behavior of banks in comparison with their peer groups 
(inmate’s dilemma) and with respect to the countries’ enactment (fortress’ dilemma). The intuition 
of this part of the chapter is captured by the paper of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004).  The method 
applied is an analogy of the prisoner’s dilemma as a classic strategic game, of which many versions 
have appeared in the social sciences (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). For the purpose of the following 
analysis, I include in a bank’s peer group all other banks domiciled in the same country. Admittedly, 
this definition has weaknesses. On the one hand, even within national boundaries banks are 
heterogeneous in their business goals and activities so that a bank’s genuine peer group would be a 
certain subset of all banks in the country. However, a finer differentiation of peer groups within 
countries is impossible with the sample since for a number of countries only a few observations are 
available. On the other hand, globalization and - in the wake of it - the internationalization of the 
financial sector diminish the relevance of national identity. Particularly, banks seeking cross-border 
expansion or listing on foreign stock exchanges may boost disclosure beyond national requirements 
if they do not match the requirements of the host country or perceived standards of the 
international investor community. Still, the national definition of a peer group captures the 
importance of geographic proximity and homogenous institutional, cultural and legal environment - 
including country-level disclosure regulation. I briefly return to the issue of under- or 
overaccomplishment of the national disclosure regulation at the end this chapter.  
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6.3.2 Inmate’s dilemma 
With regard to the inmate’s dilemma, taking country averages of banks’ disclosure proxies as a de 
facto country disclosure standard, I want to investigate whether and to what extent individual banks 
deviate from that practice - or, in other words: what are the differences in disclosure behavior 
within peer groups? I expect individual banks at the low and high ends of disclosure probability 
distribution to show more or less uniform disclosure habits. If there exist low overall disclosure 
habits among banks in one country, the executives will not be motivated to act as role models and 
disclose more than their peers. On the other hand, if banks in a country adhere to high standards in 
terms of their disclosure of executive remuneration, their peer group will follow close by. Third, if 
the remuneration disclosure by banks in one country is “stuck in the middle” in terms of quality 
and transparency, there will be a high degree of uncertainty as to what to publish. 
To gain insight into these issues, the banks in the 31 countries of the sample will be divided into 
three portfolios, each covering one third of the total disclosure proxy range (0 to 18.83). For the 
upper boundary, I chose the highest actually achieved average proxy value (18.83) rather than the 
theoretically achievable 20 points. 
The weeds (W): The banks in countries whose average disclosure proxy falls in the lower third of 
the actual disclosure distribution (0 to 6.28) will be included here. This portfolio covers 10 
countries of the sample (see table 4). In alternative calculations of the mean and the standard 
deviation one outlier - the Hong Kong based Bank of East Asia (BEA) - has been excluded from 
the weeds portfolio. BEA operates a global network of over 150 outlets covering Hong Kong and 
the rest of Greater China, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the British Virgin 
Islands, and Southeast Asia. BEA’s annual reports have been based upon the British corporate 
governance standards and it scored 16 disclosure points as compared to 0 for the other six Chinese 
banks and 1.5 points for the Bank of China.  
The rank growths (RG): In this portfolio there are 11 countries whose average disclosure 
magnitude in banks is in the middle third of the total disclosure range (6.29 to 12.55).  
The corns (C): The 10 countries with the highest standards of disclosure are included in this 
portfolio. The average proxies can take on values between 12.56 and 18.83. 
For the reasons discussed above, I assume that executives will not voluntarily disclose their 
remuneration. They will only do so in case they are forced to either by law or by peer pressure. If 
the common average disclosure magnitude of banks in one country is very low, then there is only a 
low risk of investors or the public penalizing directors for poor disclosure habits. Thus the comfort 
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of not publishing one’s pay is high. The hypothesis for the weeds is that if all banks in one country 
on average have low disclosure standards, then there will be a low deviation from that habit. 
Matters differ for the rank growths in the respective countries. The peers in one country of a 
particular bank’s executive on average have implemented solid disclosure standards. Yet, there are 
banks with greater disclosure in other countries, and still others, like the weeds, that practice hardly 
any disclosure at all. So the range of possible actions is large, the uncertainty of the outcome is high. 
Hence, I assume that banks in this midfield of disclosure will demonstrate the highest variation in 
the disclosure proxies. Finally, the banks of the corn portfolio primarily face peers who adhere to 
the highest standards of disclosure of remuneration. Playing in that league, one cannot afford to 
deviate. Consequently, executives are likely to uniformly follow the high standard of disclosure and 
variation in the disclosure proxies of this portfolio is expected to be limited. 
To test these hypotheses I use unweighted descriptive statistics for each country and for the three 
portfolios. Since the number of banks for most of the countries in the sample is fairly small, my 
conclusions probably cannot be extended to the entire bank population in the respective countries.  
Table 4 summarizes statistics for the three portfolios. “-“ means underaccomplishment of legal 
requirements. 
I use a simple and straightforward measure for the deviation of individual banks from peer group 
disclosure standards - the standard deviation of bank’s disclosure proxies computed for each 
country. To control for biases introduced by possible outliers - which would weigh particularly 
heavily in the small sample setting - I also compute the mean absolute deviation from the mean and 
the median absolute deviation from the median.  
By measuring deviation, I intend to capture the uncertainty of individual banks as to what to 
disclose in the context of their peer group. As expected, the rank growths exhibit on average the 
greatest uncertainty: The mean standard deviation of countries in this portfolio is 3.28 as opposed 
to 1.86 for the weeds and 2.15 for the corn portfolio. Testing the statistical significance of those 
differences via a one-tailed T-test, the rank growths to weed portfolio difference is significant at the 
5% level, the rank growths to corn at the 10% level. Also, the maximum standard deviation within 
a portfolio is largest for the middle third - i.e. the rank growth portfolio.  
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Table I.4: Peer group dilemmas, database 
  
COUNTRY 
Number 
of banks 
in sample M
ea
n 
M
ed
ia
n 
St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n Mean absolute 
deviation from 
the mean 
Median 
absolute 
deviation from 
the median 
Deviation of 
bank’s disclosure 
proxy from 
country proxy 
P
or
tf
ol
io
 I
 (
W
) 
South Korea 6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Brazil 4 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.38 0.00 -6.25 
Turkey 4 0.38 0.00 0.75 0.56 0.00 0.38 
Indonesia 2 1.50 1.50 2.12 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Japan 61 2.11 2.00 0.49 0.25 0.00 -4.39 
China 7 0.21 0.00 0.57 0.37 0.00 0.21 
Taiwan 5 3.10 2.00 2.46 1.76 0.00 -8.90 
Greece 5 3.30 2.00 2.91 2.08 0.00 -0.70 
Saudi Arabia 3 4.17 2.00 3.75 2.89 0.00 -1.33 
India 5 5.90 3.50 5.02 4.08 1.50 -8.10 
Portfolio mean 2.10  1.86 1.39 0.30 -2.66 
Portfolio median  1.75 0.00 -1.02 
Correlation coefficient    0.55 
P
or
tf
ol
io
 I
I 
(R
G
) 
Malaysia 2 8.25 8.25 2.47 1.75 1.75 -6.75 
Switzerland 5 8.30 8.00 1.52 1.16 1.00 -1.70 
Israel 2 8.50 8.50 5.31 0.00 0.00 8.50 
Denmark 4 8.50 10.25 0.00 3.75 2.00 2.50 
Portugal 3 8.67 7.50 2.02 1.56 0.00 3.67 
Belgium 3 9.50 10.5 2.18 1.67 0.50 6.50 
Germany 8 9.63 9.75 2.74 2.25 2.25 4.63 
Austria 2 10.00 10.00 6.36 4.50 4.50 5.00 
Spain 5 11.2 10.50 3.42 2.84 3.00 4.70 
Singapore 3 11.67 10.50 3.88 2.89 2.00 10.67 
South Africa 5 12.30 13.00 6.18 4.12 3.00 -2.70 
Portfolio mean 9.68 3.28 2.41 1.82 3.18 
Portfolio median  10.00 2.00 4.63 
Correlation coefficient    0.10 
P
or
tf
ol
io
 I
II
 (
C
) 
France 3 12.67 13.50 3.33 2.44 2.00 2.67 
Australia 6 13.25 15.00 4.12 3.00 1.00 8.25 
Italy 12 13.33 14.50 3.68 3.06 1.50 0.33 
Thailand 3 13.83 14.50 4.04 2.89 3.00 13.83 
Sweden 4 15.88 15.25 1.44 1.06 0.25 -0.63 
UK 11 16.86 16.50 0.78 0.53 0.00 -0.14 
Netherlands 3 17.33 17.00 1.53 1.11 1.00 5.83 
Ireland 5 17.80 17.50 1.25 0.96 1.50 -1.20 
Canada 6 18.50 19.00 0.77 0.67 0.00 -0.50 
USA 47 18.83 19.00 0.55 0.30 0.00 -0.17 
Portfolio mean 15.83 2.15 1.60 1.03 2.83 
Portfolio median  15.87 1.00 0.10 
Correlation coefficient    0.63 
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Diagram 2 illustrates the positions of countries in terms of their average disclosure in banks and 
disclosure proxy’s standard deviation. Both the mean absolute deviation from the mean and the 
median absolute deviation from the median exhibit the same patterns as the standard deviation: on 
average they take on the largest values for the rank growth portfolio.  
Diagram I.2: Relationship between banks’ average disclosure proxy and proxy’s standard 
deviation within countries 
 
6.3.3 Fortress’ dilemma 
Next, with regard to the fortress’ dilemma, I consider the deviation of a bank’s disclosure proxy 
from the country proxy (bank’s disclosure proxy minus country disclosure proxy). With respect to 
the hypothesis, the conjecture is that banks in countries with high standards of enactment 
concerning the disclosure of executive remuneration will generally adhere closely to the countries’ 
laws and regulations. Banks in countries with low enactment concerning disclosure will be 
uniformly reluctant to publish and will disclose as little as possible. Third, banks in countries with 
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mid-range enactment will demonstrate the highest uncertainty as to what to publish or not to 
publish. Thus, in this third category, the highest deviations between the countries’ enactment proxy 
and the banks actual disclosure proxy will appear. 
First, I compute correlation coefficients between individual banks’ disclosure proxies and country 
proxies for each of the three portfolios. The correlation coefficient is the metric for the degree of 
the banks adherence to the respective countries enactment. For the weeds, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.55. The highest correlation between national disclosure regulation and bank 
execution is found for the corn portfolio (0.63). For the rank growths the correlation is particularly 
low (correlation coefficient of 0.1); as can be seen in table 4, banks in this portfolio have the 
greatest tendency to voluntarily overaccomplish national requirements. Testing the statistical 
significance of those differences via a one-tailed test, the rank growths to weed portfolio difference 
is significant at a 1% level, the rank growth to corn at a 10% level. 
Furthermore, deviations of banks’ actual disclosure habits from these requirements (both 
overaccomplishment and underaccomplishment) can be observed frequently as exhibited in table 4. 
In the weeds portfolio, the prevalent pattern is an underaccomplishment of national disclosure 
standards. The average underaccomplishment is -2.66 points, whereas the maximum deviation 
exhibited by Indian banks is strikingly large (-8.9 points). The rank growths portfolio on average 
tends to overaccomplish the national regulation by 3.18 points. A notable feature of this portfolio is 
the wide range of possible deviations from the national metric: the best overperformers are 
Singaporean banks, whose average disclosure proxy is 10.67 points higher than the country 
disclosure proxy, whereas Malaysian banks on average score 6.75 fewer disclosure points than are 
required by national regulation. In the corn portfolio, five of ten countries have lower disclosure 
scores than required by national regulation; their underaccomplishment, however, is modest 
compared with other portfolios, achieving its maximum at 1.2 points. On the other hand, the corn 
portfolio contains the greatest overachiever Thailand, whose banks voluntarily disclose most of the 
relevant information on executive remuneration, achieving on average a disclosure score of 13.83. 
7 Testing the hypotheses: regression analysis 
In this section, I first test the 6 hypotheses of section 4 on the country level and then on the bank 
level via a regression analysis. A further robustness check, employing a multi-factor model at the 
bank level, will be estimated. 
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The hypotheses of section 4 are tested with Ordinary Least Squares regressions. I conducted a 
Beusch-Pagan test to confirm homoscedacity. To test hypotheses 1 to 6 via regression analysis, the 
explanatory variables are defined as follows. A dummy variable for the law system of a country 
differentiates between countries with common and civil law. The antidirector rights variable is 
supposed to epitomize an estimator for the magnitude and quality of the overall corporate 
governance of a country. These proxies stem from La Porta et al. (1998) and have been developed 
and tested as an index aggregating shareholders rights, which is used as a proxy for the quality of 
enactment of corporate governance. The financial system of a country, either market-based or 
bank-based, was also coded as a dummy variable. The market size is measured as the absolute size 
of the major stock markets of a country in USD. The degree of capital market integration and of 
national stock market development is defined as the share of a country’s stock market capitalization 
in relation of the country’s GNP. The dependent variable in this section is the country-level 
disclosure proxy. 
The regression results are reported in table 5 below. The second column contains coefficients of 
one-factor regressions establishing separate, linear relationships between each explanatory variable, 
listed in column one, and the country disclosure proxy. Column three contains regression 
coefficients of a multivariate regression of the country proxy on all explanatory variables. Each 
model contains an intercept (not reported). Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels are indicated with **, * and # respectively. 
In the full sample multivariate regression, the proxy for Singapore shows the greatest negative 
deviation from the actual proxy. It significantly exceeds those for other countries, suggesting it 
might be an outlier. Singapore has an English common law tradition, is home to a market-based 
financial system and possesses the second highest capital market integration after Switzerland. Yet 
Singapore yields only one point at the country’s enactment disclosure proxy. The absolute size of 
Singapore’s capital market is relatively small and exhibits a high concentration of the companies 
listed. The disclosure figure assigned to Singapore’s ranks among the upper quartile of all the banks. 
Thus, it adheres to very high standards of disclosure, as was to be expected considering the 
hypothesis. A possible explanation is the strong and unquestioned authority of the ruling 
government. Even though disclosure requirements are issued as voluntary listing rules, the actual 
enforcement by federal authorities and the execution of the transparency by Singaporean banks 
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compares to that of a strict law in other countries. In regression results reported in the next table, 
Singapore has been excluded from the sample1. 
Table I.5: OLS estimates with country proxy as dependent variable (30 observations, 
without Singapore) 
 COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS  
bivariate regressions multivariate regression with 
all explanatory variables 
Law paradigm 
6* 
(2.252) 
0.367 
(4.519) 
Law origin 
2.274** 
(0.740) 
1.382 
(1.801) 
Antidirector rights 
2.118* 
(0.831) 
-0.704 
(1.368) 
Financial system 
6.028** 
(2.142) 
3.493 
(2.534) 
Market size 
7.19e-07# 
(3.72e-07) 
3.51e-07 
(4.01e-07) 
Capital market integration 
6.377** 
(2.117) 
3.573 
(2.392) 
Adjusted R2 in multivariate 
regression  0.275 
Bivariate regressions all yield positive coefficients, significant at the 1% and 5% levels with the 
exception of that on market size, which is significant only at the 10% level. Bivariate regressions, 
however, are likely to suffer from endogeneity and omitted variable problems. Including all factors 
that are hypothesized to impact disclosure quality together in a multivariate regression weakens the 
statistical results: all of the explanatory variables become insignificant at conventional significance 
levels and the coefficient on antidirector rights changes the sign, implying an inverse relationship 
that runs counter to hypothesis 3. The two countries with the highest differences between strong 
antidirector rights and weak disclosure rules are Israel and Thailand. These two countries possess 
common law systems. Their democracy, on the other hand, is either distressed as in the case of 
Israel or does not comply with modern understanding as in the case of Thailand. 
Statistical insignificance of estimated coefficients resulting from large standard errors can be a 
consequence of multicollinearity in the multivariate regression. For instance, the correlation 
                                                 
1 The full sample regressions, where Singapore has been included, yield somewhat smaller magnitudes of 
estimated coefficients and a change in sign of coefficients on antidirector rights and law origin in the 
multivariate regression, as well as a lower R2 of 0.13. In general, the exclusion of Singapore from the 
sample shows better fit of the model to the data, whereas most of the tested relationships remain largely 
robust to its presence (with the exception of law origin). 
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coefficient between law paradigm and antidirector rights is 0.68, between law paradigm and law 
origin 0.88, between antidirector rights and financial system 0.57, between law origin and financial 
system 0.55, and between law origin and antidirector rights 0.76. Moreover, the relatively small 
sample size of 30 observations makes reliable judgments about accuracy and statistical significance 
difficult. 
To alleviate problems arising from multicollinearity, I condense data via factor analysis. For the 
purposes of factor analysis, the data matrix was standardized. Using principal components for 
variance decomposition, two factors were identified that together account for 74% of variance. 
After one rotation, these two factors can be best interpreted as “legal environment”, where law 
paradigm, law origin, financial system and antidirector rights load heavily, and as “market size 
effect”, where market capitalization in USD and market cap as a share of GNP weigh in heavily 
(see table 6 below).  
Table I.6:  Legal environment and market size effect factor loadings 
VARIABLE (standardized) Factor 1 
(legal environment) 
Factor 2 
(market size effect) 
  
Law paradigm 0.946 0.107 
Law origin 0.946 0.107 
Financial system 0.629 0.200 
Antidirector rights 0.769 0.386 
Capital market integration 0.254 0.757 
Market size 0.094 0.876 
Regressing the country disclosure proxy on the two factors yields positive coefficients on both 
(2.855 and 2.601), legal environment being significant at the 1% level and market size effect at the 
5% level. The model has an adjusted R2 of 0.32. 
A similar OLS regression setup has been implemented with country averages of the banks’ 
disclosure proxies as the dependent variable for the full sample of 31 countries. Singapore banks 
are included because their actual disclosure habits are no outlier in contrast to the country’s 
disclosure enactment. The results are largely similar to those obtained for the country proxy, 
although market size loses its significance even in the one factor regression while statistical 
significance of law paradigm and law origin strengthens. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on 
law paradigm in the multivariate regression is also larger in magnitude than in the previous 
regression, predicting a 2.3 difference in disclosure scores for banks domiciled in common and civil 
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law countries as opposed to 0.367 estimate from the regression with the country-level proxy as the 
dependent variable. This could mean that a country’s legal tradition has a stronger effect on 
disclosure practices of banks themselves than on their formal legal enactment in a given country. 
However, since the standard errors of the estimates are very large, these results fail to be validated 
statistically. 
Table I.7: OLS regression estimates with bank disclosure proxy as dependent variable  
 COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS  
bivariate regressions multivariate regression with 
all explanatory variables 
Law paradigm 
6.146** 
(1.915) 
2.309 
(4.244) 
Law origin 
2.174** 
(0.646) 
1.493 
(1.703) 
Antidirector rights 
1.770* 
(0.769) 
-1.231 
(1.290) 
Financial system 
5.154*  
(1.938) 
3.056 
(2.382) 
Market size 
5.44e-07 
(3.46e-07) 
4.48e-07    
(3.73e-07) 
Capital market integration 
3.733# 
(1.956) 
0.387 
(2.129) 
Adjusted R2 in multivariate 
regression 
 0.221 
Here too, the small sample size and especially multicollinearity are likely to account for weak 
statistical results in the multivariate regression. Applying factor analysis, with “legal environment” 
and “market size effect” being the two main factors as defined in the country analysis above, and 
regressing the country-average bank disclosure proxy on the two factors yields positive coefficients 
on both factors. The estimated coefficient on the factor for legal environment (2.936) is significant 
at the 1% level while that on market size effect (1.434) at the 5% level, similarly to the regression on 
the country proxy. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.26. 
To summarize, there appears to be evidence for positive relationships between disclosure standards 
and country-level legal and market determinants as expressed by law paradigm, law origin, type of 
financial system, and capital market integration. The relationship between disclosure and 
antidirector rights remains unclear, since the sign of the coefficient on the antidirector rights proxy 
proves to be sensitive to the number of regressors. In general, there is stronger statistical evidence 
for the relevance of legal system features for the level of disclosure standards than of market size 
effects.  
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A word of caution is due. As mentioned above, the small sample size and multicollinearity are 
important constraints in judging the model’s reliability and interpreting the estimates. Furthermore, 
the model assumes that all of the factors hypothesized to influence disclosure are exogenous. 
However, variables such as capital market size and capital market integration can both influence 
and be influenced by the level of disclosure, since better corporate governance can be expected to 
boost investor confidence and thus induce capital market growth. It is also possible that disclosure 
enactment and systemic features such as type of financial system or legal tradition are jointly 
determined by another, hardly quantifiable, variable such as a country’s culture or a certain path 
dependence. In this case the exogeneity assumption and estimation consistency would be violated. 
Therefore I take the simple econometric analysis presented above to be an indication of general 
relationships and correlations rather than a detailed model description. 
8 Conclusion 
In this part of my thesis, I analyze the quality of executive remuneration disclosure achieved by the 
245 largest listed banks in 31 countries. Using information on country-level disclosure requirements 
and information on executive pay contained in annual reports of the banks for the year 2004, I 
constructed numeric proxies to measure disclosure standards both at country and individual banks 
levels. These proxies allow to test hypotheses about relationships between disclosure quality and 
legal, financial and capital market features of the countries in the sample.   
One of the structuring distinctions is between countries whose legal tradition originated in the 
English common law and those with a civil law paradigm. Descriptive statistics suggests that in 
terms of the disclosure proxy, common law countries enact remuneration disclosure rules about 2.5 
times better than civil law countries, and, banks located in countries with the common law tradition 
on average have more than three times higher disclosure scores compared to banks in civil law 
countries. Also, banks in common law countries generally surpass country-level disclosure 
requirements, whereas those in countries with civil law tradition seem to fall short of the disclosure 
levels prescribed by the law. 
The regression analysis explores the impact of market-based versus bank-based system, law origin 
and paradigm, antidirector (shareholder) rights as well as capital market size and integration on 
disclosure quality of countries and, in particular that of banks, in the respective countries. The 
strongest evidence I obtain is for the importance of law paradigm and type of financial system for 
average levels of disclosure. The relationship between disclosure and antidirector rights remains 
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unclear, since the sign of the coefficient on the antidirector rights proxy proves to be sensitive to 
the number of regressors. In general, there is stronger statistical evidence for the relevance of legal 
system features for the level of disclosure standards than of market size effects. 
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Part II 
Do Capital Markets Honor 
Good Disclosure of Executive Remuneration? 
 
Disclosure of executive remuneration by the 245 largest listed banks of 
the world and the impact on the cost of equity capital and/or stock 
performance 
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1 Introduction 
Following the controversial public debate about executive remuneration disclosure, it seems that 
supporters often argue the case from the perspective of the shareholder or the interested public. 
Yet, there is an aspect to executive information disclosure that should be appealing to the 
shareholder and the executive officer alike. Good executive information disclosure might create a 
win-win situation. For shareholders, the question of executive remuneration disclosure is part of 
the information risk associated with their investment in a company. Less knowledge means higher, 
better knowledge lower information risk. The former translates into higher, the latter into lower 
risk premiums demanded by investors. In this respect, the shareholder’s and the executive’s 
interests concur: while the investor is interested in a reduction of risk, managerial staff seeks to cut 
the cost of equity capital.  
In the literature, there is plenty of evidence that information disclosure lowers investment risks and 
hence reduces capital costs and/or improves stock performance. With this in mind it seems 
surprising that an analogous relationship between executive remuneration disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital has not been surveyed separately as of yet. Hence, in part two of the thesis I ask  if 
one could generate significant statistic evidence in support of the hypothesis that better executive 
remuneration disclosure leads to reduced cost of equity capital and/or a better stock performance. 
The outline of part two is as follows. Section two gives an overview of the literature on the 
relationship between information disclosure activities as well as other elements of corporate 
governance and the cost of equity capital. In section three, the methodological approach is 
described and possible criticism discussed. Section four comprises the detailed arguments for each 
of the four employed paradigms. Four common proxies for either stock performance, volatility 
and/or cost of equity capital will be analyzed: long/short spreads, Sharpe ratios, price-earnings 
ratios, and Tobin’s qs. Section five concludes. 
2 Information risk and the cost of equity capital 
Important as the issue may be, the link between disclosure levels and cost of equity capital is not 
well established and is difficult to quantify. Barry and Brown (1985) suggested that the greater the 
degree of disclosure is, the smaller parameter uncertainty and estimation risk become. In rebuttal, 
Berton (1994) argues that advanced disclosure activities target stock traders, a practice which would 
add to share price volatility, thereby increasing risk and leading to a higher cost of capital. 
Obviously Berton’s theory, while interesting, was not adopted by later researchers. Botosan (1997) 
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remarks that the extent to which firms benefit from increased disclosure levels remains a 
controversial issue. La Porta et al. (2002) argue that, although outside investors can protect 
themselves against bad corporate governance by lowering the price they are willing to pay for 
shares, the effect of such protections on valuation has not yet received comprehensive attention. 
Two lines of research can be distinguished. The first concentrates on the relationship between the 
cost of equity capital and information disclosure activities in particular. The second group of studies 
focuses on the cost of equity capital as it relates to all elements of corporate governance. As 
disclosure of information is vital to every aspect of corporate governance, both types of studies are 
relevant for this research. 
Many of these studies suggest more or less forcefully that there is a direct relationship between 
good corporate governance or disclosure of information and lower cost of equity capital. More 
specifically, most first-run studies support at least one of the following hypotheses:  
- Good information disclosure reduces the information risk of the investor. 
- Foreigners invest less in companies with poor corporate governance. 
- Poor disclosure of information results in lower liquidity of the stock transactions. 
- The relation of private and public information impacts the cost of equity capital. 
In the following, some of the most current and exemplary studies will be briefly summarized. 
Clarkson et al. (1996) document a negative association between public disclosure and the cost of 
equity capital. To the extent that public disclosure reduces estimation risk borne by the investors, 
these results support the conjecture that estimation risk is systematic risk and hence, priced into the 
capital market. Analyzing a sample of 122 manufacturing firms in the USA, Botosan (1997) finds 
that greater disclosure is associated with a lower cost of equity capital. However, she finds no 
evidence of an association between her proxy for disclosure and cost of equity capital for firms 
with a high analyst following. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) examine the effect of total disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital and find, contrary to their expectations, that greater total disclosure is 
not associated with a lower cost of equity capital. However, firms that provide greater disclosure in 
the annual reports do benefit in terms of a lower cost of equity capital, amounting to an 
approximately 0.7 percentage point difference between the most- and least-forthcoming firms. One 
especially interesting finding is that the timelier the disclosure is, the higher is the cost of equity 
capital, adding weight to the argument that better disclosure increases stock volatility. 
Recent research (La Porta et al. 1997, 1999c, 2000) strongly supports the idea that the extent of 
legal protection of investors in a country is an important determinant of the development of its 
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financial markets. Where well-enforced laws protect outside investors, these are willing to finance 
firms. In contrast, where laws are unsupportive of investors, the development of financial markets 
is stunted. When the rights of investors are better protected by law, outside investors are willing to 
pay more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognize that, 
with better legal protection, more of the firm’s profits will come back to them as interest or 
dividends as opposed to being expropriated by corporate insiders.  
Gompers et al. (2001 and 2003) analyze about 1.500 US firms from 1990 to 1999 using 24 possible 
provisions against good corporate governance. The authors form a “democrats” portfolio, proxying 
the decile of firms with the best corporate governance, and a “dictatorships” portfolio, comprising 
the decile of firms with the highest provisions against shareholders rights. Going long with the 
democrats shares and short-selling the dictatorships stocks yields an abnormal stock excess return 
of 8.5% annualized from 1990 to 1999. 
Similarly, Lombardo and Pagano (2000) argue that disclosure simply reduces out-of -pocket costs 
for obtaining concise information. This suggests that when a country lowers information risks 
through excellent corporate governance regulation, foreign investors invest more. Recent research 
generally supports this assertion. Gelos and Wei (2005) find that less opaque emerging market 
countries have greater weights in mutual fund portfolios. Aggarwhal et al. (2005) show that US 
mutual funds overweigh emerging markets that have stronger accounting standards, shareholder 
rights and legal frameworks. On the firm level, they also conjecture that an US listing is associated 
with a substantial increase in foreign investment. 
As domestic sources of outside financing are limited in many countries around the world, it is 
important to understand the factors that influence foreigners to provide capital to a country’s firms. 
A study by Leuz et al. (2005) examines whether and why investors’ concerns about corporate 
governance result in fewer foreign holdings. They use a comprehensive set of foreign holdings by 
US investors as a proxy for foreign investment and analyze a sample of 4,411 firms from 29 
emerging markets and developed economies. The authors assert that foreigners invest significantly 
less in firms that are poorly governed, i.e., firms that have ownership structures that are more 
conducive to outside investor expropriation. Interestingly, this finding is not simply a matter of a 
country’s economic development but appears to be directly related to a country’s legal institutions 
and information rules. They therefore argue that information problems faced by foreign investors 
play an important role in this result. 
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The idea that the effects of high or low levels of information disclosure could be more pervasive 
than our simple capital asset-pricing models have thus far considered is eventually suggested by 
Easley et al. (2002). In traditional asset-pricing models, the answer to the question of whether a 
higher probability of private information-based trading should have an effect on its required return 
is negative. This is because these models rely on the notion that if assets are priced efficiently, then 
all information is already incorporated into the share price and hence need not be considered 
separately. A difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information-based trading 
between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5% per annum. Hence, if 
corporate governance impacts asset prices systematically, then a consideration of the capital asset 
pricing models should be expected. Easley and O’Hara (2004) conclude that estimation risk is not 
captured in the traditional CAPM market beta, but is nondiversifiable and, accordingly, should be 
priced.  
Focusing on the analysis of information symmetries, previous papers already propose that public 
information attenuates information asymmetries, and thus reduces the cost of equity capital. This 
second line of research supposes that the increased cost of equity capital with regards to 
information asymmetry results from investors’ demands for compensation for expected transaction 
costs deriving from possible illiquidity or the potential risk associated with dealing with better 
informed players (Verrecchia (2001)). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) conclude that reducing the 
asymmetry of information between insiders and outside investors will increase the liquidity of the 
market for a firm’s stock, thus inducing large institutional investors to invest. To have low cost 
equity capital, especially large firms must attract large positions from institutional investors. If the 
initial information asymmetries are large for such firms, reducing them will increase the current 
price of the security. 
An early line of research, presented by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), argues that the cost of 
equity capital appears through increases in the bid-ask spread. They offer empirical evidence for 
this conjecture by showing a positive correlation between security returns and the bid-ask spread 
after adjusting for beta, size and residual risk. Information disclosure affects the cost of equity 
capital through its effect on information asymmetry. Bid-ask spreads could be reduced by 
increasing the liquidity of the respective stock. Liquidity increase could be construed as having 
resulted from greater information disclosure, going public compared to private placement. 
Greater disclosure enhances stock market liquidity, thereby reducing the cost of equity capital either 
through reduced transaction costs or increased demand for a firm’s securities (Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985). 
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The last set of studies analyzes the magnitude and/or the relation of private information to public 
information and its impact on the cost of equity capital. The two major insights in modern finance 
are the effects of diversification, i.e., that idiosyncratic risk premiums vanish in large economies, 
and price discovery, the revelation of private information in equilibrium prices. While the 
implications of diversification for risk premiums are well known from the extended CAPM and 
APT under homogeneous beliefs, less is understood about how private signals impact risk 
premiums (Hughes et al. 2005). The authors investigate the effects of private information and 
diversification on risk premiums in a noisy rational expectations model in which risky asset payoffs 
have a factor structure. The authors show that the APT pricing relation holds with asymmetric 
information. Consistent with intuition, factor-risk premiums decrease according to the ratio of 
informed to uninformed investors. 
Accordingly, Botosan et al. (2004) find an inverse relationship between the cost of capital and the 
precision of public information, but a positive relationship between the precision of private 
information and the cost of equity capital. The authors suggest that the results have implications for 
both managers and academics. The association between the precision of public and private 
information combined with their opposing effects on the cost of equity capital implies that a 
manager must consider the relationship between the precision of public and private information 
when determining the firm’s corporate reporting strategy. 
Further support for the effect of good corporate governance in reducing the cost of equity capital 
can be drawn from Hail and Leuz (2005). They examine the cost of capital and cash flow effects of 
cross-listings in the US and provide strong evidence that cross-listing on a US exchange reduces the 
firms’ cost of capital. These effects are larger for firms from countries with weaker institutional 
structures, and are thus consistent with the idea that cross-listing is a way to opt out of the home 
country’s institutional framework. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2001) document findings that suggest that, after controlling for other 
influences, an increase in overall earnings opacity in a country is linked to an economically 
significant increase in the cost of equity and an economically significant decrease in trading in the 
stock market of that country. They constructed a panel data set of earnings aggressiveness, loss 
avoidance and earnings smoothing. The motivation for their theories and research stemmed from 
observations regarding the previous decline of the US equity markets, which had been attributed to 
investors’ concerns over corporate governance and, hence, demands for higher rates of return to 
compensate for increased information risk. 
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Beiner et al. (2006) analyzed a sample of representative Swiss firms with a comprehensive 
description of firm-level corporate governance. Their results support a positive relationship 
between corporate governance and firm valuation. For the median firm in the sample, a one 
standard deviation increase in the corporate governance index causes an increase of the market 
capitalization by at least 12% to the respective company’s book asset value.  
In South Korea, analyzing 246 firms listed at the KOSPI, Kato et al. (2005) reveal for the first 
time that overall significant executive pay-performance link is driven by non-Chaebol (high 
relevance of corporate governance) firms and that no such link exists for Chaebol (thus low 
corporate governance) firms. The evidence is consistent with the recent literature on the nature 
of Chaebols in Korea and the current corporate governance reform efforts in Korea that are 
aimed mostly at Chaebol firms. 
Most of the previous research assumes that good corporate governance and/or good information 
disclosure reduces information risk and, hence, causes reduced cost of equity and/or higher firm 
valuations. Of course there is a hen-or-egg problem: Alternatively, companies with lower cost of 
equity capital and or higher equity valuations could be likely to deliberately select better standards 
of information disclosure and a better level of corporate governance. In that case, good 
information disclosure and/or good corporate governance would be a proxy for another omitted 
nexus variable, reconciling governance and performance. Thus, endogeneity concerns will have to 
be considered. 
Another vital part of information disclosure is the quality and precision of earnings reports. The 
following question arises: is there a detectable nexus between earnings management and/or income 
smoothing and information risk? Using “information risk” and “information uncertainty” as 
synonymous terms, Fancis et al. (2003) define the latter as “the precision of an investment signal”.  
In total, the literature supports a directional prediction that greater public information reduces 
information asymmetry and, in turn, the cost of equity capital (Botosan et al. 2004). While the 
importance of executive remuneration disclosure to corporate governance is widely acknowledged 
in the literature, lack of relevant data has prevented researchers from investigating a possible impact 
on the cost of equity capital more closely. Hence, a focused effort to test the hypothesis that good 
disclosure of executive remuneration reduces the cost of equity capital suggests itself. This leaves 
this core question: Is it possible to analyze the quality and quantity of the disclosure of executive 
remuneration so as to generate a statistically detectable, relevant difference in the cost of equity? 
50 
 
3 Research design and methodological approach 
In this part of the thesis, I draw on the database provided in the first part. With respect to the 
explanatory power of the transparency index to the cost of equity capital and/or stock 
performance, four strategies are analyzed and evaluated.  
First, section 4.1 investigates what the risk spread would be like if one, from January 1999 on, had 
gone long with the stocks of the twenty percent of the banks displaying the highest disclosure 
proxies and, concurrently, had sold short the twenty percent with the lowest disclosure proxies. 
This investment strategy considers the stock prices from January 1999 to June 2005 on a monthly 
basis, all foreign currencies converted to the USD on the respective monthly basis. Being rather an 
observation, there is naturally very limited explanatory thrust to this model.  
Second, in order to evaluate the stock performance in relation to the inherent volatility, in section 
4.2 I compute the Sharpe ratio, again using stock prices from January 1999 to June 2005. It is 
hypothesized that the better the disclosure on either the banks level or the country level is, the 
higher the Sharpe ratio will be, i.e., the better the risk-adjusted performance of the stock.  
Third, in section 4.3 I address the cost of equity capital employing the price-earnings ratios 
(henceforth: P/E ratios) of all banks for the accounting year 2004 as well as the 10-year 
government bond returns of the respective 31 countries. According to the conjecture, stock buyers 
are willing to pay a premium for the stocks of banks displaying excellent disclosure of executive 
remuneration, thus generating higher P/E ratios. On the other hand, banks that exhibit bad 
disclosure of executive remuneration will be penalized with low P/E ratios. The bivariate proxy 
P/E ratio considers the price and the earnings of the banks. Yet it neglects the alternative yield 
possibilities of investors in the 31 different countries - specifically the fact that they can as easily 
invest in either the worldwide risk-free rate or in the local risk-free rate of their respective countries. 
An algorithm will be proposed to equalize those different alternative earnings possibilities. 
Finally, in section 4.4, the investors’ confidence will be epitomized by the Tobin’s q of each bank 
on the base of the accounting year 2004. The conjecture is that investors are willing to pay a 
premium for the assets of those banks that provide good or excellent disclosure of executive 
remuneration. On the other hand, investors demand discounts for the prices of the total assets if 
the respective banks exhibit low levels of disclosure. 
Although possessing information for only one or two accounting years, the assumption is that the 
disclosure behaviour of a bank has been - and will be - the same for years. The execution of 
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disclosure is required by laws and binding listing rules (appendix 4). Those do not vary much over 
the years. Moreover, the principle of disclosure continuity prevails, i.e. laws prohibit constantly 
changing disclosure patterns to some degree. Of course, firms coordinate their disclosure activities 
across different media, such as the quarterly reports, investor relations disclosures, ad-hoc news etc. 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) find a significant rank-order correlation between annual reports and 
other publication disclosure ranks as well as between annual reports and investor relations 
disclosure. Thus their findings support the employment of the annual report as an information base 
for the disclosure proxy. 
Moreover, it is very important for the design of this approach that the form and content of annual 
reports of firms are generally constant and comparable over the years (Lang and Lundholm 2000). 
It is unreasonable to assume erratic changes in terms of the reporting structure.  
So far, the disclosure proxy is the only explanatory variable for lower cost of equity capital and/or 
better stock performance. That, of course, raises questions concerning the problem of endogeneity 
and/or omitted variables. On the one hand, it is possible that banks with higher value systematically 
choose better disclosure of executive remuneration rather than good disclosure causing higher 
valuation (reverse causation). On the other hand, both disclosure levels which are treated as an 
explanatory variable in the following models and pricing/valuation measures taken as endogenous 
variables may be jointly determined by a broader, latent variable such as broadly defined corporate 
governance quality or corporate culture. Consequently, in sections 4.3 and 4.4, two-step 
instrumental regressions will be used to subsequently test for endogeneity.  
Multivariate models will incorporate six additional variables from the first part of the thesis, where 
the respectively constructed factors are extensively discussed. The financial system 
dummy finsys distinguishes between banks located in countries with a bank-based system and 
banks domiciled in countries with market systems (see appendix 2). The law dummy differentiates 
between countries with civil- and common-law traditions (see appendix 6). The dummy mcapgnp  
is supposed to capture the degree of national stock market development. It is the share of a 
country’s stock market capitalization in the country’s GNP, estimating the magnitude of the capital 
market integration of a country. The total assets variable (in USD) reflects the size of each bank as 
measured by the sum of the total assets of the balance sheet as of 2004 (where available - otherwise 
as of 2003), which can also have an influence on the endogenous variables (see appendix 2). A 
potential weakness might be that size determined by total assets neglects significant purchasing 
power disparities across countries and thus possibly underestimates bank sizes in low-income 
countries.  
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The mcapusd variable also represents the size of the bank; however, here size is assessed by the 
market capitalization of common equity as of the end of 2004. In contrast to the size of assets, 
enormous differences may exist with respect to the market cap. For example, the largest bank in 
terms of total assets is the Japanese Mizuho Financial Group; Citigroup, while smaller asset-wise, is 
valued at about five-times the equity capital of Mizuho. 
The rightsdiranti -- variable is supposed to reflect the magnitude and quality of the overall 
corporate governance of a country. This proxy stems from La Porta et al. (1998) and has been 
developed and tested as an index aggregating shareholders rights, which is used as a proxy for the 
quality of enactment of corporate governance. The proxy represents the extent of “antidirector” 
rights of shareholders (see appendix 1). 
While the composition of the analysis has attempted to control for factors suggested by past 
literature, theoretical and empirical limitations obviously prevent me from determining whether all 
major influences have been controlled for. 
Due to the multinational data panel, currency and/or country-related risks are an additional issue. 
Dumas and Solnik (1995) suggest that foreign-exchange risk premiums are a significant component 
influencing securities rates of return in the international financial markets. Several approaches to 
cope with the problems of projected returns and variances in different countries have been 
proposed (e.g. Erb et al. 1996, Harvey 1991 and 1995).  I assume that the employment of the stock 
price in the home currency converted monthly at the respective exchange rate to the US dollars 
considers the currency and country effect for this purpose. 
Most valuation measures used in this paper are commonly employed by investment managers and 
scientists to quickly and efficiently evaluate the performance of firms and their stock prices. 
Generally, what makes for the attractiveness of this study is the idea that an understanding of the 
nexus of disclosure and evaluation could possibly be achieved by solely using such widely 
recognized measures. 
4 Data analysis: impact of transparency  
4.1 Transparency investment strategy: long/short spreads 
The banks will be sorted by their individual disclosure proxy and then be grouped into five parallel 
portfolios according to rank, each bank being equally weighted, thus resulting in 5 bank portfolios 
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containing 46 to 47 banks each. At the beginning of the period covered in this study, shares from 
each of the banks in the portfolio with the highest proxies are bought and held whereas shares of 
each of the 47 banks with the lowest proxies are sold short. All of the banks are publicly listed and 
respective puts are available in order to actually execute such a strategy. In June 2005, these 
positions are liquidated. The difference between this long-short strategy is called the spread. I 
hypothesize that the better the disclosure of executive remuneration of a bank is, the more 
optimistic are investors about the future development of the bank and, consequently, the more 
willing to allot funds to the stock of the respective bank. Thus, over the 78-month period, a 
significant positive spread should evolve between the long and the short strategy. 
Table II.1: Long/short spread results for the five portfolios: The annual return in % denotes 
the average and annual stock price increase of the number of banks per portfolio. All stock prices 
are converted to the US dollar on a monthly base. The SD of annual returns explains the 
standard deviation of the annual returns of the number of banks per portfolio.  
 Annual 
return in %
SD of annual 
returns 
Average proxy 
of banks 
Number of 
banks2 
Portfolio 1 9.9 89.42 18.50 47 
Portfolio 2 11.1 125.87 15.76 46 
Portfolio 3 11.5 115.54 8.85 46 
Portfolio 4 11.8 183.63 2.22 46 
Portfolio 5 6.5 104.36 1.14 47 
Portfolio 1 includes the banks with the most advanced disclosure practices; it yields 9.9% per year. 
Portfolio 5 largely consists of 19 of the 61 Japanese banks, 7 of the 8 Chinese banks, all 6 
Taiwanese and all 4 Brazilian banks. This portfolio contains the banks with the lowest disclosure 
standards, returning only 6.5% per year. That is a 3.4% difference per year over the surveyed 78-
month period. If the standard deviation is considered as an estimate for the uncertainty of returns 
in the respective portfolios, table 1 shows the following: Portfolio 1 offers the investor the lowest 
variation of returns around the average return - contrasting with portfolio 5 with a higher variation 
of 104.4.  
However, the return advantage of Portfolio 1 over the following three Portfolios is neither obvious 
nor consistent with the hypothesis. The higher returns and the higher variations of portfolios 2, 3 
and 4 might suggest that the banks in the portfolios have improved their transparency significantly, 
maybe because the respective countries improved disclosure regulations. While the excellent 
                                                 
2 1% outliers have been excluded. 
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disclosure of the banks in portfolio 1 might have been more constant, the dynamic of the 
improvement in the following three portfolios is expressed by higher volatility - with a higher 
return as a reward for it. 
4.2 Stock performance: Sharpe ratio 
4.2.1 Definition and hypotheses 
A commonly employed practice to assess the nexus of return and volatility, the latter estimated by 
the standard deviation of returns per unit of time, is the Sharpe ratio. Over 25 years ago, Sharpe 
introduced a measure for the performance of mutual funds and proposed the term “reward-to-
variability ratio” to describe it. The measure has gained considerable popularity and is commonly 
known as the “Sharpe ratio”. Sharpe (1994) has designated the original version, the definition is as 
follows: 
)( ,,
,,
tftb
tftb
b RRSD
RR
Sh 
                                                                                                           (4.2-1) 
bSh is the Sharpe ratio of bank b , tbR ,  is the return of bank b  in month t  from January 1999 to 
June 2005, tfR ,  is the benchmark, in this case the world risk-free rate in month t  of the 
countries in the panel, and finally )( ,, tftb RRSD  is the standard deviation of the monthly 
difference of the returns of the bank and the benchmark. 
In this version, the ratio indicates the historic average differential return per unit of historic 
variability of the differential return. The historic Sharpe ratio is closely related to the t-statistic for 
measuring the statistical significance of the mean differential return. The t-statistic will equal the 
Sharpe ratio times the square root of T , i.e., the number of returns used for the calculation. If 
historic Sharpe ratios for a set of funds are computed using the same number of observations, the 
Sharpe ratios will thus be proportional to the t-statistics of the means (Sharpe 1994). 
The data panel consists of 223 banks in 30 countries, 22 banks have been excluded from the 
Sharpe ratio analysis due to insufficient time series data. Indonesia has been left out because there 
was only one bank left in the sample. The 22 excluded banks are dispersed evenly all over the 
portfolios 1 to 5 of chapter 4.1  
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I hypothesize that if investors are of the opinion that the nexus of task, performance and pay of 
executives is designed in an investor-friendly way, they might be willing to stick to their 
investments even in case the company gets in trouble - good disclosure practices on the 
company’s side provided, of course. Hence, the assumption that the volatility of the stock prices 
of banks with good disclosure is lower than the volatility of stock prices of banks with bad 
disclosure suggests itself. Moreover, the better the disclosure of executive remuneration of a bank 
is, the more optimistic are investors about the future development of the bank and, consequently, 
the more willing to allot more funds to the stock of the respective bank, the latter generating 
stock outperformance. Lower volatility and, concurrently, outperformance in respect to the risk-
free return alternative should generate higher Sharpe ratios. Thus, in a bivariate regression 
equation 
iii bproxySh    10                                                 (4.2-2) 
where iSh  is the Sharpe ratio of bank i , ibproxy  is the disclosure proxy of bank i  and i  is the 
error term, 1  is hypothesized to be positive.  
Similarly, all of the 30 countries in the panel have enacted at least some kind of rules regulating the 
disclosure of executive remuneration. Again, it is conjectured that the more comprehensive the 
rules of a country are (higher cproxy ), the lower the risk-induced volatility is, resulting in higher 
Sharpe ratios for the banks of the respective country. In regression terms,  
iji cproxySh   10             (4.2-3) 
with 01   
Apart from the member states of the European Monetary Union, the countries in the panel each 
have their own currency. This implies that stocks of banks located in different countries are listed 
in different currencies with more or less varying exchange rates. To cope with this problem, I 
evaluate all 223 banks in the panel in USD at an exchange rate calculated monthly.  
The US, with an average bank proxy of 18.83 points, displays a maximum Sharpe ratios spread of 
401 base points between the Hudson Midcity MHC and Charles Schwab Corp. and Greece, with 
an average bank proxy of 3.3, has a spread of only 97 base points for the Sharpe ratio. This is 
surprising. A possible explanation is that in countries with high bank disclosure proxies, investors 
divest less often and are willing to stick to their investments longer than in countries with low 
proxies because they are informed about and content with the nexus of task, performance and 
pay of the executives. However, if they detect bad performance with banks displaying good 
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disclosure, investors may punish these banks more severely by selling, thus generating higher 
volatility than in countries with bad disclosure. Investors in countries with bad disclosure, on the 
other hand, are perhaps not capable of detecting the magnitude of bad performance due to lower 
disclosure levels, or are aware of the fact that they do not know the full story and, hence, have 
not invested in the first place. This leads to the following conjecture: 
  ijji bproxyShSD   10,                                                            (4.2-4) 
with 01   
An early counterargument will be that the more banks there are in a country, the higher the 
standard deviation to the respective average Sharpe ratio will be. However, the regression of the 
number of banks per country and the standard deviation of the individual banks to the country 
average on USD-level clearly prove that there is no close relationship (table 2): 
Table II. 2: Regression results of SD of Sharpe ratios on number of banks per country: 
The explanatory variable is the number of banks per country, the endogenous variable is the 
standard deviation of the banks’ Sharpe ratio per country.  
 USD SD Sharpe USD on number of banks 
1  4.21e-4 (4.81e-4) 
Intercept 0.054 
2R  0.027 
T-test - 
The actual values of the Sharpe ratio of the banks per country are displayed in table 3. The banks in 
Saudi Arabia achieved the highest Sharpe ratio, while the banks in Portugal came in last. 
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Table II.3: Banks Sharpe ratios per country: The country and bank disclosure proxy are 
explained in part I of the thesis. The bank proxy is the average of the individual banks’ disclosure 
proxy per country. The Sharpe USD is the average Sharpe ratio of the banks in the respective 
country, calculated from January 1999 to June 2005 on a monthly base. The stock prices of the 
banks in the countries are converted to the US dollar on a monthly base. SD Sh. USD denotes 
the standard deviation of the banks’ Sharpe ratios per country. 
COUNTRY Number 
of banks
Country 
proxy 
Bank 
proxy 
Sharpe 
USD 
SD  
Sh. USD 
Australia 6 5.00 13.25 0.222 0.060 
Austria 2 5.00 10.000 0.271 0.043 
Belgium 3 3.00 9.500 0.044 0.051 
Brazil 4 6.00 0.250 0.193 0.029 
Canada 6 19.00 18.500 0.193 0.028 
China 8 0.00 2.190 0.064 0.123 
Denmark 2 6.00 8.500 0.305 0.050 
France 2 10.00 12.670 0.106 0.029 
Germany 6 5.00 9.630 0.035 0.074 
Greece 5 4.00 3.300 0.024 0.041 
India 3 14.00 5.900 0.224 0.031 
Ireland 4 19.00 17.800 0.141 0.139 
Israel 4 0.00 8.500 0.113 0.043 
Italy 11 13.00 13.330 0.081 0.079 
Japan 55 6.50 2.110 0.043 0.062 
Malaysia 2 15.00 8.250 0.180 0.086 
Netherlands 3 11.50 17.330 0.125 0.054 
Portugal 3 5.00 8. 670 -0.029 0.054 
Saudi Arabia 3 5.50 4.170 0.395 0.057 
Singapore 3 1.00 11.670 0.133 0.021 
South Africa 5 15.00 12.300 0.096 0.086 
South Korea 3 0.00 0.000 0.129 0.041 
Spain 5 6.50 11.200 0.094 0.037 
Switzerland 5 10.00 8.300 0.158 0.131 
Sweden 4 16.50 15.880 0.112 0.038 
Taiwan 3 12.00 3.100 -0.003 0.027 
Thailand 3 0.00 13.830 0.061 0.048 
Turkey 4 0.00 0.380 0.150 0.025 
UK 10 17.00 16.860 0.113 0.061 
USA 46 19.00 18.830 0.085 0.078 
MEAN 223 8.167 9.189 0.129 0.058 
Standard 
deviation 
 6.190 5.556 0.092 0.031 
 
4.2.2 One-factor regression analysis 
In the first step, the regression analysis will be conducted for the equations (4.2-2) - (4.2-4), based 
on the cumulated panel data as shown in table 3. That is, the Sharpe ratios and the disclosure 
proxies of all banks in one country are accumulated per country. The value of the country in the 
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regression is weighted by the respective number of the banks in relation to the total number of 
banks in the panel.  
Table II.4: Sharpe ratio one-factor country regression: The endogenous variable is the 
average Sharpe ratio of the banks per country, the exogenous variable is the bank disclosure 
proxy (one average  proxy per country) in column 2, the country disclosure proxy in column 3 
and the standard deviation of the banks’ Sharpe ratios per country. The (a) columns present the 
results of regressions with normalized variables (z-transformation). ** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% level.  
 2: Abs. Sharpe on bank proxy 
2a: z-val 
Sharpe on 
banks proxy
3: Abs. 
Sharpe on 
country proxy
3a z-val 
Sharpe on 
country proxy
4: Abs. SD 
Sharpe on 
bank proxy 
4a: z-val. SD 
Sharpe on 
bank proxy 
1  0.0043 (0.001) 0.852 (0.099) 0.004 (3.79e-4) 0.908 (0.079) 0.004 (0.001) 0.768 (0.121) 
Intercept  0.393 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.174 0.000 
2R  0.725 0.725 0.824 0.824 0.590 0.590 
T-test ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Standard errors are included in parentheses. In addition to the absolute results of the regression 
coefficients, in the respective (a) columns I present the regression coefficient that is based on a z-
transformation of the Sharpe ratios and the disclosure proxies. On an accumulated country level, 
there exists a significant relation between the aggregate proxies and the aggregate Sharpe ratios. 
One point more on an aggregate banks disclosure proxy enhances the aggregate Sharpe ratio by 
0.43 points. The same effect holds true when countries’ disclosure enactment increases. The 
impact of the magnitude of a country’s issued rules regulating the disclosure of executive 
remuneration is even stronger than the banks’ actual disclosure practices. However, higher 
disclosure proxies of banks per country come along with an enlarged standard deviation from the 
respective country’s average, leading to the conjecture that lower stock performance and higher 
volatility of the stock prices are induced by investors, if they do not like what they see. In case of 
low average bank proxies per country, standard deviation of the Sharpe ratios may be lower, 
because investors already demand higher risk premiums and/or are less invested altogether.  
These country-by-country level regressions bear two systematic problems: First, due to their 
cumulative nature, they neglect the variations of the bank’s proxies and Sharpe ratios within one 
country. For this first analysis, aggregate bank proxies for each country have been employed: all the 
proxies for banks in each respective country have been added together. Second, the sample size of 
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30 is relatively small. Hence, in the second step, the regressions are computed according to an 
individual bank’s base. This leads to the following results: 
Table II.5: Sharpe ratio one-factor bank regression: The endogenous variable is the 
individual Sharpe ratio per bank, the exogenous variable is the bank’s individual disclosure proxy 
in column 2 and the country disclosure proxy in column 3. The (a) columns present the results of 
regressions with normalized variables (z-transformation). * denotes statistical significance at the 
5% level, “-“ denotes no statistical significance at the conventional level. 
 2: Abs. Sharpe on banks proxy 
2a: z-val Sharpe 
on banks proxy 
3: Abs. Sharpe on 
country proxy 
3a: z-val Sharpe 
on country proxy 
1  0.002  (0.001) 0.132  (0.067) 0.001 (0.001) 0.053  (0.067) 
Intercept  0.079 -2.99e-16 0.088 -3.52e-16 
2R  0.018 0.018 0.003 0.003 
T-test * * - - 
On the individual bank’s level, in contrast to the aggregate country level regressions, the bank-by-
bank Sharpe ratio regressions almost completely lose their support of the hypothesis. Compared to 
the highly significant results of the Sharpe ratio one-factor country regressions in table II.3, the 
results in table II.5 are of minor significance. This reduction in significance is explained by the 
variations of the individual bank’s proxies and Sharpe ratios within one country. While the bank 
proxy remains positive on the 5% significance level, the impact of the country proxy on the bank’s 
Sharpe ratio is gone.  
4.3 Cost of equity capital: P/E ratios 
4.3.1 Definitions and hypotheses 
Besides the share price itself, the P/E ratio of a company is the most-publicly used substitute to 
assess the attractiveness of a company’s share price in relation to its current earnings. In fact, in the 
financial press the P/E ratio is referred to more often than the price-to-book ratio. It is probably 
the financial ratio most frequently talked about (Penman 2001). 
I employ the definition of the data source Bloomberg (2005): The P/E ratio is the relationship 
between the price of a stock and its earnings per share, calculated as stock price divided by earnings 
per share. Earnings per share are calculated on a trailing 12-month basis by adding up the most 
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recent four quarters (where available). If quarterly figures are not available, the P/E will be based 
on annual earnings or on the earnings of the most recent two semi-annuals. Price p is determined 
by the respective trading volume adjusted average of daily prices of the stock of bank i  
)238,,1( i  from country j )29,,1( j  per year 2004. 
I hypothesize that the higher the P/E ratio of a bank is, the lower the return on invested capital for 
the investor will be, resulting, in turn, in a lowered risk premium expected by the investors. Again, it 
is hypothesized that the better the disclosure of executive remuneration is, the lower the capital 
costs will be. Thus a high P/E ratio should coincide with a better disclosure proxy. 
The P/E ratio is regarded as an indicator of risk: the riskier the present and the future of a bank’s 
performance and earnings are, the lower they will be priced relative to current earnings. However, 
P/E ratios also indicate a bank’s ability to increase earnings. The price in the numerator is based on 
expected future earnings. Consequently, a high P/E ratio means that future earnings are expected 
to be higher than current earnings in the denominator. In the first part of this P/E ratio analysis, it 
will be assumed that - since there are only more or less homogenous banks in a well-integrated 
environment - the potential differences in earnings growth are negligible. Further below in this 
chapter, a proxy for the individual earnings growth will be included in the regression analysis. 
iii bproxybpe   10        (4.3-1) 
with 0 1  , 
where ibpe  is the P/E ratio of bank i  and ibproxy  is the proxy for the magnitude of the 
disclosure of the executive remuneration of bank i . 
As for the countries in which the banks are domiciled, it is supposed that the more comprehensive 
the rules and regulations concerning the disclosure of executive remuneration are, the higher the 
average P/E ratio will be: 
iji cproxybpe   10   (4.3-2) 
with 0 1  , 
where jcproxy  is the disclosure proxy of country j . 
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In addition, each of the 29 countries3 in the panel has a leading stock market index, usually 
comprising major (in terms of market capitalization) publicly traded companies. There is also a P/E 
ratio for these stock market indices available, viz the (market-cap) value-weighted sum of all P/E 
ratios of the companies in the index. Thus, it is conjectured that the higher the country disclosure 
proxy, the higher the respective P/E ratio of the stock market index will be. This observation will 
test the nexus of disclosure requirements in the countries and the cost of equity capital of the total 
stock market index. Hence, it will not be focused on banks. 
ijj cproxycpe   10     (4.3-3) 
with 0 1  , 
where jcpe  is the P/E ratio of the stock market index of country j . 
However, the P/E ratio bears two logical deficiencies, which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
4.3.2 Tackling two structural deficits of the P/E ratio 
On condition that earnings of a company are negative or very low, the P/E ratio exhibits two 
weaknesses. In the first case, the P/E ratio becomes negative, which does not yield logical sense. In 
case of very low earnings, the P/E delivers very high numbers, implying that potential investors 
expect a negative risk premium in comparison to the risk-free rate. The South Korean Kookmin 
bank, for example, exhibits a P/E ratio of 3233 due to extremely low profits. It is not reasonable to 
assume that the shareholders of the bank are satisfied with a profit margin in relation to the share 
price of 0.0003%. The German banks in particular show negative P/E ratios due to the fact that, in 
the years 2003 and 2004, severe restructurings were conducted at the Commerzbank, 
HypoVereinsbank, Aareal Bank and the Bankgesellschaft Berlin. 
To tackle the problem with unreasonably high P/E ratios, an “attenuator” is incorporated in the 
simulation. It will be conjectured that in the long-run, investors do not purchase stocks at a P/E 
ratio that is twice as high as the country’s P/E average. In the case of much higher P/E ratios 
based on actual profits, the expectation of significantly higher future earnings is expressed. This 
threshold is supported by the market cap to book equity capital ratio of the respective banks (table 
6): 
                                                 
3 Israel and Saudi Arabia had to be excluded from the analysis due to insufficient data availability. 
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Table II.6: Market capitalization premium to the book capital - high outliers: The first two 
lines show the relation of the stock market capitalization to the book equity value of the banks 
with high outlier P/Es in percent. Column one denotes the median mean and column two the 
arithmetic mean of the high outliers. Line three is the relation of the high outliers mean to the full 
sample mean.  
Median 
Arithmetic 
average 
Full sample 101% 135% 
High outliers 146% 297% 
Premium ratio of 
outlier to sample 
145% 243% 
To assess the negative P/E outliers properly, it is assumed that no investor will purchase stocks of 
banks with a P/E ratio of less than one fourth of the country-specific P/E ratios. Banks with a 
negative P/E ratio and a positive share price provide investors with the future outlook of a decent 
profit return on capital; otherwise their market capitalization could not be explained. This threshold 
is supported by the market cap to book equity capital ratio of the respective banks (table 7): 
Table II.7: Market capitalization premium to the book capital - negative outliers: The first 
two lines show the relation of the stock market capitalization to the book equity value of the 
banks with negative outlier P/Es in percent. Column one denotes the median mean and column 
two the arithmetic mean of the negative outliers. Line three is the relation of the negative outliers 
mean to the full sample mean. 
Median 
Arithmetic 
average 
Full sample 101% 135% 
Negative outliers 22% 35% 
Premium ratio of 
outlier to sample 
22% 28% 
The deficiency adjustment leads to the panel data given in appendix 8. 
Henceforth, the hypotheses (4.3-1) and (4.3-2) are as follows: 
iii bproxybadjpe   10 ,  (4.3-4) 
iji cproxybadjpe   10   (4.3-5)                      
with 0 1  , in both cases, 
whereas ibadjpe  is the deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of bank i . 
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4.3.3 Incorporating different earnings possibilities for each country 
The major stock indices of the countries in the panel exhibit different P/E ratios. These different 
P/E ratios are partly based on the different risk-free interest rates in the respective countries that 
offer an investment alternative to stocks, different expected earnings growth rates, and, of course, 
different risk premiums that the investor demands from the companies in these countries due to 
diverse country risk gradings. Generally, different average P/E ratios exist among various 
industries. Since the panel data contains banks only, there should be no further significant bias.  
However, the different alternative earnings possibilities will have to be considered. As the P/E ratio 
depends on the cost of capital, and the cost of capital in turn depends in part on overall interest 
rates, P/E ratios are sensitive to interest rates. So when interest rates of government obligations 
were high in the late 1970s and early 1980s, P/E ratios were low; when interest rates were relatively 
low in the 1990s, P/E ratios were relatively high (Penman 2001). 
The effect of different local interest rates will be incorporated by a separate and second adjustment. 
The variously expected profit growth rates will be neglected because it is assumed that the 
information about the profit that the banks plan in the future - and, of course, the investors’ 
willingness to trust this plan - is already incorporated in the current stock pricing.  
The impact of the different, local risk-free interest rate on the P/E ratio will be estimated as 
follows: in country j , one either invests in long-term government bonds - in this case with a 10-
year maturity and an interest return (coupon yield and bond price changes) of jbdr , - or, 
alternatively, in the stocks of bank  i  in country j  with an expected return of )/(1,, ijib badjper  . 
The short-term interest levels of the local money markets will not be included because stock 
investments, by nature, are long-term investments, thus the long-term, 10-year government bond 
returns will be utilized to estimate the impact of the interest rates. Moreover, money-market returns 
are not so much as long-term bonds moulded by the free offer and demand of the financial 
markets but rather tend to be tactical instruments by the respective central banks and governments 
used to react to the national economic situation. 
One objection is that in the case of the government bond, the investor receives the full interest 
payment whereas in the case of the stocks P/E ratio, it depends on the dividend policy of the bank 
to determine what part of profits will be paid out as dividends and what part are retained earnings. 
However, the accumulated profits strengthen the balance sheet of the bank and, hence, an 
increasing stock price will eventually compensate for the profit retention. 
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Tax-wise there exists a second objection. Some countries apply different tax rates on interest 
income, dividend income and capital gains. For the purpose of this calculation it is assumed that the 
stock price, as it is determined by the demand of an investor, comprises the tax issues. 
The average return of the 10-year government bonds, weighted according to the respective number 
of banks domiciled in the 31 countries in the sample, is 4.53%, the average P/E ratio of the local 
stock market indices, accordingly weighted, is 23.09, and the average of the deficiency-adjusted P/E 
ratio of the banks is 10.15. 
With regard to adjusting for the different yield possibilities, the following transformation will be 
applied: 
i
gbd
jgbd
i badjperavg
r
badjpeir
)(
- , ,   (4.3-6) 
where ibadjpeir -  is the interest rate and deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of bank i , jgbdr ,  is the 
10-year government bond return of the respective country j  of bank i , and )( gbdravg  is the (by 
the number of the banks per country weighted average) 10-year government bond return of all 29 
countries.  
In the same way, the P/E ratios of the stock market indices of the countries will be transformed: 
i
gdb
jgbd
j cadjperavg
r
cadjpeir
)(
- , ,                                                                                          (4.3-7) 
where jcadjpeir -  is the interest-rate and deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio of  country j . 
Thus, the hypotheses (4.3-4), (4.3-5) and (4.3-3) formulated earlier will be tested by the following 
regressions: 
iii bproxybadjpeir   10-     (4.3-8) 
iji cproxybadjpeir   10-                                                                                        (4.3-9) 
iji cproxycadjpeir   10-                                                                                      (4.3-10) 
with 0 1  , in all three cases. 
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4.3.4 One-factor regression analysis 
In the first step, the regression analysis will be conducted for the equations (4.3-1) - (4.3-3), based 
on the panel data as shown in appendix 8. That is, the deficiency-adjusted P/E rations and the 
disclosure proxies of all banks in one country are accumulated per country. The cumulative values 
of banks’ disclosure proxies and P/E ratios per country reflect the overall importance of each 
country’s banking sector in the panel. Thus, countries with a larger number of listed banks have 
greater weights. 
The calculation reveals the following results, neglecting the alternative yield possibilities of the 
different risk-free rates of the 10-year government bonds in the respective countries: 
Table II.8: Deficiency-adjusted P/E one-factor regression results (country-level): The 
explanatory variables are the average bank disclosure proxy per country in line one and the 
country disclosure proxy in the second row. The dependent variable is the average and 
deficiency-adjusted P/E of the banks per country in the first columns and the country P/E in the 
last column. “**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Regressions with banks’ P/E as 
dependent variable (cumulated)
Regression with 
country P/E as 
dependent variable 
bproxy  
(cumulated) 
0.561**  
(0.163)   
cproxy   0.712** (0.122) 
1.727**  
(0.424) 
2R  0.289 0.539 0.364 
All regressions have been estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and include an 
intercept. Statistical significance on the 1% and 5% level is indicated with ** and *, respectively. 
Standard errors of coefficient estimates are included in parentheses.  
After incorporating the different yield possibilities in the respective countries into the P/E ratios of 
the countries and the banks as outlined in 4.2, the results are as follows:  
66 
 
Table II.9: Interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E one-factor regression results (country-
level): The explanatory variables are the average bank disclosure proxy per country in line one 
and the country disclosure proxy in the second line. The dependent variable is the average, 
interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E of the banks per country in the first columns and the 
country P/E in the last column. “**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Regressions with banks’ 
interest-adjusted P/E as 
dependent variable (cumulated)
Regression with 
country interest-
adjusted P/E 
bproxy  
(cumulated) 
0.532** 
(0.049)   
cproxy   0.523** (0.034) 
1.115** 
(0.087) 
2R  0.800 0.893 0.851 
Taking these results at face value, a broadening of aggregate disclosure of executive remuneration 
by one point increases the aggregate P/E ratio by 0.53 points and thus reduces the risk premium 
that the investors demand by 0.51%. Thus, investors do not demand an average return on 
investment of 10.23% p.a. as they do with a P/E ratio of 9.75, but they ask for 9.72%, leading to a 
new P/E ratio of 10.28. For the governments of the respective countries, the impact of enhanced 
rules and regulations leads to even more significantly reduced risk premium demands of investors. 
This conjecture is valid for all companies that are included in the respective stock market indices; 
however the impact of enhanced rules of disclosure on banks only is stronger. 
However, these country-by-country level regressions bear two systematic problems: First, due to 
their cumulative nature, they neglect the variations of the banks proxies and P/E ratios within one 
country. For this first analysis, aggregate bank proxies for each country have been employed: he 
arithmetic mean of the proxy for each country has been multiplied by the number of banks located 
in that country. Henceforth, the weighted measures for a small panel whose banks exhibit large 
disclosure proxies and a large panel whose banks show small disclosure proxies may turn out to be 
very similar. The same goes for cumulative P/E ratios. Second, the sample size of 31 is relatively 
small.  
Hence, in the second step, the regressions are computed on an individual bank’s base. This leads to 
the following results, with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses: 
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Table II.10: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on individual banks 
and country disclosure proxies: The explanatory variables are the individual banks disclosure 
proxy in line one and the country disclosure proxy in the second line. The dependent variable is 
the individual, interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E of the banks in the first columns and the 
country P/E in the last column. “**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Regressions with banks’ 
interest-adjusted P/E  
Regression with 
country interest-
adjusted P/E 
bproxy  
 
0.248** 
(0.034)   
cproxy   0.174** (0.041) 
0.295** 
(0.050) 
2R  0.189 0.073 0.132 
The results are statistically significant and support hypotheses (4.3-8) through (4.3-10). In contrast 
to the aggregate bank-per-country level, at an individual bank’s level, the hypotheses (4.3-1) to (4.3-
3) can only be supported by the data, if the P/E ratios of the banks are adjusted by the varying 
alternative earnings possibilities in the respective countries where the banks are domiciled. While on 
the aggregate bank-per-country level the impact of the countries’ magnitude of rules and 
regulations concerning the disclosure of executive remuneration on the banks’ aggregate P/E ratios 
is higher than the banks’ aggregate disclosure habits, on a bank-per-bank level the effect of the 
individual bank’s disclosure efforts exceeds the country proxy’s impact. 
Generally, high one-factor regressions bear the danger of omitted variables and endogeneity. In the 
next chapter, besides disclosure quality the regressions will include further explanatory variables 
such as the size of the banks proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets as well as market 
capitalization, historical growth of profits, the level of the capital market integration of a country, 
and the strength of antidirector rights.  
4.3.5 Multi-factor regression analysis  
In order to address the issue of omitted variables in one-factor regression in the previous chapter, 
the following model is estimated: 
,--                   
-
6
543210
ij
jiiiii
rightsdiranti
mcapgnpmcapusdlnassetsgrprofitbproxybadjpeir




    (4.3-11) 
68 
 
where ibadjpeir - is the P/E ratio of each bank in the sample adjusted in the manner described 
previously, ibproxy  is the disclosure proxy of the respective bank i , jmcapgnp  is the share of a 
country’s stock market capitalization in the GNP of country j , estimating the magnitude of the 
capital market integration of a country, and supposed to capture for the degree of national stock 
market development. To control for different growth potentials, igrprofit  proxies for growth rate 
of profits are measured as the relative difference between bank’s i  pretax profits from 2003 to 
2004. The ilnassets  variable reflects the size of each bank measured by the logarithm of total 
assets of the balance sheet as of 2004, which can also have an influence on the P/E ratio. 
The imcapusd variable also represents the size of bank i ; however, in this case size is assessed by 
the market capitalization of common equity as of the end of 2004. The jrightsdiranti --  variable 
is supposed to epitomize an estimator for the magnitude and quality of the overall corporate 
governance in country j . These proxies stem from La Porta et al. (1998) and have been developed 
and tested as an index aggregating shareholders rights, which is used as a proxy for the quality of 
enactment of corporate governance. The proxy represents the extent of “antidirector” rights of 
shareholders. On a scale from 0 to 5, the higher the factor is, the better the antidirector rights of 
shareholders are.  
The model is estimated with Generalized Least Squares, where account has been taken of possible 
error interdependencies within countries. The results are presented in table 11. Robust standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
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Table II.11: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on individual banks 
disclosure proxies and the control variables: The explanatory variables are the individual 
banks disclosure proxy and the 5 control variables profit growth ( grprofit ), market capitalization 
of the individual banks ( mcapusd ), the size of banks in terms of the logarithm of total assets 
( lnassets ), the capital market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the strengths of the 
antidirector rights of the countries ( antidir ). The dependent variable is the individual, interest- 
and deficiency-adjusted P/E of the banks. The first column presents the nonstandardized 
regression coefficients and the second column shows the standardized (z-transformation) 
coefficients. “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. Robust standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
 
Nonstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
bproxy  0.288** (0.096) 0.532** 
grprofit  0.344 (0.257) 0.107 
mcapusd  2.40e-06** (4.00e-07) 0.211* 
lnassets  -1.023** (0.246) -0.321** 
mcapgnp  -0.556 
(1.015) -0.071 
antidir  -0.248 (0.394) -0.094 
Intercept  Yes 
2R  0.25 
In the model specification, the disclosure proxy has the highest positive impact on the P/E ratios 
of the banks in comparison with other regressors (standardized coefficients of 0.532). All else being 
equal, a one-point improvement of disclosure can be expected to account for an about 0.3-point 
increase in the value of the bank as expressed by P/E ratios weighted according to country-specific 
differences in risk-free rates. The coefficient of bproxy  is statistically significant, as well as 
coefficients on market capitalization of the bank mcapusd  and the log of banks’ book value of 
assets. The magnitude of the historic profit-growth coefficient is economically significant (a one-
percent change in growth is associated with a 0.3% change in risk- and deficiency-adjusted P/Es), 
but has no statistical significance in these model specifications.  
Admittedly, the grprofit  variable may be an imprecise control for growth since, due to data 
availability constraints, it considers changes in profits over two years only. Surprisingly, the proxy 
for the overall quality of the corporate governance of a country ( antidir ) contradicts intuition and 
common sense - better antidirector rights come along with lower P/E ratios. However, the data of 
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La Porta et al. stem from 1998 and thus the quality of this correlation is to be questioned. 
Nonetheless, it does tend to support the theory that the quality and magnitude of the disclosure of 
executive remuneration on the one hand, and general corporate governance issues on the other 
hand, are not regarded equally by the equity markets. Another significantly negative relationship is 
the size as estimated by the total assets and the willingness of investors to reduce risk premiums. 
No significant relation exists between the capital market integration and the level of P/E ratios. 
4.3.6 Endogeneity concerns 
Another problem that may weaken the regression results is possible endogeneity of the bank 
disclosure proxy. This would be the case if bank-specific disclosure practices are influenced by or 
are part of broader corporate governance practices going beyond the control for antidirector rights 
in model specification above, which directly impact banks’ P/E ratios. It is also possible that banks 
with high P/E ratios tend to endogenously practice good disclosure; that is, market valuation of a 
bank expressed by P/E ratios would have an influence on disclosure standards and not vice versa. 
To deal with endogeneity, one needs at least one instrumental variable for the bank disclosure 
proxy that is highly correlated with the proxy but is not correlated with the error term. The financial 
system dummy (equals to one for banks located in market-based system countries and zero for 
bank-based systems) and the bank disclosure proxy have a relatively high correlation coefficient of 
0.7. It is also plausible that the market system dummy will be exogenous if used in models as an 
instrument for the bank proxy since individual banks have no decisive influence on their legal and 
economic environment. Another suitable instrument is the law dummy, which differentiates 
between civil- and common-law countries. La Porta et al. (1998-2002) show that the law origin of 
countries is relevant for corporate governance regulations. Using both dummies as instruments for 
bproxy  in 2SLS regressions produces a positive and highly significant coefficient on disclosure of 
0.448 in the full model specification (regression in table 12). 2SLS coefficient estimates on bproxy  
remain highly significant and are larger than those in OLS and GLS regressions. Standard errors in 
parentheses in the table below are robust and account for cluster (country) interdependencies. Thus 
the results of 2SLS regressions go in line with the initial hypothesis. A Hausman test does not reject 
the null hypothesis that bproxy  is exogenous, so that endogeneity does not seem to be an issue 
here. 
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Table II.12: Regressions of interest- and deficiency-adjusted P/E on instrumented 
individual banks disclosure proxies and the control variables: The explanatory variables are 
the instrumented (by law system and financial system) individual banks disclosure proxy and the 
5 control variables profit growth ( grprofit ), market capitalization of the individual banks 
( mcapusd ), the size of banks in terms of the logarithm of total assets ( lnassets ), the capital 
market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the strengths of the antidirector rights of the 
countries ( antidir ). The dependent variable is the individual, interest- and deficiency-adjusted 
P/E of the banks. “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. Robust 
standard errors of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
bproxy  
instrumented by 
financial system and 
law dummies 
0.448** 
(0.101) 
grprofit  0.290 (0.270) 
mcapusd  2.56e-06** (3.11e-07) 
lnassets  -1.316** (0.331) 
mcapgnp  -0.906 
(1.140) 
antidir  -0.537  (0.455) 
Intercept  Yes 
2R  0.20 
4.3.7 Criticism of the interpretation of adjusted data 
The results of bank-by-bank regressions support the hypothesis well. The interpretation of the 
coefficients of bproxy , however, is not straightforward, since the dependent variable has been 
transformed. Transformation always means a change and sometimes creates a difficulty with regard 
to the interpretation of the estimated coefficients. On the one hand, the adjustments that have been 
made of P/Es for a risk-free rate are intuitive. On the other hand, when interpreting the regressions 
with the transformed P/Es, the estimated coefficients are marginal changes, all else being equal, of 
the transformed P/Es, not of the original P/Es, with resulting difficulties in making policy-relevant 
conclusions on the basis of these research results. After identifying the strongly positive 
relationship between disclosure and transformed P/Es, one cannot tell a bank’s executive that a 
one-point improvement in disclosure can be expected to bring him a 0.24 point improvement in his 
bank’s P/E, at least not the P/E that he computes by dividing share’s price by earnings per share, 
but the only in the transformed P/E, which is strictly speaking a different variable, even if it is 
more easily justified economically as a more accurate measure of value. 
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Henceforth, although the logical flow of the arguments about transforming the different risk-free 
earning alternatives is conclusive, the question remains: What would the regression results look like 
if one does not follow that transformation? This will be discussed in the next section. 
4.3.8 Alternative regressions with only deficiency-adjusted P/E 
On the country level, there is a statistically significant relationship between disclosure standards 
established by national legislation as measured by country disclosure proxy icproxy , and only 
deficiency-adjusted P/E ratios of selected capital market indexes. The following OLS regression 
results were obtained for a sample of 28 countries. Israel and Saudi Arabia have been excluded 
because data on the country P/E ratios were not available. Japan’s stock index P/E ratio appears to 
be an extreme outlier (see diagram 1), so it has been excluded from the regression as well. The P/E 
ratios of the resulting sample are a good approximation of the normal distribution, which is 
confirmed by the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. 
Diagram II.1: Only deficiency-adjusted average country P/E to country proxy 
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In a further regression, the countries capital market integration, proxied by the stock market 
capitalization of each country as a share of the GDP and the antidirector rights dummy are added 
as explanatory variables to control for differences in capital market integration and the strength of 
shareholder rights as an additional expression of external corporate governance. As can be seen in 
table 13, the coefficients of both control variables, however, are statistically insignificant.  
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Table II.13: Regressions with the only deficiency-adjusted country P/E ratios of national 
stock indexes on country disclosure proxies and the two country control variables: The 
explanatory variables are the country disclosure proxies and the two control variables capital 
market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the strengths of the antidirector rights of the 
countries ( antidir ). The dependent variable is the only deficiency-adjusted country P/E of the 
national stock markets.“*” denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Robust standard errors 
of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
cproxy  0.268* 
(0.098) 
mcapgnp  -0.833 
(1.118) 
antidir  -0.269 (0.493) 
2R  0.148 
The model predicts that a one-point improvement in a country’s disclosure standards is associated 
with a 0.268-point increase in P/E ratios of the respective national stock index.  
Conducting regression analysis with only deficiency-adjusted P/E ratios of the individual banks 
poses a number of challenges. As mentioned earlier, within each country, many important factors 
may prevail which ultimately affect banks’ P/E ratios, such as legislative norms, economic situation, 
disturbances in the national capital markets, taxation differences, culture-specific investor behavior, 
etc. Adequate modeling of all relevant factors is difficult, considering the immense scope of 
country-specific knowledge and data one would need for a comprehensive model. Avoiding 
modeling country specificities altogether, however, may lead to inconsistent or biased estimations. 
4.3.9 Bank’s P/E positions in relation to the average country P/E and the bank proxy 
Including national capital markets’ relative sizes is but a minimal control for relevant differences 
between countries. Now, to put each individual bank’s P/E ratio in the national economic context, 
a new variable, cinadjpe , is created. This variable equals the difference between an individual 
bank’s P/E ratio and the P/E ratio of its home country’s national stock market index. Israel and 
Saudi Arabia have been excluded again because data on the country P/E ratios were not available. 
The bank and country P/Es are only deficiency-adjusted and not transformed with regard to the 
different earning alternatives. The GLS regression results are shown in table 14. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses: 
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Table II.14: Regression of the difference between individual bank P/E ratios and country 
stock market index P/E ratios on individual bank proxy and control variables: The 
explanatory variables are the individual bank disclosure proxies and the two control variables 
capital market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the size of the banks ( lnassets ). The 
dependent variable is the only deficiency-adjusted difference between individual bank P/E ratios 
and country stock market index P/E ratios. “**” and “*” denote statistical significance at the 1% 
and 5% level. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
bproxy  0.820** (0.113) 
mcapgnp  -6.209** 
(1.407) 
lnassets  -0.593 (0.467) 
2R  0.22 
The regression coefficient of bproxy  is positive and much larger in magnitude. All else being equal, 
a one-point increase in bproxy  is predicted to account for a 0.82 point increase in the difference 
between a bank’s P/E ratio and the P/E ratio of the national stock index, which is attributable to a 
rise in the bank’s P/E. The following graph plots the predicted regression line in the two-
dimensional space of bank’s disclosure proxy and P/E difference measure: 
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Diagram II.2: Bivariate scatterplot of individual bank’s disclosure proxy vs. difference 
between bank and country P/E ratios 
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It is obvious that the results are likely to be driven by the concentration of observations in the 
bottom left corner of the plot. Almost all of those observations are of Japanese banks. In the 
country level regression above, Japan has been excluded since the P/E ratio of its stock index was 
an obvious outlier.  
With an average around 42, the P/E ratios of the Japanese banks are generally rather high by 
comparison with banks in other countries. That is an indication of the special economic situation in 
Japan, particularly in light of its recent history of stagnation and crisis in the banking sector. All of 
this has resulted in an extremely loose monetary policy with negative real interest rates and 
accordingly poor-to-nonexistent alternative opportunities for capital investors. One way to deal 
with this special situation was the 10-year government bond interest transformation previously. 
Here, a dummy variable for Japan is created, which equals one for all observations on Japanese 
banks and is zero otherwise. Another argument for a control variable for Japan derives also from 
the high number of Japanese banks in the sample, i.e. 61 out of 238, whereas most other countries 
are represented by less than eight banks. Generalized least squares pooled regressions are computed 
with natural logarithms of banks’ deficiency-adjusted P/E ratios as dependent variables to reduce 
the variance. The results are exhibited in table 15: 
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Table II.15: Regression banks P/E on banks proxy with Japan dummy: The explanatory 
variables are the individual bank disclosure proxies and the dummy variable for Japan. The 
dependent variables are the only deficiency-adjusted, individual, logarithmized bank P/E ratios of 
the national stock markets. “**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Robust standard 
errors of the estimated coefficients are included in parentheses.  
bproxy  
0.012 
(0.007) 
significant at 10% level
(dummy) Japan 0.546** (0.104) 
lnassets  -0.066** (0.022) 
Intercept  yes 
2R  0.197 
The coefficient on bproxy  in the second regression is significant on the 10% level. It is positive, 
which is in line with the hypothesis of higher P/E ratios for better disclosure practices on the level 
of individual banks. Its economic magnitude, however, remains relatively small. Since the 
dependent variable is in the logarithmic form, the coefficient on bproxy  can be interpreted as a 
percentage change in P/E ratios following a marginal change in disclosure proxy. All other things 
being equal, a one-point increase in bproxy  (range 0 to 18.5) can be associated with an 
approximately one percent rise in a bank’s deficiency-adjusted P/E ratio. 
4.4 Investor’s confidence: Tobin’s q 
4.4.1 Definition and calculation of Tobin’s q 
Tobin’s q has become an increasingly attractive theoretical firm performance measure because it 
provides an estimate of the value of a firm’s intangible assets, such as monopoly power, goodwill, 
high quality managers and growth opportunities, where the value is assumed to reflect the results of 
performance (Perfect and Wiles 1994, Tobin 1978). Originally, Tobin’s q was defined as the ratio of 
the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its assets and was first introduced into 
macroanalysis by Tobin (1969) in order to explain the causal relationship between q and 
investment. Tobin argues that if at the margin q exceeds unity, then firms have an incentive to 
invest since the cost is less than the new capital investment. Since then Tobin’s q has been widely 
used in the takeover literature (Badrinath and Kini 1994). 
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In this case, Tobin’s q is the quotient of the market value of assets divided by the book value of 
assets, where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value 
of common stock less the sum of the book value of common stock. This computation follows the 
analysis of Kaplan and Zingales (1997), using the market capitalization instead of replacement cost 
of assets. The results in Perfect and Wiles (1994) indicate that the improvements obtained from the 
more involved computations of q are fairly limited, particularly when regressions are estimated with 
firm-fixed effects. For the purpose of this estimation, the actual market value of equity at the end of 
fiscal year is utilized. 
assetsvalue of book
stockscommonof value bookcap  market  of assetsbook value Tobins'q 
   
               (4.4-1) 
Studies concerning Tobin’s q and corporate governance issues have been conducted before by La 
Porta et al. (2002). They analyse the twenty largest industrial companies in 27 wealthy countries 
with respect to the relation of shareholder protection and the value of the companies’ stock. They 
conjecture that bad shareholder protection leads to lower values of equity measured by Tobin’s q. 
Banks are excluded from the study, due to their heterogeneous nature compared to industrial firms. 
Gompers et al. (2003) use the incidence of 24 governance rules and construct a Governance Index 
to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1.500 large US-American firms during 1990s. 
They find that firms with stronger shareholders rights had higher firm values, estimated by Tobin’s 
q. 
In the previous chapter, the conjecture of a possible relationship between P/E ratios and the 
disclosure proxies of banks and countries was analysed. A close relation might exist between P/E 
ratios and the respective bank’s Tobin’s q. Thus, the question arises whether does the testing of the 
Tobin’s q variable provide any new insight or is it redundant? Tobin’s q employs total assets, book 
value of equity and the market capitalization, whereas the P/E ratio uses different variables. The 
connection is the stock price and the market capitalization, whereas the latter is the price-per-stock 
times the number of issued shares.  
I estimate the regression analysis of the Tobin’s q on the banks’ P/E ratios: 
iii badjpetobinq   10                                                                                   (4.4-2) 
Table 16 exhibits the results of the regression: 
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Table II.16: Regression result of bank Tobin’s qs on bank P/E ratios 
 R Absolute  
1  0.003** (0,001) 
Intercept 1.003 
2R  0.076 
Standard errors are included in parentheses. The absolutely low value of the regression coefficient 
1   and a very low 2 R  encourage the additional Tobin’s q analysis.  
 
Moreover, while Tobin’s q values exist for Israeli and Saudi Arabian banks, those banks could 
not be included in the country P/E ratio analysis. Badrinath and Kini (1994) also find in their 
analysis that while the magnitude of the P/E ratio diminishes significantly when controlling for 
Tobin’s q, the interactions between q and P/E are not systematic or consistent. 
I hypothesize that investors who purchase stocks of banks that display good disclosure of executive 
remuneration are willing to pay a premium for the assets of the banks. On the other hand, investors 
demand discounts for the prices of the total assets if the respective banks exhibit poor quality or 
low levels of executive remuneration disclosure. 
iii bproxytobinq   10    (4.4-3) 
with 0 1  , 
where itobinq  is the value of the Tobin’s q of bank i  and ibproxy  is the disclosure proxy of the 
executive remuneration of bank i  and εi is the regression residual. 
With regard to the country level, it is conjectured that the more comprehensive a country’s rules 
regulating the disclosure of executive remuneration are, the higher the premium investors are 
willing to pay, and thus, the higher the Tobin’s q.  
iji cproxytobinq   10    (4.4-4) 
with 0 1  , 
where jcproxy  denotes the disclosure proxy of country j . 
In the USA, e.g., Merrill Lynch Bank is priced with an agio of 66% on the book value of total 
assets, whereas Colonial Bank Group is valued with a discount of 7%, or in other words, a spread 
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of 73 percentage points. In the UK, HSBC is traded with a premium of over 8%, Abbey National 
is discounted by 3%, thus a difference of about 11%. In Malaysia, where stockholders purchase 
equity shares with 24% above book value, the second bank achieves only 1% when selling stocks. 
The stocks of the 61 banks in Japan are traded at prices in an interval between 3% discount and 
only 4.5% agio. In China, the maximum valuation spread is only 9%. Hence, apparently countries 
with higher disclosure proxies display higher variations of the bank Tobin’s qs. This is surprising 
on the face of it.  Of course there is an inherent simplification, because in this study all banks are 
considered to be alike. Merrill Lynch Bank is a strong player in investment banking, thus 
generating profits and value without a great amount of assets, whereas the Colonial Bank Group 
focuses mainly on the traditional banking business, and hence is assets-burdened in the balance 
sheet. 
Similar to the spreads of the Sharpe ratios (chapter 4.2.2), a possible explanation is that in 
countries with high bank or country disclosure proxies, investors are willing to pay higher 
premiums for assets than in countries with low proxies because they are informed about and 
content with the nexus of task, performance and pay of the executives. However, if they detect 
bad performance with banks displaying good disclosure, investors may punish these banks more 
severely by discounting share prices. Investors in countries with bad disclosure, on the other 
hand, are perhaps less capable of detecting the magnitude of bad performance due to lower 
disclosure levels, or are aware of the fact that they do not know the full story and, hence, have 
demanded discounts in the first place. Consequently the value variation interval is smaller. This 
leads to three further hypotheses: 
  i10,   jjij cproxytobinqSD                                                                                   (4.4-5) 
with 0 1  , 
  i10,(   jjij bproxytobinqSD                                                                                 (4.4-6) 
with 0 1  , 
  i,10,   jijij tobinqtobinqSD                                                                                  (4.4-7) 
with 0 1  , 
where jSD  )( , jitobinq  is the standard deviation of the average Tobin’s q value of the country j , 
computed for banks domiciled there. 
The average Tobin’s qs of the banks per country are as follows: 
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Table II.17: Tobin’s qs of banks per country 
COUNTRY cproxy  bproxy  Tobin’s average 
Tobin’s  
standard deviation 
Malaysia 15.00 8.25 1.126 0.156 
US 19.00 18.83 1.114 0.112 
Australia 5.00 13.25 1.103 0.035 
Indonesia 0.00 1.50 1.092 0.108 
Turkey 0.00 0.38 1.068 0.189 
Portugal 5.00 8.67 1.048 0.042 
Thailand 0.00 13.83 1.042 0.014 
Spain 6.50 11.20 1.039 0.029 
UK 17.00 16.86 1.035 0.032 
Canada 19.00 18.50 1.035 0.018 
Ireland 19.00 17.80 1.033 0.038 
South Africa 15.00 12.30 1.031 0.047 
Singapore 1.00 11.67 1.026 0.092 
average 8.14 9.94 1.006 0.059 
China 0.00 2.19 1.022 0.043 
India 14.00 5.90 1.021 0.031 
Sweden 16.50 15.88 1.019 0.006 
Italy 13.00 13.33 1.015 0.029 
Greece 4.00 3.30 1.014 0.016 
Belgium 3.00 9.50 1.011 0.003 
Switzerland 10.00 8.30 1.006 0.033 
Taiwan 12.00 3.10 1.006 0.037 
Netherlands 11.50 17.33 1.006 0.029 
France 10.00 12.67 1.002 0.022 
Denmark 6.00 8.50 1.001 0.018 
Japan 6.50 2.11 0.999 0.066 
South Korea 0.00 0.00 0.997 0.019 
Germany 5.00 9.63 0.995 0.011 
Austria 5.00 10.00 0.991 0.001 
Brazil 6.50 0.25 0.983 0.042 
Israel 0.00 8.50 0.948 0.006 
Saudi Arabia 5.50 4.17 0.890 0.005 
The banks domiciled in Malaysia, USA and Australia reveal the highest Tobin’s q valuation, while 
Saudi Arabia, Israel and Brazil display the lowest. The assets of the banks in seven countries are on 
average valued lower than the book value of assets. In the case of Japanese and German banks, this 
might be explained by the ongoing restructurings during the evaluation period 2003 and 2004. In 
case of the countries Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, political instabilities might also suggest a 
way to interpret that fact. 
Generally, the interval of Tobin’s qs of the banks is low compared to an industrial portfolio. This 
effect should be explained by the relatively low ratio of book equity in relation to the total assets as 
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compared to industrial enterprises. An additonal reason could be the fact that in the balance sheets 
of banks many assets are activated with their market and/or redemption value, whereas in the 
balance sheets of industrial companies a great number of the assets are intangible or valued at 
(lower) book prices. 
4.4.2 One-factor regression analysis 
In the first step, the regression analysis will be conducted for the equations (4.4-3) - (4.4-7), outlined 
previously, based on the cumulated panel data as shown in table 17. That is, the Tobin’s qs and the 
disclosure proxies of all banks in one country are accumulated per country. The value of the 
country in the regression is weighted by the respective number of the banks in relation to the total 
number of banks in the panel. The results are displayed in table 18. 
Table II.18: One-factor OLS regression results of Tobin’s qs on average bank and country 
proxy at country level: The dependent variable is the average Tobin’s q of the banks per 
country. The exogenous variable is the bank disclosure proxy (bproxy , one average proxy per 
country) and the country disclosure proxy ( cproxy ). The (a) columns present the results of 
regressions with Tobin’s qs, the (b) columns with the standard deviation of the individual bank 
Tobin’s q per country. “**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Standard errors are 
included in parentheses. 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES (a) Regressions with Tobin’s q 
(b) Regressions with the standard deviation  
of Tobin’s q 
bproxy  0.061** (0.011)  
0.708** 
(0.131)   
cproxy   0.069** (0.008)  
0.924** 
(0.071)  
Tobin’s q     0.959** (0.131) 
2R  0.501 0.746 0.501 0.854 0.919 
There appears to be a significant willingness of investors to pay an aggregate price premium to 
the book values of the accord with a high level of aggregate disclosure of executive remuneration. 
Moreover, investors pay aggregate premium prices for banks’ assets in countries that impose a 
high standard of law enactment on the disclosure of executive remuneration. The differences in 
valuations are significantly positive related to the levels of premiums that are paid by stockholders 
on the book values of assets. The higher the valuation level as proxied by Tobin’s q, the larger 
the deviation from the average valuation in the respective country is. 
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Again, these country-by-country level regressions bear two systematic problems: First, due to their 
cumulative nature, they neglect the variations of the bank’s proxies and Tobin’s qs within one 
country. For this first analysis, weighted bank proxies for each country have been employed. The 
arithmetic mean of the proxy for each country has been multiplied by the number of banks located 
in that country. All the proxies for banks in each respective country have been added together. 
Second, the sample size of 31 is relatively small. Therefore, in the second step, the regressions are 
computed on an individual bank’s base. This leads to the results shown in table 19: 
Table II.19: One-factor regression results of Tobin’s qs on bank and country proxy: The 
explanatory variables are the individual bank disclosure proxy in line one and the country 
disclosure proxy in the second line. The dependent variable is the individual bank Tobin’s qs. 
“**” denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. Standard errors that account for 
interdependencies of observations within clusters (countries) are included in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) 
bproxy 0.005** (0.001)  
cproxy  0.005** (0.002) 
2R  0.184 0.152 
In contrast to the bank-by-bank regression with the P/E ratios, the bank-by-bank Tobin’s q 
regression remains supportive of the hypothesis as conjectured already in the country-based 
analysis. Adding one point to a bank’s disclosure proxy by disclosing one additional element of 
the executive’s remuneration accounts for a 0.0046 point increase, i.e. 0,5% in a bank’s value as 
expressed by Tobin’s q, all else being equal.  Being located in a country with tighter rules and 
legislation with respect to disclosure of executive remuneration and therefore higher cproxy  
implies a very similar correlation. Both results are significant on a 1% level.  
These high correlations of one-factor regressions bear the danger of omitted variables and 
endogeneity. In the next chapter, the regression will be controlled by the size of the banks, 
proxied by the total assets, the level of the capital market integration of a country, the law system 
and/or the financial orientation of a country. 
4.4.3 Multi-factor regression analysis 
In order to address the issue of omitted variables in relation to the results of the one-factor 
regression in 4.4.2, the following six-factor model is estimated: 
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where the explanatory variables are the same as in (4.3-11), except for profit growth control. 
Here it is proxied by book value of assets growth )(grassets  over the years 2003 and 2004.  
The results are exhibited in Table 20 and include robust cluster-dependent standard errors: 
Table II.20: Results of the GLS multi-factor regression of individual bank Tobin’s qs on 
individual bank proxy and control variables: The explanatory variables are the individual 
banks disclosure proxy and the 5 control variables asset growth ( grassets ), market capitalization 
of the individual banks ( mcapusd ), the size of banks in terms of the logarithm of total assets 
( lnassets ), the capital market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the strengths of the 
antidirector rights of the countries ( antidir ). The dependent variable is the individual bank 
Tobin’s q. The first column presents the nonstandardized regression coefficients and the second 
column shows the standardized (z-transformation) coefficients. “**” and “*” denote statistical 
significance at the 1% and 5% level. Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are 
included in parentheses.  
 
Nonstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
bproxy  0.004** (0.001) 0.361** 
grassets  -0.025 
(0.046) -0.065 
mcapusd  5.02e 09 (9.71e 09) -0.243 
lnassets  -0.017** (0.006) -0.285** 
mcapgnp  0.010 
(0.015) 0.066 
antidir  0.007 (0.005) 0.140 
Intercept  Yes 
2R  0.3 
Clustering, and hence GLS, takes account of within-country interdependencies of errors, since 
intra-country correlations are very likely. The relation of high quality of disclosure of executive 
remuneration to positive Tobin’s qs remains strong. Similar to P/E regressions, bproxy  exhibits 
the strongest positive impact on banks’ Tobin’s qs and has a high statistical significance in this 
model specification. The coefficient of lnassets is also significant at the 1% level, whereas other 
control variables do not reach usual significance levels. The grassets variable appears to be neither 
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significant nor consistent with economic theory that suggests that stronger growth should lead to 
higher Tobin’s q.  
In this study, the magnitude of diversification of a bank as an explanatory variable on the Tobin’s q 
is not included because, due to the similarity of the subjects in the panel field data, a significant 
impact is not expected. Lang and Stulz (1994) find no evidence supportive of the view that 
diversification provides firms with a valuable intangible asset. In contrast, they suggest that highly 
diversified firms have significantly lower average and median q ratios than single-segment firms. 
4.4.4 Endogeneity concerns 
The endogeneity concerns expressed in the previous section have to be considered for models with 
Tobin’s q as the dependent variable, too. Using financial system and law dummies as instruments 
for bproxy , as described in section 4.3.6, the estimates exhibited in table 21 with robust (cluster 
dependent) standard errors are produced. 
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Table II.21: 2SLS regressions with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable on instrumented 
individual bank disclosure proxies and the control variables: The explanatory variables are 
the instrumented (by law system and financial system) individual bank disclosure proxies and the 
5 control variables asset growth ( grassets ), market capitalization of the individual banks 
( mcapusd ), the size of banks in terms of the logarithm of total assets ( lnassets ), the capital 
market integration of the countries ( mcapgnp ) and the strengths of the antidirector rights of the 
countries ( antidir ). The dependent variable is the individual bank Tobin’s q. “**” and “*” 
denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level. Robust standard errors of the estimated 
coefficients are included in parentheses. 
bproxy  
instrumented by 
financial system and 
law dummies 
0.006** 
(0.001) 
grassets  -0.034 
(0.041) 
mcapusd  1.99e 09** (8.63e 09) 
lnassets  -0.021** (0.006) 
mcapgnp  0.005 
(0.015) 
antidir  0.004 (0.006) 
Intercept  Yes 
2R  0.27 
The Hausman test for endogeneity confirms that there exists a systematic difference between 
efficient (OLS) and consistent (2SLS) estimates. Thus endogeneity does not appear to be an 
issue. The results are very similar to those in uninstrumented regressions, with coefficients of 
bproxy  becoming slightly larger. It also remains highly significant. 
5 Conclusion 
In this part of the study, I pursue the question whether higher levels of disclosure of executive 
remuneration parallel lower risk premiums demanded by investors and/or better stock 
performance. Four absolute risk-performance measurements are analyzed: long/short strategy, 
Sharpe ratios, P/E evaluations and Tobin’s qs. 
First, applying a transparency-based investment strategy, I examine a 78-month period where one 
would have gone long with the stocks of the top twenty percent of banks displaying the highest 
disclosure proxies and, concurrently, would have sold short stocks for the twenty percent of banks 
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with the lowest bank disclosure proxies. The former portfolio would have yielded 9.9% per year, 
while the latter would have returned 6.5% per year only. However, the return relation of Portfolio 1 
to the three consecutive portfolios is not consistent with the hypothesis. If one regards the standard 
deviation as a proxy for the uncertainty of returns in the respective portfolios, then Portfolio 1 
offers the investor the lowest variation of returns around the average return and Portfolios 2, 3 and 
4 provide sequentially higher variations of returns around the average return. 
Second, I investigate the stock performance in relation to the volatility: the hypotheses are 
supported that (a) more advanced disclosure produces higher Sharpe ratios on an accumulated 
country-level and (b) that a significantly positive relation exists between the bank and country 
proxies and the Sharpe ratio. A one-point increase in a bank’s disclosure proxy enhances the 
Sharpe ratio by 0.43 points. The impact of a country’s magnitude of issued rules and legislation 
regarding the disclosure of executive remuneration is even stronger. However, the hypotheses 
diminish on an individual banks’ level. 
Third, the costs of equity capital are estimated, using a methodology based on P/E ratio estimates. 
I suggest two approaches to deal with the two deficiencies of P/E ratios as well as the alternative 
yield opportunities of investors for their respective countries. If governments enhance the 
disclosure rules, the effect on higher P/Es is strong. On the bank-per-country level, regression 
results assert that a one-point increase in the proxy for disclosure of executive remuneration is still 
honored by the capital markets with a 0.248- to 0.29-point higher valuation in the capital markets as 
expressed by the deficiency- and risk-adjusted P/E ratio - in other words, the risk premium 
demanded by investors is reduced by approximately 0.25. Compared to other explanatory variables 
in the model, the banks’ disclosure quality is predicted to have the strongest positive impact on the 
adjusted price earnings. The results remain strong in two-stage least squares regressions that 
address the problem of possible endogeneity of the disclosure proxy.   
Fourth, I test the investors’ confidence by analysing the Tobin’s qs. The conjecture that better bank 
disclosure and disclosure laws lead to higher Tobin’s qs for each bank is supported by the evidence. 
Regressions with data cumulated per country predict a 0.06-point increase in Tobin’s q for a one-
point improvement in disclosure. Regressions with individual banks reveal also positive impact of 
disclosure change on Tobin’s q that is smaller in magnitude (about 0.005), but is equally statistically 
strong and robust across different estimators and model specifications. It also has the greatest 
explanatory weight compared to other regressors.  
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Sharpe ratios, P/E ratios and Tobin’s qs are frequently - if not the most frequently - employed 
methods in investment banking and economics to efficiently determine the performance of firms 
and their relative stock price values. What is supposed to make for the attractiveness of this study is 
the idea that the nexus of good disclosure of executive remuneration and better investors’ 
confidence could be proven by applying such widely recognized methods. In the case of P/E ratios 
and Tobin’s qs, the evidence supporting the conjectures and the robustness of the results should 
strongly motivate executives and governments to discuss more advanced transparency standards 
where necessary. In the case of long/short spreads and the Sharpe ratio, the positive, yet 
diminishingly weak results on the individual banks’ level require further consideration. Hence, in 
part three of this study, this question will be addressed in a detailed analysis.   
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Part III 
Is Good Transparency of Executive Remuneration 
Awarded by Abnormal Stock Returns? 
 
Disclosure of executive remuneration by the largest listed banks of the 
world and the impact on abnormal stock returns 
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1 Introduction 
In part two of this study, the hypothesis that better disclosure of executive remuneration results in 
better stock performance has been tested univariately via long/short spreads and bivariately via the 
Sharpe ratio. The positive, yet weak regression results raise the question whether a possible nexus 
of better disclosure and higher relative stock performance can be established more clearly. This 
question is addressed in the following, last part of the study. In doing so, three things will have to 
be considered: first, a more comprehensive asset pricing model must be defined and estimated; 
second, the hypothesis that better disclosure practices lead to better stock returns must be given a 
detailed theoretical foundation; and third, the hypothesis in question will have to be tested. 
The outline of this last part is as follows. Section two explicates the theory and formulates the 
hypotheses. In section three, the research design and methodological approach is outlined. I discuss 
the method of the estimation of the abnormal stock return and describe the data. Section four 
comprises the data analysis that extensively tests the hypotheses. Section five concludes. 
2 Theory and hypotheses 
The problem discussed in this last part does not refer to the nexus of absolute stock return/firm 
performance and the downright level of the executive pay. The latest improvements of disclosure 
regulations in many countries have triggered an immense body of research papers regarding the 
absolute executive remuneration level and the firm performance. Kato et al. (2007) find for 246 
publicly traded Korean companies that cash compensation is significantly related to firm 
performance. Also, Kato and Kubo (2006) assert that Japanese CEOs’ cash compensation is 
sensitive to firm performance as do Kato and Long (2006) for Chinese CEOs. In rebuttal to these 
findings, Girma et al. (2007) conjecture that in the case of the UK, the relationship between pay 
and performance remains weak and the link to firm size has, if anything, been strengthened after 
the Cadbury corporate governance reforms. Fattorusso et al. (2007) argue that more transparent 
performance conditions make managerial rent extraction more difficult, yet may shift pay to higher 
and camouflaged bonuses with lower pay-performance responsiveness. Also, the conclusions of 
Kato and Kubo concerning Japan are questioned by Basu et al. (2007), who find that the excess pay 
related to ownership and monitoring variables is negatively associated with subsequent accounting 
performance, consistent with the presence of an agency problem. In addition, they do not detect an 
association between this excess pay and subsequent stock returns. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) state 
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that US public companies have been inclined to raise executive compensation with the specific aim 
of improving the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to company performance. 
The hypothesis addressed in this analysis states that good transparency of the disclosure of the 
executive remuneration supports possible and positive abnormal stock returns for shareholders. I 
assert that the better the executive remuneration disclosure is, the higher the abnormal stock 
returns will be. Moreover, firms domiciled in countries that demand comprehensive and detailed 
disclosure by issuing and enforcing consequent disclosure enactment might display potentially 
positive abnormal stocks returns in contrast to firms located in countries with lax disclosure 
requirements.  
With regard to the estimation of possible abnormal stock returns, I refer to the four-factor Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Cahart (1997). That is, the absolute stock returns will be 
controlled for the price of the four risk factors: volatility (Sharpe 1964), size and book-to-market 
ratio effects (Fama and French 1993) and potential short-term underreactions to information, i.e.  
the momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).  
Investors do not like bridal veils, but want to know the exact nature of the nexus of individual 
performance, firm profitability and absolute pay level to which their funds are devoted. So what 
could be the inherent reasons for possible and positive abnormal stock returns in case of good 
transparency? 
First, the absolute stock performance could be higher when transparency is more comprehensive. 
The executive might be inclined to deliver a better job, knowing that his pay-and-performance 
nexus is more comprehensively reported to his employers than that of his colleague, whose 
respective nexus remains obscure and camouflaged. A better management procedure should lead to 
an improved company performance, which, in turn would eventually result in higher absolute stock 
returns. Although this argument may seem intuitively common-sense, in the literature, no attempt 
at producing the evidence has been made so far. After all, with respect to corporate governance, 
whereof disclosure is one vital part, Mitton (2002) documents that in five crisis-hit countries, 
significantly better stock price performance is associated with firms displaying quality corporate 
governance. 
Lower volatility of the stock prices of a company exhibiting high disclosure standards may be a 
second reason for higher abnormal stock returns. Shareholders could be more willing to stick to 
their stocks even when the company is troubled by bad performance or volatile stock markets, 
because they know the executives - sharing the shareholder’s financial fate - are highly motivated to 
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improve the firm’s situation. This may create mutual trust and a win-win situation. Fewer sales of 
stocks as well as fewer repurchases of stocks after trend reversals result in lower stock price 
volatility and, ultimately, in possible positive abnormal stock returns. 
Third and generally, smaller companies display higher inherent risk than larger companies (Fama 
and French 1993). However, if a small company delivers the same quality of the disclosure as a 
large company, the risk for the shareholder may be reduced. Thus the shareholder of a small 
company with good executive remuneration disclosure may exhibit the same strategic investment 
behaviour as the shareholder of a large company. The specifically higher volatility of that small firm 
compared to larger firms may diminish and, hence, produce possible abnormal stock returns. 
Fourth, the same line of argument goes for the book-to-market ratio of a company. There is 
evidence for the view that stock prices of a firm with a high book-to-market ratio display higher 
responsiveness to the stock market than those of a company with low book-to-market values 
(Fama and French 1993). The proposed reason is that the low market value in relation to the book 
equity value expresses concerns about the future prospects of that firm. In the case of a firm with a 
low book-to-market ratio and good disclosure of executive remuneration, the low market 
evaluation may have less to do with the shareholder’s anxiousness about future prospects. Possibly, 
the valuation might reflect a more objective assessment of the company’s situation. The 
shareholder’s investment decisions might resemble more the decisions of an investor who is 
oriented to firms with a higher book-to-market value. The responsiveness of the low book-to-
market stock of that firm might be lower and, hence, abnormal returns could be the result. 
Fifth, momentum is consistent with delayed price reactions to firm specific information (Jegadeesh 
and Titman 1993). Possibly, investors who buy past winners and sell past losers temporarily move 
prices away from their long-run values, thereby causing prices to overreact. Shareholders may be 
underreacting to information about the short-term prospects of firms. A shareholder of a firm that 
displays excellent transparency of the pay-and-performance relationship will be extensively and 
thoroughly informed. In the face of any new good or bad news about that company, the 
shareholder will reassess their stock pricing accordingly, because the previous stock price was 
construed of accurate data. This results in lower short-term underreaction to information compared 
to other firms that do not practice comprehensive disclosure. Lower underreaction leads to less 
overreaction in the stock pricing, the market values are not driven away from their actual values. 
This adds up to lower momentum and possibly results in abnormal returns. Chui et al. (2000) 
conducted an analysis of momentum and the influence of legal systems of the Asian stock markets. 
They examine the listed assets of eight different Asian countries: the four common law countries 
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Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and the four civil law countries Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan. Among others, they tested the conjecture that the momentum effect should be 
stronger in countries with weak investor protection. The momentum in civil law countries should 
be higher. However, their evidence does not support this conjecture. The countries with significant 
momentum returns, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, are all common law countries. 
To explain this, they offer another argumentation. Stock prices can be manipulated, and this occurs 
more frequently in civil law countries, where it is more difficult to enforce security laws. Market 
manipulation can potentially offset the momentum effect if manipulators tend to induce negative 
serial correlation in stock returns by pushing stock prices above their intrinsic values with false 
disclosures and then let the prices subsequently collapse. La Porta et al. (1997-2000) show that 
investor protection in common law countries is stronger than in civil law countries. 
The issue of the relation of good corporate governance to abnormal return is discussed by 
Gompers et al. (2001 and 2003). The authors analyze about 1,500 US firms, using 24 possible 
provisions against good corporate governance. To estimate the performance, they employ the four-
factor model of Cahart (1997). Thus their approach differs from my analysis in 4.1 and 4.2 of part 
two, where univariate long/short spreads and the Sharpe ratio were estimated. Their evidence 
asserts that over the time period from 1990 to 1999, an investment strategy that purchased the 
portfolio of the firms with the lowest provisions and sold short the portfolio comprising the firms 
with the highest provisions against good corporate governance, would have yielded striking 8.5% of 
abnormal annual returns.  
These arguments strengthen the conjecture that firms displaying high transparency of executive 
remuneration will exhibit higher abnormal stock returns than firms that camouflage the pay-and-
performance nexus of their executives.  
However, factors other than those described above might explain abnormal returns, too. On the 
country level, these variables could be the capital market integration of a country, designed to 
capture the importance of the capital markets for the total income of the country and proxied by 
the total stock market capitalization in relation to the country’s GNP. On the individual firm’s level, 
the first explanatory variable that I will test is the size of the company, measured by the sum of the 
total assets of the balance sheet. I assume that the different equity market capitalizations of the 
firms are sufficiently considered by the size risk price factor of the CAPM. The leverage of debts to 
equity capital and the growth of the total assets will form two more explanatory variables of the 
company level.  
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The source and definition of the data as well as the construction and the estimation of the risk 
factors will be outlined in the next chapter. 
3 Research design and methodological approach 
3.1 Estimation of the abnormal stock return 
Basically, Ross’s (1976) arbitrage pricing theorem (APT) laid the ground for the numerously 
flourishing multi-factor models that are denoting current research papers. Ross’s arbitrage pricing 
theorem does not identify the respective risk factors. Theoretical research provides several potential 
candidates. I will include four sources of risk in this analysis. The abnormal stock returns of the 
companies in the sample will be estimated by the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964), 
enhanced by the two proxies defined by Fama and French (1993) for size and book-to-market ratio 
effects. Also, the momentum effect by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) will be considered. I will use 
four equations in subsequent regression analyses:  
one-factor model:        titiitfti RMRFRR ,,1,,    (3.1-1) 
three-factor model:      titititiitfti HMLSMBRMRFRR ,,3,2,1,,         (3.1-2) 
four-factor portfolio return model: 
tititititiitfti MomentumHMLSMBRMRFRR ,,4,3,2,1,,                  (3.1-3) 
four-factor market return model: 
tititititiitfti MomentumHMLSMBRMSCIRFRR ,,4,3,2,1,,            (3.1-4) 
 
whereas tiR ,  is the monthly, actually observed stock return of bank i  in period t  in excess to the 
monthly risk free asset return tfR ,  in period t . RMRF is the monthly return of the stocks of the  
portfolio minus monthly risk free asset return tfR , . RMSCIRF is the monthly return of the 
Morgan Stanley Capital world equity price index minus the monthly risk free asset return tfR , . 
SMB  (small-minus-big) is designed to capture the different market equity size effects, HML (high-
minus-low) to assess book-to-market equity effects, and Momentum  to estimate momentum 
effects. RMRF , RMSCIRF , SMB , HML  and Momentum  are expected risk price premiums, 
i,41  are the respective slopes and thus, the factor loadings of the individual bank i  to the 
respective risk price premium, estimated as regression coefficients of the respective risk factors. i  
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is the monthly mean abnormal stock return of company i . i  is the estimated intercept coefficient 
of the regression curve. A positive i  epitomizes an additional, abnormal stock performance 
attribution, not deriving from or not being explained by the four risk factors. High positive i  
yields supplement performance for the investor out of a non-diversifiable, systematic attribution. In 
contrast, negative i  reduces the investor’s diversifiable abnormal return. If one assumes that all 
available information concerning the company i  and the capital markets is included in the equity 
prices, then positive i  shows an overperformance of the company after controlling the actual 
abnormal returns by the four risk parameters, and vice versa, a negative i  indicates an 
underperformance. 
In this analysis, the four-factor market return model is favored, yet the other three equations for the 
estimation of the abnormal stock return are included to ensure that the results are authenticated by 
the results of different model specifications and do not accidentally derive from one model outline. 
The factor models are consistent with a market equilibrium model with four risk factors. 
Alternatively, they may be interpreted as a performance attribution model, where the coefficients 
and premia on the factor-mimicking portfolios indicate the proportion of mean return attributable 
to the according four elementary strategies high-versus-low beta stocks, small-versus big market 
capitalization stocks, value-versus-growth stocks and one-year return momentum versus contrarian 
stocks. Gompers et al. (2001 and 2003) mention an ongoing debate about whether the four factors 
are proxies for risk or return. However, they take no position on this issue and simply view the 
four-factor model as a method of performance attribution. They interpret the intercept coefficient 
  as the abnormal return in excess of what could have been achieved by passive investment in the 
factors. Cahart (1997) suggests that the four-factor model is consistent with a model of market 
equilibrium with four risk factors.  
In this analysis, the period from January 1995 to December 2006 is the estimation period. Thus I 
consider a completed time period in the past, where the monthly stock returns tiR , in excess to the 
monthly risk free asset return tfR , are actually existent and observable. Hence, for the purpose of 
this analysis, I conjecture i,1 RMRF is the price for the risk of the volatility, i,2 SMB is the price 
for the risk of investing in a smaller bank, i,3 HML is the price for the risk of investing in a bank 
with high book-to-market equity capitalization,  and, i,4 Momentum is the price for the short-term 
information risk, each of these estimated in the respective market equilibrium. In that sense, risk 
96 
 
factors capture common, viz. shared and undiversifiable, variation in the stock returns of the 
portfolio (Fama and French 1993 for the three-factor model).  
The estimation of the variables of the equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4 seems to be standard procedure. 
However, this sample comprises stocks of banks in 29 different countries with accordingly different 
currencies - viz. varying exchange rates, different risk free rates and distinguished national stock 
market indices. Also, the gauging the optimal formation and lagging periods for the momentum 
effect will need to be addressed. The construction and the estimation of the variables of the 
equation will be next explained in detail.  
3.1.1 One-factor model: Sharpe’s CAPM 
In spite of a lot of critical evidence to the single linearity of the Sharpe CAPM, it has been still the 
default view for most financial economists and practitioners going into the 1990s (Davis 2001). 
Sharpe (1964) constructed a market equilibrium theory of asset prices under conditions of risk. 
Sharpe argues that in equilibrium there will be a simple linear relationship between the expected 
return and standard deviation of return for efficient combinations of risky assets. For individual 
assets, there will be a consistent relationship between their expected returns and systematic risk. 
Diversification enables the investor to escape all but the risk resulting from swings in economic 
activity - this risk remains even in efficient combinations. Only the responsiveness of an asset’s rate 
of return to the level of economic activity is relevant in assessing its risk. Prices will adjust until 
there is a linear relationship between the magnitude of such responsiveness and expected return. 
The Sharpe proxy will be estimated as: 
ttt rfrpRMRF         (3.1-5) 
 
whereas trp  is the return of the banks’ equally weighted stocks in the portfolio in the month t , 
assessed by the percentage difference of the stock prices to the stock prices of the previous month. 
Dividends are included by according accumulation. In this estimation, trp  is construed in two 
alternative ways: first, trp  is the cumulative price difference of all stocks of all banks to the 
previous month. This is the approach that Sharpe (1964) first suggested, when analyzing individual 
stocks in a portfolio. A closed world is created in which investors can either purchase stocks of the 
respective banks in the bank portfolio, or buy the risk free asset. Alternative asset investments, and 
thus, other risk-return portfolio combinations, e.g., in the stock markets of the 29 countries, are 
excluded. This is a valid conduction because the risk-return profiles of the banks to each others will 
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be considered only in relation to different levels of disclosure of executive remuneration (see also 
Sharpe et al. 1995). 
However, this proceeding does not indicate the responsiveness of the banks stock prices to the 
world stock market, which may or may not be different. The disclosure proxy of the individual 
banks or the country’s enactment proxies may or may not exhibit different explanatory power with 
regard to the different abnormal stock returns. Hence and second, for equation 3.1-4: 
 
ttt rfrmsciRMSCIRF   (3.1-6) 
 
whereas trmsci  is the monthly return of the world stock market index MSCI.  
trf  is the return of a risk free asset. The banks in the sample are domiciled in 29 countries, hence 
there are 29 different risk free rates. For purpose of this simulation, trf  is created as a world risk 
free rate by forming the arithmetic average of the monthly returns of all risk free assets in the 
respective 29 countries in which the 191 banks in the portfolio are located. In the case of the US, it 
is the T-bill rate, in the other countries the according asset class. Thereby the return contribution of 
each country is weighted by the number of banks in relation to the total number of banks in the 
portfolio.  
The individual banks slope to the Sharpe proxy is estimated by: 
 
2
,
,1
p
pi
i 
  (3.1-7) 
 
whereas i,1  is the beta coefficient for bank i  and determines the covariance of bank i  to the bank 
portfolio in relation to the variance of the portfolios excess returns to the risk free rate. pi,  is the 
covariance of the returns of bank i  to the returns of the portfolio minus the return of the risk free 
rate trf . 
2
p  is the variance of the returns of the banks in the portfolio minus the return of the risk 
free rate trf . The i,1  coefficient is estimated as the slope in the time series regression of the banks 
stock returns on the excess portfolio returns.  
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Once again, as in the case of the Sharpe premium proxy, two betas are gauged for the two four-
factor models 3.1-3 and 3.1-4, first with the cumulated returns of all banks in the portfolio, and 
second with the MSCI world stock market index. 
With regard to the respective weights of the banks in the portfolio in terms of size, the calculation 
of the Sharpe proxies and betas can be conducted in two alternative ways: Either each bank may 
contribute the same magnitude of risk to the portfolio, or each bank delivers weighted according to 
risk with its respective size to the portfolio. In this analysis, the first approach will be estimated. 
The potential impact of the size of the banks will be considered separately in a multivariate 
regression analysis later.  
Another issue stems from the different currencies in which the banks’ stocks are quoted. To solve 
this problem, all non-US currencies are converted to the US-Dollar on a monthly base, using the 
respectively effective exchange rate. 
All data has been gathered on a monthly base for the time period from January 1995 to December 
2006. This time interval has been selected deliberately. On the one hand, a longer time period 
would have significantly reduced the potential number of banks that could be included in this 
analysis due to data availability. On the other hand, this time period more or less ensures that all 
national stock markets of the 29 countries in the panel have had at least one significant bull and 
bear phase.   
One systematic criticism of the Sharpe model addresses the assertion that one beta coefficient for 
each bank exists and remains constant over the time. In rebuttal, evidence from Wu and Chiou 
(2007) and Bollerslev et al. (1988) suggest that the beta coefficients are indeed time-varying. The 
originating conditional covariances are quite variable over time and are a significant determinant of 
the time-varying risk premia. To at least partially address this issue, in addition to the traditional 
estimation of the abnormal returns as one time-series regression intercepts, the alphas will be 
subsequently estimated in rolling regressions. They will be calculated as means of intercepts (alphas) 
of 83 rolling regressions. Each rolling regression is with 60 monthly observations. For each 
subsequent regression, the time window of 60 months has been moved one month forward. The 
total time span remains unchanged from January 1995 until December 2006.  
Fama and French (1993) challenge Sharpe’s conjecture that only the responsiveness of an asset’s 
rate of return to the level of economic activity is relevant when assessing its risk. Their 
enhancement of the CAPM will be addressed next. 
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3.1.2 Three-factor model: small-minus-big and high-minus-low 
Fama and French (1993) have displayed that extending the classic CAPM by two factors leads to a 
better theoretical explanation for risk-adjusted returns of assets. The two factors are the relative size 
of a company as well as the relation of the book value to the market capitalization of a company. 
The three-factor model improves, on average, the pricing errors from the one-factor model. 
Smaller companies and companies with a high book-to-market ratio display higher returns in 
relation to the portfolio. This relationship was tested and proven extensively across industries and 
different periods of time by Fama and French (1994, 1996, 1997), Annin (1997), and, across 
countries by Arshanapalli et al. (1998). Already in 1981, Banz (1981) systematically analyzed the 
differences in size and its impact on excess returns, using all stocks of the NYSE from 1926 to 
1975 as data source. Banz argues that on average, over 40 years, small NYSE companies possess 
significantly higher risk-adjusted returns by 0.4% per month than large NYSE companies. Hence, 
Banz conjectures that due to the longevity of these size-related differences in returns, there exists a 
defect of the explanatory power of the classic CAPM. The results are not just because of market 
inefficiency.  
The statistically relevant effect of size, however, does not deliver a theory that explains the effects 
fundamentally. It is not possible collinearity with the other factor loadings (Cahart 1997). One 
hypothesis is based on the varying availability of information about small and large firms. Investors 
expect higher risk premiums for firms with lower transparency. Usually, the transparency and the 
availability of information of smaller companies are not as good as that of large firms. Barry and 
Brown (1985) suggest a hypothesis which relates the impact of different levels of information to the 
balance of the capital market. Unfortunately, the authors do not deliver empirical evidence. 
Moreover, the relation of bad information base and smaller companies goes without analysis. 
The analyzed banks possess significant differences in size as well as very different market-to-book 
ratios. SMB  (small-minus-big) estimates the monthly difference of returns of small in excess to 
large banks from January 1995 to December 2006. The proxy for the size is the market 
capitalization of the banks as of 2004 (Bloomberg, The Banker 2005). The banks are divided into 
two groups. In the BIG group, all large banks are sorted until the sum of their market capitalization 
reaches 70% of the total market capitalization of all banks in the portfolio. The remaining banks are 
grouped into the SMALL portfolio. Finally, SMB  is the monthly difference of the equally-
weighted stock returns of banks in the SMALL group minus the equally-weighted stock returns of 
members of the BIG group. The coefficient i,2  of the individual bank i  to the SMB  risk factor 
is: 
100 
 
 
t
ti
i rSMB
rSMBr
2
 ,,,2  (3.1-8) 
 
whereas ti rSMBr ,,  is the covariance of the monthly stock returns of the individual bank i  to the 
monthly SMB  returns from January 1995 until December 2006, and trSMB
2  is the variance of 
the SMB  in that time period. The coefficient i,2 is estimated as the slope in the multivariate time 
series regression of the banks stock returns on the SMB  portfolio returns.  
HML (high-minus-low) estimates the risk factor of returns of the varying book-to-market equity 
ratios of the banks in the sample. Using the book-to-market ratios as the sort key, the banks are 
divided into three portfolios by a equally-weighted, descending 30%/40%/30% distribution into 
HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW-portfolios. HML results as the subtraction of the equally-weighted 
monthly stock returns of the banks in the HIGH portfolio minus the equally-weighted returns of 
the banks in the LOW portfolio from January 1995 until December 2006. The coefficient i,3  of 
the individual bank to i  the HML  risk factor is: 
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whereas trHMLri,  is the covariance of the monthly stock returns of the individual bank i  to the 
HML  returns from January 1995 until December 2006, and trHML
2  is the variance of the 
HML  in that time period. The coefficient i,3 is estimated as the slope in the multivariate time 
series regression of the banks stock returns on the HML  portfolio returns.  
3.1.3 Four-factor model: momentum 
Investment strategies that exploit momentum by buying past winners and selling past losers predate 
the scientific evidence and have been implemented by a vast of professional investors worldwide. 
The popularity of this approach has grown to the extent that momentum investing constitutes a 
distinct style of investment in the world equity markets. DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) 
suggest that stock prices overreact to information. Hence, they conjecture that buying long-term 
past losers and selling long-term past winners (contrarian strategy) achieve abnormal returns. They 
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show that over 3- to 5-year periods, stocks that performed poorly over the previous 3 to 5 years 
achieve higher returns than stocks that performed well over the same period. However, since long-
term losers outperform the long-term winners only in a January, it is unclear whether their results 
can be attributed to overreaction. 
Jegadeesh (1990) documents that monthly returns on individual stocks exhibit significantly negative 
first-order serial correlation and significantly positive higher-order serial correlation. Ten portfolios 
were formed based on the predicted returns and the difference between the excess returns on the 
extreme decile portfolios was 2.49 percent per month over the period 1934-1987, and still 2.20 
percent per month excluding the January anomaly. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that trading 
strategies which buy short-term past winners and sell short-term past losers realize significant 
abnormal returns over the 1965 to 1989 period. The strategy which selects stocks based on their 
past 6-month returns and holds them for 6 months realized an excess return of 12.01% per year on 
average. They conjecture that momentum is consistent with delayed price reactions to firm specific 
information. However, the longer-term performances of these past winners and losers reveal that 
half of their excess returns in the year following the portfolio formation date dissipate within the 
following two years. One possible explanation is that investors who buy past winners and sell past 
losers move prices away from their long-run values temporarily and thereby cause prices to 
overreact. Second, market participants possibly underreact to information about the short-term 
prospects of firms but overreact to information about the long-term prospects. 
Fama and French (1996) find that the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) captures the 
reversal of long-term returns documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). Moreover they assert 
that their three-factor model explains the strong patterns in returns observed when portfolios are 
formed on earnings/price, cash flow/price, and sales growth. However, they admit that the three 
factor relation cannot explain the continuation of short-term returns documented by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). Chan et al. (1996) show evidence that momentum in stock prices relates to the 
market’s underreaction to earnings-related information. Conrad and Kaul (1998) implement the 
momentum strategy at eight different horizons and during several different time periods from 1926 
to 1989. They conclude that momentum strategy usually nets positive and statistically significant 
profits at medium time horizons, i.e., three to twelve months, except during the period from 1926 
to 1947.  
Momentum effects are not limited to the U.S. Rouwenhorst (1998) conjectures that international 
equity markets exhibit medium-term return continuation. He shows that between 1980 and 1995 an 
internationally diversified portfolio of past medium-term Winners outperforms a portfolio of 
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medium-term Losers. In his sample, return continuation is negatively related to firm size, but is not 
limited to small firms. The international momentum returns are correlated to those of the United 
States which suggests that exposure to a common factor may drive the profitability of momentum 
strategies. More confirmation that momentum is a systematic risk factor derives from Hong and 
Stein (1999), who modelled and tested a unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and 
overreaction in asset markets. The dependency of the momentum effect on the firm size has been 
researched by Hong et al. (2000).  
tMomentum  is construed as the difference of the monthly stock returns of the 30% of banks with 
the highest momentum in the sample ( nrhighretur ), subtracted by the monthly stock returns of 
the 30% of banks with the lowest momentum ( rlowreturn ). The stock returns of all banks have 
been weighted equally. To tackle the problem of selecting the most significant momentum in the 
sample by finding the optimal formation and lagging periods, different periods have been 
simulated. The tested formation and lagging periods are three, six, nine and twelve months, 
respectively and alternatively. The lagging period always ended in June 2005 and started at the 
according number of months earlier. The reason for the end of the lagging period is that the annual 
reports for 2004 are generally published in the spring of 2005. Thus, the information about the 
disclosure of the executive remuneration and the reaction to that information should be reflected in 
the stock prices in the first half of 2005. The formation period ended at the month before the 
beginning of the lagging period and started at the respective number of months of the formation 
period earlier. The strongest momentum has been detected by the formation period and the lagging 
period of 12 months each. The analysis to this result is presented in appendix 9.  
 The coefficient i,4 of the individual bank i  to the tMomentum  risk factor is: 
 
rlowreturnnrhighretur
rlowreturnnrhighreturri
i 
 2,4 ,  (3.1-10) 
 
 
whereas rlowreturnnrhighreturri  ,  is the covariance of the monthly stock returns of the 
individual bank i  to the tMomentum  returns from January 1995 until December 2006, and 
rlowreturnnrhighretur 2  is the variance of the tMomentum  in that time period. The 
coefficient i,4 is estimated as the slope in the multivariate time series regression of the banks stock 
returns on the tMomentum  portfolio returns.  
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3.2 Data and time-series considerations 
The construction of the proxy for the degree of disclosure of executive remuneration has been 
explained in part I.  In this case, the data set contains information about the 191 largest publicly 
listed banks of the world, whose data have been available for the time period under consideration. 
The proxy for the size of a bank is the bank’s total assets in USD per December 31, 2004, 
according to the overview of the top 1000 world banks in The Banker (The Banker, 2004 and 
2005).  
The banks’ disclosure data for this study has been gathered primarily from the 191 individual   
annual reports from 2004 and/or 2003 respectively. Of course, firms coordinate their disclosure 
activities across different media, such as the quarterly reports, investor relations disclosures, ad-hoc 
news etc. Lang and Lundholm (1993) find a significant rank-order correlation between annual 
reports and other publication disclosure ranks, as well as between annual reports and investor 
relations disclosure. Thus their findings support the employment of the annual report as the 
information base for the disclosure proxy. For some of the US banks, the data source of executive 
compensation was obtained from company proxy statements filed with the SEC, condensed via the 
American AFL-CIO (2005). The countries’ respective disclosure laws and regulations have been 
investigated up to June 2005 with the help of Ernst&Young Law International, Ferrarini and 
Moloney (2005) and the numerous listing rules of the respective stock exchanges.  
The monthly stock prices from January 1995 to December 2006 for each bank and the monthly 
currency exchange rates for each country from non-US dollar to US dollar have been gathered 
from Bloomberg. The market capitalization of each bank in USD and the book value of the equity 
capital stem from The Banker (2004, 2005).  
The asset growth variable for each bank is derived from Bloomberg and is calculated in percentage 
from the end of 2004 to the end of 2003. The leverage of each bank per the end of the fiscal year 
2004 is proxied by the total debt to total assets, which is calculated in percentage as follows: (Short 
Term Borrowings + Long Term Borrowings + Securities Sold with a Repurchase Agreement) 
divided by Total Assets. The data source is Bloomberg. The market capitalizations of the national 
stock markets per the respective GNPs of each country at the year 2004 stem from part one of this 
thesis. 
Thus, sufficient time symmetry exists for the disclosure proxy of the banks’ executive remuneration 
and the countries’ proxy for the enactment of regulations concerning disclosure requirements, book 
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equity capital and market capitalization (size) of the banks, and the country-specific variables. The 
momentum effect has been calculated by the effect of the general release date of the annual report 
for 2004 of the banks, viz. the first half of the year 2005.  
To investigate possible connections between the quality of executive remuneration and stock 
returns, I use time series-stock returns for the period 1995 to 2006, whereas the data on disclosure 
is available as of 2003 and/or 2004 only. Although time-series data on disclosure proxy would have 
certainly been preferable, gathering those data was beyond my means due to complexity and 
unavailability of information. Moreover, examination of annual reports for other years that were 
available to me showed that transparency levels remained about the same for the years before and 
after 2004. On the other hand, the corporate governance structures of firms, whereof the disclosure 
of the executive remuneration is a vital part, evolve relatively stable since 1990 (Gompers et al. 
2001). Corporate governance systems are interrelated with the law paradigm and the market system 
of a country (La Porta et al. 1997, 1999), both are persistent over long time periods. In addition, in 
part one I have presented evidence that bank proxies are significantly and strongly correlated with 
the respective countries’ law paradigm (common and civil law), law origin (English, Scandinavian, 
German and French) and financial system (market- vs. bank-centered). With regard to the 29 
countries, neither of the three dimensions has reversed during the time period from 1995 to 2006.   
The form and content of annual reports of firms are generally constant and comparable over the 
years (Lang and Lundholm 2000). For two apparent reasons, it is unreasonable to assume erratic 
changes in terms of the reporting structure. First, consistency in the reporting structure allows 
investors to easily locate information when moving from one report to the next. Second, disclosure 
rules require specific information elements to be included in the annual report and, although 
disclosure standards within the countries have evolved over time, they do not change very often 
(Stanko and Zeller 2003).  
The execution of disclosure is required by laws and binding listing rules (appendix 4). Those do not 
vary much over the years. Moreover, the principal of disclosure continuity prevails, i.e. laws 
prohibit constantly changing disclosure patterns to some. 
In conclusion, I conjecture that the essence of these arguments allows for a long-term study of the 
relationship of stock prices and the transparency of executive remuneration. 
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4 Data analysis: disclosure and abnormal returns  
4.1 Bank-by-bank time-series regressions 
The bank’s individual monthly abnormal stock returns (alphas) are estimated as intercepts of 
alternatively one-, three- and four-factor time-series regressions (equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4). The 
four-factor model is estimated two times, first, by using the stock returns of all 191 banks in the 
portfolio and, second, by employing the world equity stock market index MSCI returns as the 
return of the market portfolio. The mean monthly average alphas of the banks per country and the 
respective standard deviation are exhibited in table 1. The estimation period is January 1995 until 
December 2006.  
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Table III.1: Summary statistics for alphas estimated as intercepts from bank-by-bank 
time-series regressions. The four alternative multi-factor models are explained in chapter 3.1. 
These are used to estimate the monthly abnormal stock return (alpha) of each of the 191 banks 
domiciled in the respective 29 countries. The mean alpha represents the arithmetic average of the 
monthly abnormal stock returns of the number of banks per country, controlled for the prices of 
the risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of the three-factor model 
of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of 
momentum. SD denotes the standard deviation of the alphas of the banks per country. 
   
One-factor 
 model 
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
model 
MSCI four-factor 
model 
COUNTRY 
N
um
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r 
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Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Australia 6 0.34 0.24 0.43 0.23 0.58 0.23 0.94 0.23 
Austria 1 0.80 0.61 0.64 0.72  
Belgium 3 0.23 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.71 0.17 
Brazil 4 -0.83 0.89 -1.20 0.94 -0.93 0.89 -0.32 0.78 
Canada 6 0.59 0.18 0.71 0.18 0.70 0.21 1.12 0.19 
China 3 0.77 0.70 0.69 1.12 0.95 1.09 1.25 0.74 
Denmark 2 0.91 0.28 1.08 0.12 1.22 0.21 1.52 0.12 
France 2 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.87 0.28 
Germany 6 -0.39 0.33 -0.54 0.43 -0.49 0.36 -0.01 0.36 
Greece 4 0.96 0.51 1.15 0.69 0.71 0.58 1.34 0.59 
India 3 1.40 1.64 1.42 1.60 1.54 1.52 1.89 1.24 
Ireland 4 0.76 0.69 0.93 0.70 0.78 0.74 1.21 0.74 
Israel 3 -0.35 0.25 -0.58 0.57 -0.64 0.51 -0.28 0.50 
Italy 9 0.22 0.34 0.07 0.50 -0.09 0.46 0.32 0.48 
Japan 51 -0.34 0.25 -0.42 0.28 -0.47 0.33 -0.21 0.35 
Malaysia 2 -0.10 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.75 0.10 
Netherlands 2 -0.11 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.79 0.23 
Portugal 2 -0.07 0.59 0.01 0.60 -0.18 0.41 0.24 0.35 
Singapore 3 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.38 0.14 0.85 0.14 
South Africa 5 -0.76 0.25 -0.94 0.30 -0.89 0.27 -0.21 0.35 
South Korea 3 0.23 1.08 0.25 1.43 1.00 1.59 2.22 1.71 
Spain 4 0.31 0.18 0.22 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.62 0.13 
Switzerland 2 -0.11 0.19 -0.06 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.61 0.17 
Sweden 3 0.36 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.29 0.23 0.75 0.18 
Taiwan 2 -1.05 0.25 -0.87 0.62 -0.67 0.85 -0.39 0.66 
Thailand 3 -1.67 0.31 -1.47 0.43 -1.16 0.30 -0.18 0.30 
Turkey 4 -3.45 0.76 -4.04 0.97 -3.79 1.16 -3.08 1.26 
UK 6 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.65 0.31 
USA 43 0.46 0.47 0.59 0.45 0.56 0.45 0.92 0.40 
Total 191     
Mean  -0.009 0.41 -0.009 0.49 -0.005 0.49 0.4 0.47 
Many of the bank individual alphas, viz. the regression intercepts as estimated by one-, three- and 
four-factor regressions, exhibit pricing errors that are exceeding statistically conventional 
significance levels. This issue burdens the analysis, because, in part, I may be using nonexistent 
variables. Fama and French (1997) have addressed pricing errors in their paper, finding that pricing 
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errors of industries of 3% and more are typical for the CAPM and the three-factor model. The 
standard errors of individual firms are certainly much higher. A set of recent papers (Daniel and 
Titman 2005, Lewellen et al. 2006) attempt to test and interpret pricing errors in CAPM models. 
Phalippou (2007) shows that just a tiny alteration in test asset construction can have a big effect on 
the question of how to judge asset pricing models.   
Three problems exist with respect to large pricing errors: the first problem arises from imprecise 
estimates of the factor risk premiums. The average monthly excess return of the 191 bank stocks in 
the portfolio on the world risk free asset return is 0.77% (9.24% annually), which is very high.  The 
standard error is 0.31. Hence, determining a picture of the mean distribution by calculating the 
traditional plus-and-minus two standard error interval, the lower bound is 0.15%, the upper bound 
is 1.39%, leaving a spread of 1.24%. In case of the average monthly excess return of the world 
equity market index MSCI on the world risk free asset return is merely 0.32%, the standard error is 
0.21. The lower bound of the two standard error interval is -0.10% below zero, the upper bound is 
0.74%, denoting an interval of 0.84 accordingly. While I can observe this problem, it is inherent in 
the model specification and cannot be solved.  
I will suggest mitigation for the second and third problem. Second, imprecise estimates of the risk 
loadings might prevail, that would be precise if they were constant. That caveat has been expressed 
earlier in the theory section. I use a rather long time period from January 1995 until December 
2006. The question arises whether possible instabilities of the estimated risk factor coefficients have 
been neglected, that may or may not impact the regression results. To mitigate this problem, in 
chapter 4.2 I will estimate time-varying alphas by a rolling bank-by-bank regression analysis. Third, 
pricing errors of individual firms are larger than that of industries or portfolios. One possible 
solution to this issue is the formation of portfolios like Gompers et al. (2001) did. I will apply that 
approach in chapter 4.3, proving statistical significance of alphas within portfolios built according 
to disclosure quality rankings.  
Estimates of firm’s individual abnormal returns remain imprecise. With regard to the level of 
pricing errors of the banks’ abnormal stock returns, the following regressions are supposed to 
provide a general indication. 
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Table III.2: Bivariate regressions of alphas calculated in the four multi-factor 
specifications on bank’s disclosure proxy at the bank-by-bank level. The bproxy  estimates 
the magnitude of the disclosure of the executive remuneration in the annual reports of the 191 
banks in 2004 on a scale from 0 to 20 points. The coefficient represents the mean monthly 
change of the abnormal stock return (alpha) of an individual bank, if all else remains equal, the 
bproxy  changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled 
for the prices of risk of volatility (one-factor model), in addition in case of  the three-factor 
model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of 
momentum. The 191 observations represent the 191 banks in the sample. 
 
alpha from 
 one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from 
four-factor 
portfolio model
alpha from 
four-factor 
market model 
bproxy  0.048** (0.014) 
0.060** 
(0.016) 
0.056** 
(0.015) 
0.058** 
(0.016) 
Constant 
-0.495* 
(0.210) 
-0.621* 
(0.247) 
-0.576* 
(0.231) 
-0.184 
(0.251) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
2R  0.18 0.21 0.20 0.21 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The results of the alpha estimations obtained by the time-series regression indicate roughly a 0.05% 
increase of abnormal stock return per month per increment of one point disclosure proxy, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. All else remaining equal, if a bank decided to disclose more 
comprehensively the remuneration of its executive by, e.g., 5 points, the additional annual abnormal 
stock return of that bank would increase by around 3% in this model environment.  
Table 3 exhibits the regression of the banks’ alphas per country, obtained by the mean average of 
the banks’ alphas that are domiciled in that country, on the respective country disclosure proxy. 
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Table III.3: Bivariate regressions of the arithmetic means of alphas per country 
calculated in the four multi-factor models on the country-level disclosure proxy. The 
cproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure rules in the 29 countries in the sample with 
regard to the executive remuneration in the annual reports on a scale from 0 to 20 points. The 
coefficient represents the monthly change of the abnormal stock return of a bank, if all else 
remains equal, the cproxy changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 3.1-1 to 
3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility (one-factor model), in addition in case of  the 
three-factor model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor 
models of momentum. The 29 observations represent the 29 countries in the sample. 
 
alpha from  
one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from 
four-factor 
portfolio model
alpha from 
four-factor 
market model 
cproxy  0.045 
(0.030) 
0.054# 
(0.033) 
0.041 
(0.033) 
0.034 
(0.033) 
Constant 
-0.399 
(0.380) 
-0.472 
(0.425) 
-0.302 
(0.425) 
0.256 
(0.422) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 
2R  0.1 0.11 0.07 0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# significant at 10% 
At the country level, the results are both lower in magnitude of the coefficient and weaker in terms 
of statistical significance than the results at the bank-by-bank level. Only the regression of the mean 
banks’ alpha per country deriving from the three-factor asset pricing model on the country 
disclosure proxy provides an estimated coefficient on cproxy  that is significant at the 10% level. In 
this particular model, if a country enhances the disclosure requirements concerning executive 
remuneration by, e.g., 5 points, the abnormal annual stock returns of the banks in this sample 
would increase by around 3%, all else remaining equal.  
Table 4 exhibits the results of the multivariate regressions of alphas on bank proxy, total assets, 
leverage, asset growth and capital market integration. 
According to the hypotheses, the bank proxy coefficient remains positive and statistically significant 
on a 5% level in case of the one-factor model and on a 1% level in case of the other three 
estimation models. Moreover, the values with around 0.04% additional abnormal stock return per 
month and bank per one point increase to the bank proxy persist on a strikingly high level. 
Although bproxy  are both statistically significant and high, the other variables are not statistically 
significant on conventional levels. Here, however, multicollinearity may indeed be a problem. 
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Table III.4: Multivariate regressions of alphas calculated in the four multi-factor model 
specifications on bank proxy, total assets, leverage, asset growth and capital market 
integration. The bproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure of the executive 
remuneration in the annual reports of the 191 banks in 2004 on a scale from 0 to 20 points. The 
coefficient represents the monthly change of the abnormal stock return of a bank, if all else 
remains equal, the bproxy  changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 3.1-1 to 
3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility (one-factor model), in addition in case of  the 
three-factor model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor 
models of momentum. The 190 observations represent the 191 banks in the sample minus one 
bank, for which the respective data was not available. lnassets  denotes the logarithm of total 
assets of a bank’s balance sheet per the end of 2004, the leverage  of each bank per the end of 
the fiscal year 2004 is proxied by the total debt to total assets, the grassets  variable is calculated 
on the end of 2004, and mcapgnp  is the market capitalizations of the national stock markets per 
the respective GNPs of each country at the year 2004. 
 
alpha from  
one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from 
four-factor 
portfolio model
alpha from 
four-factor 
market model 
bproxy  0.038* (0.015) 
0.047** 
(0.016) 
0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.044** 
(0.014) 
lnassets  -0.044 (0.058) 
-0.030 
(0.063) 
-0.029 
(0.059) 
0.022 
(0.055) 
leverage  0.005 (0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
grassets  0.006 (0.004) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
mcapgnp  0.071 (0.290) 
0.166 
(0.318) 
0.182 
(0.301) 
0.081 
(0.279) 
Constant 
-0.166 
(0.987) 
-0.513 
(1.091) 
-0.496 
(1.022) 
-0.549 
(0.962) 
Observations 190 190 190 190 
2R  0.20 0.24 0.22 0.24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
#significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
4.2 Rolling bank-by-bank time-series regressions 
In this paragraph, I attempt a robustness check of the results of the previous chapter. The analysis 
is analogically based upon the idea of conditional CAPM (CCAPM), albeit I propose a simplified 
estimation procedure. The conditional versions of the CAPM of Breeden (1979) are motivated by 
the rejections of tests of unconditional versions of the CAPM. The conditional models retain the 
basic structure of the CAPM, but allow for time-variation in the covariation of asset returns with 
the market or sample return and time variation in the premium associated with this covariation. 
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Table III.5: Summary statistics for rolling alphas estimated as intercepts from bank-by-
bank time-series regressions calculated in the four multi-factor model specifications. The 
four alternative multi-factor models are explained in chapter 3.1. These are used to estimate the 
monthly mean abnormal stock return (alpha) of each of the 191 banks domiciled in the respective 
29 countries. The mean alpha represents the arithmetic average of the monthly abnormal stock 
returns of the number of the banks per country, controlled for the prices of the risk of volatility 
in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of the three-factor model of size and book-to-
market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of momentum. Alphas in these 
regressions were calculated as means of alphas of 83 rolling regressions. SD denotes the standard 
deviation of the alphas of the banks per country. 
   
One-factor 
 model 
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
model 
MSCI four-factor 
model 
COUNTRY 
N
um
be
r 
of
 b
an
ks
 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Mean 
alpha 
SD 
Australia 6 0.41 0.25 0.48 0.17 0.68 0.16 1.13 0.22 
Austria 1 0.34 0.28 0.28 0.33  
Belgium 3 -0.16 0.24 -0.06 0.28 -0.23 0.26 0.33 0.23 
Brazil 4 -0.79 0.64 -1.28 0.57 -1.06 0.63 -0.28 0.43 
Canada 6 0.73 0.14 0.78 0.22 0.76 0.23 1.21 0.21 
China 3 0.46 0.56 0.25 0.55 0.71 0.73 0.93 0.82 
Denmark 2 0.84 0.25 0.98 0.12 1.08 0.19 1.44 0.13 
France 2 0.52 0.14 0.69 0.12 0.68 0.25 1.37 0.27 
Germany 6 -0.96 0.77 -1.11 0.81 -1.23 0.85 -0.50 0.84 
Greece 4 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.48 -0.11 0.24 0.63 0.25 
India 3 1.08 2.15 0.98 1.69 1.18 1.77 1.65 1.66 
Ireland 4 0.71 0.92 0.84 0.86 0.58 0.85 1.13 0.88 
Israel 3 -0.71 0.23 -0.84 0.45 -0.96 0.35 -0.51 0.33 
Italy 9 0.14 0.48 -0.11 0.71 -0.39 0.65 0.13 0.57 
Japan 51 -0.22 0.28 -0.20 0.35 -0.23 0.41 0.02 0.46 
Malaysia 2 0.92 0.13 0.89 0.14 1.25 0.05 1.77 0.07 
Netherlands 2 -0.37 0.03 -0.24 0.10 -0.35 0.02 0.50 0.03 
Portugal 2 -0.45 0.58 -0.42 0.46 -0.68 0.34 -0.18 0.26 
Singapore 3 0.48 0.04 0.53 0.10 1.19 0.09 1.71 0.19 
South Africa 5 -0.87 0.48 -1.15 0.41 -1.04 0.45 -0.32 0.52 
South Korea 3 1.51 1.25 1.40 1.65 2.64 2.21 3.74 2.19 
Spain 4 0.09 0.21 -0.14 0.30 -0.22 0.26 0.45 0.05 
Switzerland 2 -0.68 0.42 -0.68 0.46 -0.69 0.58 -0.02 0.94 
Sweden 3 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.68 0.18 
Taiwan 2 -1.21 0.36 -1.15 0.82 -1.14 1.00 -0.84 0.82 
Thailand 3 -0.73 0.37 -0.66 0.51 -0.09 0.34 0.88 0.32 
Turkey 4 -3.38 0.88 -3.87 0.40 -3.39 0.64 -2.33 1.18 
UK 6 0.00 0.40 0.12 0.40 0.08 0.44 0.64 0.48 
USA 43 0.40 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.53 0.85 0.47 
Total 191    
Mean  -0.01 0.48 -0.01 0.50 -0.04 0.53 0.05 0.54 
Alphas used in these regressions have been calculated as means of alphas of 83 rolling regressions. 
Each rolling regression was carried out with 60 monthly (viz. 5 years) observations. For each 
subsequent regression, the time window of 60 months has been moved one month forward. The 
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total time span remains the same from January 1995 until December 2006. This procedure is 
supposed to address the issue of potential parameter instabilities, but does not necessarily solve the 
problem of the high pricing errors in chapter 4.1. Thus, once again, the following regression results 
are presented with the corresponding caution. The results of the rolling alphas of the banks per 
country are provided in table 5. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the bivariate regressions of rolling alphas calculated in the 
four multi-factor model specifications on the bank’s disclosure proxy of executive remuneration on 
the individual bank-by-bank level. 
Table III.6: Bivariate regressions of rolling alphas calculated in the four multi-factor 
model specifications on the bank’s disclosure proxy on the individual bank-by-bank level. 
The bproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure of the executive remuneration in the 
annual reports of the 191 banks of 2004 on a scale from 0 to 20 points. The coefficient represents 
the monthly change of the abnormal stock return of a bank, if all else remains equal, the bproxy  
changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the 
prices of the risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of  the three-
factor model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor 
models of momentum. Alphas in these regressions were calculated as means of alphas of 83 
rolling regressions. The 191 observations represent the 191 banks in the sample. 
 
alpha from  
one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from 
four-factor 
portfolio model
alpha from 
four-factor 
market model 
bproxy  0.040* (0.015) 
0.048* 
(0.018) 
0.041* 
(0.017) 
0.044** 
(0.016) 
Constant 
-0.413# 
(0.233) 
-0.500# 
(0.284) 
-0.424 
(0.261) 
0.005 
(0.243) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
2R  0.12 0.14 0.09 0.11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
# significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The results of the rolling alpha estimations obtained by the time-series regression indicate about a 
0.04% increase of abnormal stock return per month per increment of one point disclosure proxy, 
statistically significant at the 5% level with the one-, three- and four-factor portfolio model, and 
significant at the 1% level with the four-factor market model. If a bank decides to enhance the 
disclosure of its executive’s remuneration more comprehensively by 5 points, the additional 
annually abnormal stock return of that bank would increase by around 2.4% in this model 
environment, all else being equal.  
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Table 7 exhibits the bivariate regression results of the banks’ mean monthly abnormal stock returns 
per country on the country proxy, i.e. the magnitude of the rules and regulations of the 29 countries 
concerning disclosure of executive remuneration. 
Table III.7: Bivariate regressions of the arithmetic means of rolling alphas per country 
calculated in the four multi-factor model specifications on the country-level disclosure 
proxy. The cproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure rules in the 29 countries in our 
sample with regard to the executive remuneration in the annual reports on a scale from 0 to 20 
points. The coefficient represents the monthly change of the abnormal stock return of a bank, if 
all else remains equal, the cproxy  changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 
3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in 
addition in case of  the three-factor model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in 
case of the two four-factor models of momentum. Alphas in these regressions were calculated as 
means of alphas of 83 rolling regressions. The 29 observations represent the 29 countries in the 
sample. 
 
alpha from  
one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from  
four-factor  
portfolio model
alpha from  
four-factor  
market model 
cproxy  0.046** 
(0.011) 
0.056** 
(0.012) 
0.042** 
(0.013) 
0.036** 
(0.013) 
Constant 
-0.489** 
(0.155) 
-0.595** 
(0.170) 
-0.448* 
(0.189) 
0.075 
(0.192) 
Observations 191 191 191 191 
2R  0.12 0.15 0.08 0.06 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
In this case, if a country improves the rules concerning the transparency of executive remuneration 
by one point, and everything else remains equal, than the results of the rolling alpha estimations 
obtained by the time series regression indicate about a mean 0.04% increase of abnormal stock 
return per month or 0.48% annually per bank this respective country. The result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all four model specifications.  
Table 8 shows the results of the multivariate regressions of the banks’ individual rolling alphas on 
bank proxy, total assets, leverage, asset growth and capital market integration. 
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Table III.8: Multivariate regressions of banks’ individual rolling alphas calculated in the 
four multi-factor model specifications on bank proxy, total assets, leverage, asset growth 
and capital market integration. The bproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure of the 
executive remuneration in the annual reports of the 191 banks in 2004 on a scale from 0 to 20 
points. The coefficient represents the monthly change of the abnormal stock return of a bank, if 
all else remains equal, the bproxy  changes by one point. The alphas are estimated by equations 
3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility (one-factor model), in addition in case 
of  the three-factor model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two 
four-factor models of momentum. Alphas in these regressions were calculated as means of alphas 
of 83 rolling regressions. The 190 observations represent the 191 banks in the sample minus one 
bank, for which the respective data was not available. lnassets  denotes the logarithm of total 
assets of a bank’s balance sheet per the end of 2004, the leverage  of each bank per the end of 
the fiscal year 2004 is proxied by the total debt to total assets, the grassets variable is calculated 
on the end of 2004, and mcapgnp  is the market capitalizations of the national stock markets per 
the respective GNPs of each country at the year 2004. 
 -1 -2 -3 -4 
 
alpha from  
one-factor 
model 
alpha from 
three-factor 
model 
alpha from 
four-factor 
portfolio model
alpha from 
four-factor 
market model 
bproxy  0.033* (0.015) 
0.037* 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.017) 
0.033# 
(0.017) 
lnassets  -0.054 (0.059) 
-0.033 
(0.067) 
-0.032 
(0.066) 
0.036 
(0.059) 
leverage  0.001 (0.004) 
0.0003 
(0.005) 
-0.0001 
(0.005) 
0.0003 
(0.005) 
grassets  0.007 (0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
mcapgnp  0.101 (0.281) 
0.262 
(0.309) 
0.294 
(0.294) 
0.108 
(0.266) 
Constant 
0.034 
(0.944) 
-0.393 
(1.054) 
-0.353 
(0.993) 
-0.483 
(0.911) 
Observations 190 190 190 190 
2R  0.15 0.17 0.13 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
#significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
According to the hypothesis, the bank proxy is positive and statistically significant on a 10% level in 
the case of the four-factor market model, and significant on a 5% level in the case of the one- and 
three-factor model. In the case of the four-factor portfolio model, bproxy  loses its statistical 
significance. The values of the coefficients with around 0.035% additional abnormal stock return 
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per month and bank per one point increase of the bank proxy persist on a high level. Although 
bproxies  are both statistically significant in most model specifications and high, the other variables 
are not statistically significant on conventional levels. Here, once again, multicollinearity may be a 
problem.  
Next, I will form portfolios of banks, thereby expecting to find low pricing errors within the 
portfolios. 
4.3 Portfolio regressions 
4.3.1 Portfolio regression with two extreme portfolios 
In the first calculation, I form three portfolios, two of them containing banks with extreme high 
and low scores of bank proxies. The HIGH portfolio includes 59 banks with bank proxies of 17 
points or more. The LOW portfolio comprises 66 banks with bank proxies of 2 points or less. The 
remaining 66 banks in the MIDDLE portfolio are not considered. Subsequently, the mean excess 
stock returns of the HIGH and the LOW portfolio are regressed separately on the four multi-factor 
portfolio model specifications as defined in equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4. I estimate the sign and the 
statistical significance of the portfolio alpha as the intercept in these regressions. The OLS 
regressions were estimated employing the monthly observations over the period from January 1995 
to December 2006. The results are reported in table 9.  
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Table III.9: Excess abnormal monthly stock returns (alpha high-low) of the two extreme portfolios of banks with highest and lowest 
disclosure. The Low and High alphas represent the monthly mean abnormal stock return of the 66 banks in the LOW portfolio with bproxies of 2 and 
less, and the 59 banks in the HIGH portfolio with bproxies  of 17 and more. High-Low (bold) denotes the difference of the monthly mean abnormal 
returns of the banks in the HIGH minus the LOW portfolio. Market , HML  (high-minus-low), SMB  (small-minus-big) and Momentum  are 
coefficients of the respective risk prices for volatility, size, book-to-market-cap and momentum. Coefficients and alphas are estimated in multivariate 
regressions of equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of the three-factor 
model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of momentum. The 142 observations represent the number 
of months used in regressions, viz. 11.8 years from January 1995 through December 2006.  
 One-factor   
Three-
factor 
  
Four-factor 
portfolio 
  
Four-factor 
market 
  
Model High-Low Low High High-Low Low High High-low Low High High-low Low High 
Alpha 
0.859* 
(0.427) 
-0.457* 
(0.225) 
0.403# 
(0.227) 
1.085* 
(0.445) 
-0.562* 
(0.234) 
0.523* 
(0.237) 
1.035* 
(0.455) 
-0.542* 
(0.239) 
0.494* 
(0.242) 
1.072* 
(0.450) 
-0.180 
(0.289) 
0.892** 
(0.299) 
Market  0.100 (0.113) 
0.860** 
(0.059) 
0.960** 
(0.060) 
0.096 
(0.112) 
0.863** 
(0.059) 
0.959** 
(0.060) 
0.097 
(0.113) 
0.863** 
(0.059) 
0.959** 
(0.060) 
0.132 
(0.167) 
1.061** 
(0.107) 
1.193** 
(0.111) 
HML     0.128 (0.143) 
-0.044 
(0.075) 
0.084 
(0.076) 
0.117 
(0.145) 
-0.039 
(0.076) 
0.078 
(0.077) 
0.119 
(0.145) 
-0.025 
(0.093) 
0.094 
(0.096) 
SMB     0.119 (0.179) 
-0.094 
(0.094) 
0.024 
(0.095) 
0.118 
(0.180) 
-0.094 
(0.094) 
0.024 
(0.096) 
0.119 
(0.180) 
-0.081 
(0.115) 
0.038 
(0.120) 
Momentum        0.070 (0.132) 
-0.029 
(0.070) 
0.042 
(0.070) 
0.067 
(0.132) 
-0.056 
(0.085) 
0.011 
(0.088) 
Observations  142 142  142 142  142 142  142 142 
2R   0.60 0.65  0.61 0.66  0.61 0.66  0.42 0.46 
# significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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All four high-low alpha intercepts are significant at the 5% level. This two-extreme portfolio model 
specification generates a strikingly large monthly mean abnormal stock return excess of the HIGH 
portfolio on the LOW portfolio from 0.86% to 1.08%, that is about 10% to 12% annually. These 
abnormal stock returns could have been achieved by buying the stocks of the banks in the HIGH 
portfolio and selling short the LOW portfolio over the period from January 1995 to December 
2006.  
Aside from the alphas, both of the volatility risk price coefficients (shown in table 9, 1 in the 
equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4) of the stocks of the banks in the two HIGH and LOW portfolios are close 
to one and statistically significant in all four multi-factor model specifications. The other risk price 
coefficients are not significant on conventional statistic level. Hence, I cannot argue about the 
differences in the responsiveness of the banks’ stock prices with regard to differences in size, book-
to-market caps and/or momentum. 
This strikingly severe punishment of an investment in a portfolio of banks with extremely bad 
transparency of executive remuneration, and concurrently, the stunning financial reward of buying 
stocks of banks with excellent disclosure, raises the question whether the result is robust to other 
portfolio setups or is accidentally dependent of this particular portfolio specification.  
4.3.2 Portfolio regressions with nine systematic portfolio setups 
Since the extreme portfolio division that I followed above may appear somewhat arbitrary, I next 
implement portfolio setups that are constructed by systematically dividing the sample of the 191 
banks into 2 to 10 portfolios and consider the outside portfolios (HIGH and LOW disclosure 
proxies) for each of these setups. By changing portfolio divisions I also check the robustness of 
results achieved above. The variable used for dividing the sample into the portfolios is the bank’s 
individual proxy for the disclosure of executive remuneration. Table 10 contains the values of 
bproxy  that define low and high portfolios and the number of banks in those portfolios. 
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Table III.10: Alternative portfolio constructions. The divisor determining the number of the 
portfolios is the bank proxy. The bproxy  estimates the magnitude of the disclosure of the 
executive remuneration in the annual reports of the 191 banks in 2004 on a scale from 0 to 20 
points (see chapter 3.2 for details). The model setups with 8 and 9 portfolios are identical, 
because there are no banks with disclosure proxies that fall in the interval between cutoff points 
of the 8 and the 9 portfolios. The Low (High) number of banks represents the quantity of banks 
in the portfolio with the lowest (highest)bproxy , determined by the individual bank’s bproxy  
less (more) or equal than. 
 
 Low High
N
um
be
r 
 
of
 p
or
tf
ol
io
s 
bproxy  
less or 
equal than N
um
be
r 
of
 b
an
ks
 
bproxy  
more or 
equal than N
um
be
r 
of
 b
an
ks
 
10 1.90 14 17.10 58 
9 2.11 66 16.89 59 
8 2.38 66 16.63 59 
7 2.71 66 16.29 64 
6 3.17 69 15.83 74 
5 3.80 71 15.20 77 
4 4.75 71 14.25 82 
3 6.33 74 12.67 87 
2 9.50 91 >9.5 100 
 
According to the portfolio regression described above in the case of the extreme portfolio, for each 
of the nine portfolios 2 to 10, I employ the two outside lying portfolios LOW and HIGH, and 
subsequently estimate the monthly mean abnormal stock returns of the respective number of the 
banks in the portfolio by using the four multi-factor model specifications 3.1-1. to 3.1-4. I then 
calculate the abnormal return that could be achieved by buying the stocks of the banks comprised 
in the HIGH disclosure portfolio and selling short the LOW disclosure portfolio by regressing the 
difference of the returns of the two outside portfolios. Table 11 exhibits the results. 
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Table III.11: Abnormal monthly stock returns (alpha) of an investment strategy that is 
long in stocks of banks with highest disclosure and short in stocks of banks with lowest 
disclosure with 9 different portfolio allocations. Alphas are estimated by time-series 
regressions using the four multi-factor model specification 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the prices 
of risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of  the three-factor model 
of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of 
momentum. HIGH-LOW denotes the difference of the monthly abnormal stock returns of the 
banks in the HIGH in excess of the LOW portfolio. The 142 observations represent the number 
of months used in regressions, viz. 11.8 years from January 1995 through December 2006. The 
composition of the number of portfolios is shown and explained in table 10. 
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
po
rt
fo
lio
s One-factor 
model 
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
portfolio  model
Four-factor 
market model 
alpha 
HIGH-LOW 
alpha 
HIGH-LOW 
alpha 
HIGH-LOW 
alpha 
HIGH-LOW 
2 0.607# 0.752* 0.704* 0.741* 
34 0.742* 0.932* 0.887* 0.945* 
4 0.761# 0.956* 0.909* 0.969* 
5 0.799# 1.004* 0.953* 1.005* 
6 0.812* 1.024* 0.979* 1.029* 
7 0.837* 1.065* 1.013* 1.054* 
8 0.859* 1.085* 1.035* 1.072* 
9 0.859* 1.085* 1.035* 1.072* 
10 1.515* 1.900** 1.504* 1.217# 
Mean 0.866 1.089 1.002 1.012 
Median 0.812 1.024 0.979 1.029 
SD 0.256 0.321 0.215 0.128 
Obser- 
vations 142 142 142 142 
# significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Once again, the strategies of investing in a banks’ stocks portfolio with excellent disclosure and 
short-selling the group of banks with the worst transparency of executive remuneration in January 
1995 would have generated monthly mean abnormal stock returns between 0.61% and 1.90% per 
December 2006. Basically all of the results are statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus the 
results in table 9 prove to be largely robust to the respective construction of the portfolio setup. 
The four-factor market model shows the lowest standard deviation of returns in relation to the 
number of subgroups, the three-factor model exhibits the highest variation of returns. Diagram 1 
                                                 
4   Please note that the 3-portfolio in the setup in table 11 is not equivalent with the extreme portfolio in the 
previous table 9, which also contained results for the two extreme portfolios of the sample divided in three 
portfolios altogether, because the allocation in the multi-portfolio approach is different. 
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visually depicts the relation of the difference of the monthly abnormal mean stock returns (alpha) 
of banks in the HIGH minus the LOW portfolio, estimated by the time-series regressions of the 
four different multi-factor models specified in 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, in relation to the number of 
subgroups per portfolio. 
Diagram III.1: Difference of the monthly mean abnormal stock returns between HIGH- 
and LOW portfolios in relation to the number of portfolios 
The results in table 11 and diagram 1 suggest that the higher the spread between the banks in the 
HIGH and the LOW portfolio is, the higher is the reward of investing in the stocks of the banks 
with the best transparency, and concurrently, selling short the stocks of the banks with the poorest 
disclosure in the period from January 1995 to December 1995.  
Next, I address the issue whether the higher monthly abnormal stock returns of the bank portfolios 
with better remuneration transparency coincide with lower responsiveness of their stock returns to 
the four risk price premiums. Similar to the case of the extreme HIGH-LOW portfolio (table 9), 
the differences of the HIGH and LOW market coefficients are small and, like the other risk price 
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coefficients, they are not significant on a conventional statistical level. Only the 10 portfolio setup 
represents an exception. Here the risk price coefficient for volatility and market are statistically 
significant. In the 10 portfolio setup, the HIGH portfolio comprises 58 banks with excellent 
disclosure proxies of 17.10 point and higher, the LOW portfolio contains 14 banks with bad 
transparency of equal or less than 1.90 points. Table 12 shows the results in detail. 
In accordance with the conjectures in the theory section 2 earlier, in the 10-portfolio setup, the 
stock prices of the banks in the HIGH portfolio with disclosure proxies of 17.10 points or higher 
exhibit lower responsiveness and, hence, less volatility to the stock price variance of the portfolio 
and market returns in all four different multi-factor model specifications. The differences of the 
coefficients for the risk price of volatility (1) range between -0.75 and -1.02, statistically significant 
at the 1% level. However, the lower responsiveness does not derive from low volatility risk price 
coefficients of the banks in the HIGH portfolio. Those are ranging between 0.95 and 1.18, thus 
close to 1, meaning that the volatility of the banks’ stocks in the HIGH portfolio vary according to 
the variance of the portfolio in case of the one-, three- and four- factor model, and to the variance 
of the world stock index in case of the four-factor market model. The effect results from the high 
volatility of the banks in the LOW portfolio. Their volatility risk price coefficients range from 1.70 
to 2.20, statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, the volatility of the stocks of those banks 
varies about twice as much as the variance of the portfolio and/or market returns do.   
With regard to the momentum risk price coefficient and in rebuttal to the assumption in the theory 
part, however, the two differences of the momentum coefficient (4 in the equations 3.1.3 and 
3.1.4) of the banks in the HIGH minus the LOW portfolio score positive with 0.56 in the case of 
the four-factor portfolio model and 0.59 in the case of the four-factor market model specification. 
Both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. These remarkably positive and significant 
momentum risk price coefficients might suggest that shareholders of banks that show excellent 
disclosure underreact to information more than those of banks with low transparency, because I 
assume that high momentum is based upon short-term underreaction. I have selected the time 
period of the publication of the annual report 2004 for the estimation of the momentum effect, 
thus deliberately trying to capture exactly the effect of the reaction of the shareholders to the 
comprehensive information about the nexus of the firm performance and the executive 
remuneration. Drilling deeper, however, the momentum risk price coefficients of the banks in the 
HIGH portfolio are close to 0 and thus indeed in accordance with the theoretical conjecture. The 
two momentum coefficients of the LOW portfolio are negative with -0.52 in case of the four-factor 
portfolio model and -0.57 in case of the four-factor market model. Both coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. In line with the above arguments in this particular model specification, 
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these negative values could imply that shareholders have been surprised positively or negatively by 
the content of the annual report and conversely changed the direction of the previous trend - 
although the disclosure of executive remuneration cannot be the root cause of that surprise, 
because as the low disclosure proxy points out, there is not much transparency to expect.   
The results concerning volatility and momentum, however, emerge only in this particular, in terms 
of disclosure proxy spreads most extreme, 10 portfolio set up. Analyzing the other 2-9 portfolio 
setups, the regressions do generally not yield statistically significant differences of the risk price 
coefficients for the book-to-market HML  (high-minus-low), size SMB  (small-minus-big) and 
Momentum . With regard to the volatility coefficient RMRF  (portfolio) and RMSCIRF  (market), 
only the 3 and 4 portfolio setups yield statistically significant differences at the 10% level and at all 
four of the multi-factor specifications. In case of the four-factor market model, also the 2 portfolio 
setup scores a positive difference at the 10% significance level. The magnitude of the differences of 
the market price risk coefficients ranges from +0.28 to +0.18, epitomizing a rather small and not 
particularly noteworthy variation in volatility. Nonetheless, the portfolio setups with smaller spreads 
of disclosure quality indicate that shareholder activity of banks with good disclosure is somewhat 
higher than that of banks with below average transparency of executive remuneration. 
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Table III.12: The 10 portfolios setup. Difference of the abnormal mean monthly stock returns (alpha high-low) of the High minus the Low 
portfolio. The Low and High alphas represent the mean monthly change of the abnormal stock return of the 14 banks in the LOW portfolio with 
bproxy  of 1.9 and less, and the 58 banks in the HIGH portfolio with bproxies  of 171 and more. High-Low denotes the difference of the monthly 
abnormal returns of the banks in the HIGH minus the LOW portfolio. Market , HML  (high-minus-low), SMB  (small-minus-big) and Momentum  are 
coefficients of the respective risk prices for volatility, size, book-to-market-cap and momentum. Coefficients and alphas are estimated in multivariate 
regressions of equations 3.1-1 to 3.1-4, controlled for the prices of risk of volatility in case of the one-factor model, in addition in case of  the three-factor 
model of size and book-to-market cap, and in addition in case of the two four-factor models of momentum. The 142 observations represent the number 
of months used in regressions, viz. 11.8 years from January 1995 through December 2006 
 
10 portfolio 
setups 
One-factor   Three-factor   
Four-factor 
portfolio 
  
Four-factor 
market 
  
 High-Low Low High High-Low Low High High-low Low High High-low Low High 
Alpha 
1.515* 
(0.659) 
-1.105* 
(0.556) 
0.410# 
(0.229) 
1.900** 
(0.687) 
-1.372* 
(0.582) 
0.528* 
(0.239) 
1.504* 
(0.685) 
-1.008# 
(0.577) 
0.497* 
(0.245) 
1.217# 
(0.684) 
-0.326 
(0.638) 
0.891** 
(0.300) 
Market  -0.757** (0.174) 
1.706** 
(0.147) 
0.949** 
(0.061) 
-0.759** 
(0.173) 
1.706** 
(0.147) 
0.948** 
(0.060) 
-0.750** 
(0.169) 
1.699** 
(0.143) 
0.949** 
(0.061) 
-1.017** 
(0.255) 
2.195** 
(0.237) 
1.178** 
(0.112) 
HML     0.305 (0.221) 
-0.220 
(0.187) 
0.085 
(0.077) 
0.220 
(0.218) 
-0.141 
(0.184) 
0.079 
(0.078) 
0.204 
(0.221) 
-0.110 
(0.206) 
0.094 
(0.097) 
SMB     -0.006 (0.277) 
0.024 
(0.235) 
0.018 
(0.096) 
-0.010 
(0.270) 
0.027 
(0.228) 
0.018 
(0.097) 
-0.016 
(0.273) 
0.047 
(0.255) 
0.031 
(0.120) 
Momentum        0.564** (0.199) 
-0.519** 
(0.168) 
0.045 
(0.071) 
0.588** 
(0.202) 
-0.573** 
(0.188) 
0.015 
(0.089) 
Observations  142 142  142 142  142 142  142 142 
2R   0.49 0.64  0.50 0.64  0.53 0.65  0.41 0.45 
# significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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5 Conclusion 
In this analysis, I examine the hypothesis that better transparency of executive remuneration 
explains better stock performance proxied by the abnormal monthly stock returns. The absolute 
returns are controlled for the risk prices of stock volatility, size and book-to-market effects and 
potential short-term underreactions to information, i.e. the momentum effect. The theoretical 
concept states that, on the one hand, the comprehensive disclosure of the nexus of executive’s pay 
and the company’s performance induces better and contemporary accountability, resulting in better 
firm profitability and, eventually higher absolute stock performance. On the other hand, good 
transparency of the executive remuneration may create higher shareholder trust and commitment, 
generating lower responsiveness and stock price volatility with regard to the stock market, the 
different sizes and book-to-market ratios, and the short-time reactions towards information. Both 
effects, alternatively and/or concurrently, would eventually lead to higher abnormal stock returns.  
I analyze and quantify the magnitude of executive remuneration disclosure of the world’s 191 
largest exchange-listed banks, using annual reports as the primary source of information, and the 
diverse disclosure rules in the 29 countries in which these banks are domiciled. Using an 
international sample of 29 countries with accordingly different currencies, risk free rates, stock 
markets and the like, a method for the detailed estimation of the monthly mean abnormal stock 
returns is developed. Four multi-factor CAPM models are construed and the monthly abnormal 
stock returns are estimated by multi-factor time-series regressions for the time period from January 
1995 to December 2006 on a monthly base for each bank. 
To investigate possible connections between the quality of executive remuneration and stock 
returns, I use time series-stock returns for the period 1995 to 2006, whereas the data on disclosure 
is available as of 2003 and/or 2004. Examination of annual reports for other years that were 
available showed that transparency levels remained about the same for the years before and after 
2004. Corporate governance structures of firms, whereof the disclosure of the executive 
remuneration is a vital part, evolve relatively stable since 1990 (Gompers et al. 2001). Corporate 
governance systems are interrelated with the law paradigm and the market system of a country (La 
Porta et al. 1997, 1999, and part I of this thesis), both are persistent over long time periods. The 
form and content of annual reports of firms are generally constant and comparable over the years 
(Lang and Lundholm 2000). In conclusion, I conjecture that the essence of these arguments allows 
for a long-term study of the relationship of stock prices and the transparency of executive 
remuneration. 
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The evidence suggests that, first, the monthly mean abnormal stock returns of portfolios 
comprising banks with good disclosure of executive remuneration are higher than those of bank 
portfolios with low transparency. Second, the higher the spread of good and bad disclosure of 
executive remuneration is, the higher is the difference of the monthly abnormal stock returns of the 
banks portfolios. An investment strategy that buys the stocks of the portfolio with the banks 
exhibiting above-average disclosure and selling short the stocks of the portfolio with the banks 
showing below-average transparency would have yielded annually mean abnormal stock returns of 
strikingly high 7.l2% to 9.0% annually, depending on which of the four estimation models is 
applied. These findings are robust to nine different portfolio setups, statistically significant 
predominantly at the 5% level and confirmed by all four multi-factor model specifications that were 
employed to estimate the abnormal returns. Thus, the results coincide with Gompers et al. (2001 
and 2003), who find a 8.4% return in a similar approach with regard to provisions against good 
corporate governance. Third, with respect to the two risk price coefficients for book-to-market 
HML (high-minus-low) and size SMB (small-minus-big), the regressions of the portfolio setups do 
not generate significant results, indicating that in this sample and in this research setup, the 
differences in the size of the banks and the varying market evaluation of book equity do not show 
different shareholder behaviour. Fourth, with respect to market risk price factor, the portfolio 
setups with smaller spreads of disclosure quality indicate that shareholder activity of banks with 
good disclosure is somewhat higher than shareholder activity of banks with below-average 
transparency of executive remuneration. Fifth and contrastingly, considering the difference of the 
extreme portfolio of the banks with the very best disclosure versus the banks with the lowest 
disclosure, however, the stock volatility of the latter turns out to be much higher and thus 
consistent with the theory.  
The strikingly large and statistically significant reward of abnormal monthly stock returns by 
investing in the stocks of bank portfolios with excellent and selling short stocks of bank portfolios 
with poor disclosure of executive remuneration might motivate to analyze open issues in future 
studies: Is this effect sustainable across other industries than finance institutions and or other, 
longer and or shorter time periods? Due to the high pricing errors of the monthly abnormal stock 
returns on an individual bank level, I have not been able to test for omitted variables and 
endogeneity. Other research setups might want to find a way to mitigate that problem and be able 
to test multivariate approaches.  
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 CONCLUSIONS/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The first part of this thesis analyzes and quantifies the magnitude of executive remuneration 
disclosure of the world’s 245 largest exchange-listed banks, using annual reports as the primary 
source of information, and the diverse disclosure rules in the 31 countries in which these banks are 
domiciled. Descriptive statistics suggests that banks located in common law countries have higher 
(more than three times in terms of the quantifying proxy) disclosure compared to banks in civil law 
countries. Banks in common law countries generally surpass country-level disclosure requirements, 
whereas those in countries with civil law tradition fall short. Using factor analysis and regression 
analysis, the evidence supports a statistically stronger relationship of disclosure quality with systemic 
determinants like law paradigm and type of financial system than with market size effects. 
The second part addresses the question whether better disclosure of executive remuneration 
explains lower risk premiums demanded by investors and/or better stock performance. The 
evidence suggests that better disclosure significantly corresponds with and supports higher Sharpe 
ratios and higher Tobin’s qs. With respect to price-earnings ratios, lower risk premiums - and thus 
higher price/earnings ratios - can be supported by better disclosure if a special gauging of the 
outlier is applied. 
The third part hypothesizes that better disclosure supports higher abnormal stock returns 
controlled for the risk prices of volatility, size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. The evidence 
suggests that an investment strategy that buys the stocks of the half of the banks with above-
average disclosure of executive remuneration and sells short the stocks of the half of the banks with 
below-average disclosure generates a (striking) 8.4% annually mean abnormal return between 
January 1995 and December 2006. The result is robust to varied portfolio compositions and 
different model specifications.  
This thesis focuses on the largest banks of the world. With regard to financial institutions and in 
contrast to other fixed-assets dominated industries, the pithy saying is that at the end of each 
working day, the most important asset leaves the firm and re-enters it the next morning. Hence, 
future research might have to analyze whether these positive effects of good executive 
remuneration transparency on capital costs and stock performance withstand other industries.   
Disclosure of executive remuneration is, principally, vital to the adoption of appropriately 
structured incentive contracts, in that it can manage the agency costs of the nexus of executives’ 
performance and pay. Throughout the years that I have been working on this thesis, the issue of 
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disclosure of executive remuneration has remained an international cause célèbre, coinciding with 
growing public unease about the absolutely spiralling pay levels of CEOs that might have become 
dangerously delinked from performance. Concluding from this synopsis, the countries’ regulators 
and security exchange commissions, shareholders and chief executives should be motivated to 
consciously vote for the enactment of rules and regulations as well as the execution of more 
comprehensive transparency of executive remuneration. Last but not least, CEOs should look at 
the comprehensive disclosure of their remuneration as an opportunity rather than a thread or 
obligation.
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Legal system origins and antidirector rights of shareholders 
 
English origin 
 
French origin 
 
German origin 
Australia 4 Belgium 0 Austria  2 
Canada 4 Brazil 3 China 3 
India 2 France 2 Germany 1 
Ireland 3 Greece 1 Japan 3 
Israel 3 Indonesia 2 South Korea 2 
Malaysia 3 Italy 0 Switzerland 1 
Singapore 3 Netherlands 2 Taiwan 3 
South Africa 4 Portugal 2 AVG: 2.1 
Thailand 3 Spain 2  
Scandinavian origin 
UK 4 Turkey 2 
US 5 AVG:  1.6 Denmark 3 
AVG: 3.5   Sweden 2 
    AVG: 2.5 
Islamic origin: Saudi Arabia 1 
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Appendix 2: Country classification of market- versus bank-centered system  
COUNTRY 
 
Financial 
system 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
in million USD in % of GNP 
Australia market 776,402.76 115.00% 
Austria bank 87,776.27 22.30% 
Belgium bank 211,000.00 81.00% 
Brazil bank 330,346.57 46.00% 
Canada market 1,177,517.65 102.50% 
China bank 1,308,000.00 78.10% 
Denmark market 155,232.61 55.70% 
France bank 2,441,261.38 76.40% 
Germany bank 1,194,516.79 44.90% 
Greece bank 121,921.39 59.90% 
India bank 363,276.02 42.50% 
Indonesia bank 73,250.64 22.50% 
Ireland market 114,085.90 55.90% 
Israel bank 90,157.87 62.60% 
Italy bank 789,562.62 41.90% 
Japan bank 5,844,000.00 114.20% 
Malaysia market 181,623.79 156.00% 
Netherlands market 494,160.00 92.00% 
Portugal bank 66,612.00 45.00% 
Saudi Arabia bank 306,000.00 82.00% 
Singapore market 217,617.78 190.00% 
South Africa market 442,525.47 163.10% 
South Korea market 389,473.36 48.50% 
Spain bank 940,672.88 86.60% 
Sweden market 376,781.08 96.10% 
Switzerland bank 826,040.81 227.50% 
Taiwan bank 441,435.78 132.50% 
Thailand bank 115,390.38 83.10% 
Turkey market 98,298.85 28.50% 
UK market 2,865,243.18 136.40% 
USA market 16,232,000.00 181.00% 
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Appendix 3: Total assets, book capital and pretax profit per country 
 
COUNTRY 
N
um
be
r 
of
 
lis
te
d 
ba
nk
s 
All banks (million USD) 
 
 
Average per bank (million USD) 
 
Total assets Book capital Pretax profits Total assets Book capital Pretax profits
Australia 6 756,135 37,608 10,609 126,023 6,268 1,768
Austria 2 183,190 5,617 1,053 91,595 2,809 527
Belgium 3 1,262,255 40,810 6,761 420,752 13,603 2,254
Brazil 4 205,891 15,759 5,180 51,473 3,940 1,295
Canada 6 1,170,750 55,282 11,694 195,125 9,214 1,949
China 8 1,331,454 47,758 2,796 166,432 5,970 350
Denmark 2 328,129 10,825 2,341 164,065 5,413 1,171
France 3 2,775,556 109,289 20,822 925,185 36,430 6,941
Germany 8 2,837,482 76,129 -1,121 354,685 9,516 -140
Greece 5 169,422 10,715 1,703 33,884 2,143 341
India 5 109,478 4,957 1,855 21,896 991 371
Indonesia 2 45,209 2,910 1,202 22,605 1,455 601
Ireland 5 520,573 17,429 4,108 104,115 3,486 822
Israel 4 120,979 6,434 810 30,245 1,609 203
Italy 12 1,575,361 76,811 12,157 131,280 6,401 1,013
Japan 61 6,639,594 240,090 15,173 108,846 3,936 249
Malaysia 2 32,420 3,163 489 16,210 1,582 245
Netherlands 3 1,366,263 47,973 8,955 455,421 15,991 2,985
Portugal 3 173,233 9,653 1,377 57,744 3,218 459
Saudi Arabia 3 57,470 6,477 1,353 19,157 2,159 451
Singapore 3 210,218 16,054 2,509 70,073 5,351 836
South Africa 5 239,714 11,783 3,152 47,943 2,357 630
South Korea 6 472,509 17,689 632 78,752 2,948 105
Spain 5 941,868 48,679 12,254 188,374 9,736 2,451
Sweden 4 818,030 30,277 6,126 204,508 7,569 1,532
Switzerland 5 1,956,998 46,226 11,755 391,400 9,245 2,351
Taiwan 5 178,631 7,449 704 35,726 1,490 141
Thailand 3 83,681 5,506 889 27,894 1,835 296
Turkey 4 74,246 10,308 2,288 18,562 2,577 572
UK 11 4,399,072 192,883 40,519 399,916 17,535 3,684
USA 47 6,211,976 393,796 122,969 132,170 8,379 2,616
SUM 245 37,247,787 1,606,339 311,850 5,092,050 205,153 38,855
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Appendix 4: Enactment of disclosure of top executive remuneration 
  Form of legal 
Enactment 
Date of 
enactment 
Disclosure 
is 
Disclosure
period 
Form of 
disclosure
Distribution 
of information
Disclosure of 
remuneration policy
Individual 
disclosure 
Individ. disclosure of 
cash compensation 
Disclosure of 
stock options   
Australia listing rule 2001 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
Austria law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 agg 1 
Belgium law 2001 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
Brazil listing rule 2003 mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 no 0 no 0 agg 1 
Canada law n.a. mandatory annually sepr 3 sent yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
China none n.a. none none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
Denmark law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 agg 1 
France law 2002 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Germany law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
Greece law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
India listing rule n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Indonesia none n.a. none none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
Ireland listing rule 2005 mandatory annually ar 2 ar yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Israel none n.a. none none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
Italy law 1999 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Japan law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 no 0 agg 1 agg 1 
Malaysia listing rule 2001 mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 voluntary 0 agg 1 yes 2 
Netherlands law 2002 mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Portugal law n.a. mandatory annually sepr 3 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
Saudi Arabia law 1995 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 no 0 
Singapore listing rule n.a. voluntary none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
South Africa listing rule 2002 mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
South Korea none n.a. none none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
Spain law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 agg 1 
Sweden binding annex 2002 mandatory annually ar 2 agm yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
Switzerland listing rule 2002 mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 yes 2 
Taiwan law n.a. mandatory annually ar 2 agm no 0 no 0 agg 1 yes 2 
Thailand none n.a. none none none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
Turkey guideline 2003 voluntary annually none 0 none no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 
UK law 2002 mandatory annually sepr 3 sent yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
USA law 1992 mandatory annually ar 2 sent yes 1.5 yes 3 yes 2 yes 2 
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  DISCLOSURE OF DISCLOSURE OF SHARE TRANSACTIONS OF Disclosure of SUM 
disclosure 
proxy   
long-term 
incentive plans 
pensions loans 
non-monetary 
benefits 
executives related persons 
transactions to be 
reported to 
Australia no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 Australian Stock Exchange 5.0 
Austria no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 financial authority 5.0 
Belgium no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 3.0 
Brazil no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 public 6.5 
Canada yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 public 19.0 
China no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
Denmark no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 public 6.0 
France no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 10.0 
Germany no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 financial authority 5.0 
Greece no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 4.0 
India yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 no 0 no 0 no 0 directors report to board only 14.0 
Indonesia no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
Ireland yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 public 19.0 
Israel no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
Italy no 0 no 0 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 public 13.0 
Japan no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 6.5 
Malaysia yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 stock exchange 15.0 
Netherlands rec 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 public 11.5 
Portugal no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 5.0 
Saudi Arabia agg 0.5 agg 1 agg 0.5 agg 0.5 no 0 no 0 shareholders 5.5 
Singapore no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 1.0 
South Africa yes 1.5 yes 2 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 15.0 
South Korea no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
Spain agg 0.5 agg 1 no 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 no 0 stock exchange 6.5 
Sweden yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes 0 public 16.5 
Switzerland no 0 no 0 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 not to be reported 10.0 
Taiwan no 0 yes 2 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 public 12.0 
Thailand no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
Turkey no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 no 0 not to be reported 0.0 
UK yes 1.5 yes 2 voluntary 0 no 0 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 stock exchange 17.0 
USA yes 1.5 yes 2 yes 1.5 yes 1.5 yes+ad hoc 1 yes+ad hoc 1 public 19.0 
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Appendix 5: Country proxy, banks average proxy and deviation per country 
COUNTRY 
Country 
proxy 
Banks average 
proxy 
Deviation 
USA 19.0 18.83 -0.17 
Canada 19.0 18.50 -0.50 
Ireland 19.0 17.80 -1.20 
UK 17.0 16.86 -0.14 
Sweden 16.5 15.88 -0.63 
South Africa 15.0 12.30 -2.70 
Malaysia 15.0 8.25 -6.75 
India 14.0 5.90 -8.10 
Italy 13.0 13.33 0.33 
Taiwan 12.0 3.10 -8.90 
Netherlands 11.5 17.33 5.83 
France 10.0 12.67 2.67 
Switzerland 10.0 8.30 -1.70 
Spain 6.5 11.20 4.70 
Japan 6.5 2.11 -4.30 
Brazil 6.5 0.25 -6.25 
Denmark 6.0 8.50 2.50 
Saudi Arabia 5.5 4.17 -1.33 
Australia 5.0 13.25 8.25 
Austria 5.0 10.0 5.00 
Germany 5.0 9.63 4.63 
Portugal 5.0 8.67 3.67 
Greece 4.0 3.30 -0.70 
Belgium 3.0 9.50 6.50 
Singapore 1.0 11.67 10.67 
Thailand 0 13.83 13.83 
Israel 0 8.50 8.50 
China 0 2.19 2.19 
Indonesia 0 1.50 1.50 
Turkey 0 0.38 0.38 
South Korea 0 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix 6: Data base for comparison of country versus banks proxy sorted by law system  
COUNTRY Countryproxy 
Banks 
proxy 
Law 
origin 
Number of 
Banks 
Canada 19.00 18.50 common 6
Ireland 19.00 17.80 common 5
USA 19.00 18.83 common 47
UK 17.00 16.86 common 11
Malaysia 15.00 8.25 common 2
South Africa 15.00 12.30 common 5
India 14.00 5.90 common 5
Australia 5.00 13.25 common 6
Singapore 1.00 11.67 common 3
Israel 0.00 8.50 common 4
Thailand 0.00 13.83 common 3
Weighted average 
common 
15.04 15.69 common 97 
Sweden 16.50 15.88 civil 4
Italy 13.00 13.33 civil 12
Taiwan 12.00 3.10 civil 5
Netherlands 11.50 17.33 civil 3
France 10.00 12.67 civil 3
Switzerland 10.00 8.30 civil 5
Spain 6.50 11.20 civil 5
Brazil 6.50 0.25 civil 4
Japan 6.50 2.11 civil 61
Denmark 6.00 8.50 civil 2
Saudi Arabia 5.50 4.17 civil 3
Austria 5.00 10.00 civil 2
Germany 5.00 9.63 civil 8
Portugal 5.00 8.67 civil 3
Greece 4.00 3.30 civil 5
Belgium 3.00 9.50 civil 3
China 0.00 2.19 civil 8
Indonesia 0.00 1.50 civil 2
South Korea 0.00 0.00 civil 6
Turkey 0.00 0.38 civil 4
Weighted average 
civil 
6.34 5.06 civil 148 
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Appendix 7:  Remarks on disclosure enactment and corporate governance in Japan and Saudi 
Arabia 
Japan 
Kato and Katsuyuki (2003) estimates do not support that Japanese corporate governance is unusually 
defunct with regard to the significance and size of the sensitivity of CEO compensation to accounting 
profitability. On the other hand, to be consistent with the literature on Japanese corporate governance 
that tends to downplay the role of shareholders and stress the role of banks and employees, they find that 
stock market performance tends to play a less important role in the determination of Japanese CEO 
compensation. In short, the interests of shareholders are somewhat diluted in the Japanese corporate 
governance system as a result of the strong presence of the interests of other constituencies (e.g., 
debtholders and employees) in the Japanese corporate governance system. The diluted interests of 
shareholders in the Japanese corporate governance imply that the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm 
performance, in particular stock market performance, may be weakened in Japan. 
Dow and McGuire (2004): In addition to the overall patterns of ownership and financing described 
above, keiretsu groupings play a critical role in the Japanese economy. There are six commonly 
recognized horizontal keiretsu: Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and Dai Ichi Kango. These 
long-standing historical relationships reinforce the in-group debt and equity holdings of keiretsu firms. 
The 16 ownership structure of firms is dominated by group holdings (the main bank and its affiliates), 
which range from 23%-42% (Gerlach (1992); Hoshi (1994)). Moreover, shares in keiretsu firms are less 
frequently traded and when traded, they are likely to be placed with a previous shareholder, usually a 
keiretsu member (Johnston and McAlevey (1998)). 
Saudi Arabia 
The Union of Arab Banks (2003) has conducted research on public listed companies in Saudi Arabia. The 
main conclusions are: 
1. There is a high concentration in corporate ownership undermining the principles of good 
Corporate Governance. 
2. Substantial family corporate holdings compose the bulk of ownership and control of 
companies. 
3. Boards of directors are dominated by controlling shareholders, while friends and relatives 
constitute the board of directors in many instances. 
 137
4. There is rarely any separation between ownership and management. It is rare to find 
independent directors. 
5. Corporate Governance is not a priority in most companies, which results in lack of 
transparency and disclosure, further resulting in nepotism and corruption. 
Transparency and disclosure in Saudi Arabia (Nasser 2004):  In the 1990s Saudi Arabia sought to 
restructure its economy through programs of liberalization, privatization, and diversification away from 
oil dependencies. A framework of modernization and reform is widening the scope for private sector 
participation in economic activity. The Saudi authorities prepared and issued a Capital Markets Law, 
which was solidified in 2003, through the creation of the Supreme Economic Council, and the Saudi 
Arabian General Investment Authority.  
Listed companies are expected to report annually and quarterly about their financial statements and to set 
up audit committees. The monitoring and enforcement of reporting and the disclosure standards has 
been problematic due to the absence of a securities regulatory group primarily responsible for monitoring 
and overseeing disclosure. Disclosure is rarely done on a voluntary basis. 
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Appendix 8: Panel data set-adjusted P/E ratio of banks per country  
COUNTRY 
N
um
be
r 
 
of
 b
an
ks
 
Country 
proxy 
P/E 
country 
equity 
Banks 
proxy 
Average 
banks P/E
Average banks 
def.-adjusted 
P/E 
L-T. Int. 
rate, 10y 
Australia 6 5.00 17.23 13.25 11.40 11.40 5.77% 
Austria 2 5.00 16.13 10.00 3.76 4.15 4.43% 
Belgium 3 3.00 12.38 9.50 7.08 7.08 4.50% 
Brazil 4 6.50 9.95 0.25 2.74 3.25 13.05% 
Canada 6 19.00 20.84 18.50 7.78 7.87 5.18% 
China 8 0.00 14.83 2.19 12.66 10.75 5.50% 
Denmark 2 6.00 14.27 8.50 5.18 5.18 4.78% 
France 3 10.00 14.67 12.67 4.84 4.90 4.50% 
Germany 8 5.00 15.66 9.63 -0.93 6.92 4.50% 
Greece 5 4.00 19.63 3.30 16.68 14.83 4.43% 
India 5 14.00 19.59 5.90 4.47 5.82 7.00% 
Indonesia 2 0.00 16.74 1.50 5.94 6.57 12.38% 
Ireland 5 19.00 17.80 1.50 5.94 6.57 4.50% 
Israel 4 0.00 n.a. 8.50 0.00 n.a. 7.00% 
Italy 12 13.00 14.53 13.33 9.15 9.15 4.50% 
Japan 61 6.50 42.39 2.11 6.12 13.52 1.42% 
Malaysia 2 15.00 14.28 8.25 14.25 14.25 4.65% 
Netherlands 3 11.50 17.46 17.33 7.17 7.76 4.33% 
Portugal 3 5.00 15.79 8.67 15.50 15.50 4.43% 
Saudi Arabia 3 5.50 n.a. 4.17 0.00 n.a. 7.00% 
Singapore 3 1.00 12.84 11.67 7.68 8.75 3.62% 
South Africa 5 15.00 10.61 12.30 9.38 8.28 11.48% 
South Korea 6 0.00 10.86 0.00 542.60 7.76 5.24% 
Spain 5 6.50 16.07 11.20 8.15 8.15 4.43% 
Switzerland 5 10.00 18.30 7.80 7.82 8.00 3.01% 
Sweden 4 16.50 15.73 15.88 6.57 6.57 4.81% 
Taiwan 5 12.00 13.22 3.10 8.79 11.26 5.11% 
Thailand 3 0.00 10.04 13.83 8.90 8.90 5.11% 
Turkey 4 0.00 15.93 0.38 13.62 13.85 19.00% 
UK 11 17.00 18.45 16.86 5.47 7.60 4.87% 
USA 47 19.00 18.47 18.83 9.75 9.90 4.86% 
SUM 245       
Unweighted 
mean 
 8.06 16.33 8.74 24.79 8.78 5.98% 
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Appendix 9: Determining the optimal momentum periods 
To estimate momentum by the share price development at the lagging and formation period prior 
to June 2005, a momentum proxy is constructed. The difference of the share price from the end of 
the formation period to the start of the formation period in percent and the respective stock price 
difference in the lagging period are combined by multiplication if the price change of the formation 
and lagging period point in the same direction. The product of the stock price differences instead 
of the sum is chosen to achieve higher amplitudes when formation and lagging period exhibit price 
variation with the same skew. 
If the price deviation of the formation and lagging period point in different directions then the 
momentum proxy is assessed as zero. If both formation and lagging period show negative price 
evolvement then the momentum proxy is defined as the negative absolute product of the respective 
price changes. In case both periods yield positive results, the momentum proxy is determined as the 
positive product of the particular price differences. 
The different length of the formation and lagging period requires that the magnitude of price 
changes be adjusted accordingly. To take that effect into account, the momentum proxy will be 
divided by the respective sum of the number of months of the formation and lagging period. Thus 
it is possible to compare cleanly adjusted periods of price changes.  
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The results of the calculation are exhibited in the following table: 
 
Price differ. formation 3
Price differ. lagging 3
proxy momentum 4.14
Price differ. formation 6
Price differ. lagging 3
proxy momentum 8.27
Price differ. formation 6
Price differ. lagging 6
proxy momentun 13.17
Price differ. formation 9
Price differ. lagging 3
proxy momentum 9.74
Price differ. formation 9
Price differ. lagging 6
proxy momentum 34.09
Price differ. formation 9
Price differ. lagging 9
proxy momentum 9.17
Price differ. formation 12
Price differ. lagging 3
proxy momentum 6.30
Price differ. formation 12
Price differ. lagging 6
proxy momentum 31.77
Price differ. formation 12
Price differ. lagging 9
proxy momentum 16.70
Price differ. formation 12
Price differ. lagging 12
proxy momentum 36.70
 
The highest momentum effect in stock prices of the 191 banks is at the formation period of 12 
months and the following lagging period of 12 months also. The second and third highest 
momentum cases are with 9 months formation and 6 months lagging and, accordingly, 12 month 
formation and 6 month lagging. This study will continue to analyze the strongest momentum case 
of 12/12 months only. 
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